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Abstract 
The National Clinical Director of Mental Health for NHS England has said that we need 
to ‘dump Descartes’, and the authors of one of psychiatry’s principal diagnostic manuals 
have stated that the term mental disorder is a dualistic anachronism. Existing critical 
challenges to dualism, including affect theory, new materialism and phenomenology, 
have sought to reinstate meaning for the material body, and biomedical work exploring 
the immune system, epigenetics and the microbiome-gut-brain axis suggests that mind 
over matter is an untenable principle. Moreover, UK government health strategies have 
come to recognise the relationship between mental and physical health outcomes and 
are increasingly focused on connecting up care. However, mind and body dualism is 
deeply and habitually ingrained in medical practice, healthcare structures and research 
silos. Despite efforts focused on integration, the dominating influence of psychiatric 
discourse and the focus on mental health within the confines of the head continue to 
reinforce the split. Working with a transdisciplinary critical medical humanities 
framework, and guided by feminist criticism gesturing towards making social change, 
this thesis critiques dominant models of mental health focused on immaterial thoughts 
or brain dysfunction, both of which overwrite embodied dimensions of experience. It 
argues that mental health involves physical beings in constant contact with the world 
and that without a shift in the language, the social, corporeal and environmental aspects 
of mental health remain tacked on to problematically individualised and internalised 
constructs. To go against the grain of language, the thesis then moves on to find 
appropriate tools and models with which to conceptualise non-dualist ontologies and to 
gesture towards an embodied model of mental health. It concludes that a radical shift in 
mental health research and practice is urgently needed that drops out of the head and 
into the ‘being-body’. 
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Introduction  
 
Overview: Mind and Matter 
‘Mental’ dis/orders1 are arguably the subject of more analysis than they ever have been 
before in the UK; framed as an urgent and pressing personal, social, political and 
economic problem.  This may be connected to some key movements and developments. 
First, the rapid growth in new biological sciences like neuroscience with disorders once 
considered to be non-organic, or socially constructed, now being increasingly researched 
as individual brain dysfunctions. Second, the importance of tackling health has risen to 
the top of the policy agenda – the British Prime Minister, Theresa May, put mental 
health services and support at the centre of her 2017 annual lecture at the Charity 
Commission and, in health policy, mental health has repeatedly been offered ‘parity of 
esteem’ with physical health.2 Third, there has been a vigorous focus on destigmatising 
mental illness with personal narratives from celebrity figures3, the UK Royal Family4 and 
even mental health policy makers5 foregrounding the subject – and centralising the need 
to talk about mental illness.6 Literary memoirs, newspaper articles, television and film 
representations, and social media accounts have circulated narratives about individual 
experiences of ‘mental’ dis/order. Across these powerful medical and scientific, political 
and cultural discourses, mental health is largely contained to the individual; located as 
psychology in the head (as opposed to the broader physical body or related to the social 
                                                          
1 I will discuss the use of the slash and inverted commas in ‘mental’ dis/order on page 33. 
2 Gov.uk, ‘Press Release: Prime Minister unveils plans to transform mental health support’, 19 January 2017 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-unveils-plans-to-transform-mental-health-
support> [accessed 9 July 2017]. 
3 Hollie Brotherton, ’23 celebrities speak honestly about their mental health battles, Marie Claire, 5 January 
2017 <http://www.marieclaire.co.uk/news/celebrity-news/celebrities-speak-out-about-mental-health-12047> 
[accessed 9 July 2017]. 
4 Heads Together, <https://www.headstogether.org.uk/about-heads-together/> [accessed 9 July 2017]. 
5 Megha Mohan, ‘The NHS mental health chief who had a nervous breakdown’, BBC News, 23 January 2017 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-trending-38720826> [accessed 9 July 2017]. 
6 Time to Change, ‘About Mental Health’ < http://www.time-to-change.org.uk/mental-health-statistics-
facts> [accessed 9 July 2017]. 
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world) and often located in the function of the brain. These models broadly speak to a 
Cartesian mind over matter – or mind over body – model of selfhood. 
From totally different perspectives, there has been a call for the meaning of 
mental illness or ‘mental’ dis/order to be investigated and uprooted beyond the 
dominant medical models of these internalised psychological or neurological 
frameworks; this has included research within critical psychiatry, critical mental health 
studies, sociology and medical anthropology. Concerns about the globalisation and 
medicalisation – and the increasingly brain-centred emphasis of psychiatry – have drawn 
considerable bodies of research. Perhaps most especially, the power structures implicit in 
psychiatry’s classifications of order and disorder have been disassembled by anti-
psychiatry critiques from the 1960s onwards, and are still articulated in protests against 
the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (most recently DSM-5) in recent years.7 Further, analysis by the French 
philosopher Michel Foucault has led and inspired criticism that has interrogated how 
individual and cultural narratives and understandings about mental health are led and 
shaped by powerful medical discourse.8 
In the last decade, there has also been a move from within healthcare policy and 
the National Health Service (NHS) in the UK towards a sort of self-critique by stitching 
together physical and mental healthcare into an integrated approach and articulating the 
fundamental connectivity of mental and physical health outcomes.9 Additionally, 
research from the fields of cognitive science and systems theory has underpinned the 
notion of embodiment as a ‘major paradigm of psychopathology’ (again shifting the 
                                                          
7 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition 
(DSM-5) (Washington DC: American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
8 Michael Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, transl. by Alan Sheridan 
(Tavistock, 1973; Oxon: Routledge Classics, 2003).  
9 Geraldine Strathdee (NHS England), ‘Integrated Care: 3 years of Progress and “Jugular” Actions Needed’, 
presentation to The King’s Fund, March 2016. 
<http://www.kingsfund.org.uk/sites/files/kf/media/Geraldine_Strathdee_integrating_physical_mental_healt
h.pdf > [accessed 8 July 2017]. 
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boundaries of ‘mental’ dis/order).10 Furthermore, and much more broadly, the corporeal 
and material turns in critical theory have seen the multiple meanings of the body 
brought to the critical surface and the notion of the embodied mind theorised and 
located in a number of disciplinary spaces in the humanities and social sciences, 
particularly mobilised by affect theory, phenomenology and feminist and new materialist 
positions.  
However, despite all these challenges to the structures and assumptions in the 
classification and location of ‘mental’ dis/order, there is, within current healthcare 
policy, public health narratives and clinical practice, an arguably unrelenting bias to a 
Cartesian model. The implicit ontological meaning of ‘mental’ health is often overlooked 
in clinical practice, which is focused on the action of treatment, not interpretation, and 
which lacks a language or conceptual framework within which to deconstruct how the 
language and narratives of ‘mental’ health and illness may be complicit with dualism, 
and what the meaning and implications of this dualism might be.  
I suggest that this is a problematic gap in understanding how the language and 
narratives of ‘mental’ disorder impact on how it is experienced, and how it is dealt with 
therapeutically. This thesis, therefore, aims to set up an intervention in terms of the way 
in which healthcare is conceptualised, arguing that a failure to problematise the 
language of ‘mental’ health means a continual fall-back into dualist mind over matter 
assumptions. My thesis enters here to examine and interrogate the meaning of the word 
‘mental’; to draw in critical, theoretical work from humanities disciplines to dig beneath 
that which sediments and has become naturalised in this word, and to suggest that its 
neurological and psychological underpinnings have translated into both popular and 
policy vocabularies, bringing with them an inherent and unexamined dualism. I suggest 
that this dualism relates to positive, self-determining ideas of mind over matter, the 
                                                          
10 Thomas Fuchs and Jann E. Schlimme, ‘Embodiment and Psychopathology: A Phenomenological 
Perspective’, Current Opinion in Psychiatry 22 (2009), 570–575, p. 575. 
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body as a project or object, neo-liberalist individualism and is limiting in both defining 
and treating ‘mental’ illness. 
The aims of this project are twofold; first, to interrogate the main definitions and 
models underpinning mental healthcare in the UK today. Here, I aim to conduct a 
discursive analysis of the multiple meanings of ‘mental’ dis/order in terms of where they 
emanate from, how they are positioned and by whom. This means analysing the form, 
shape and function of different narratives and words, and their involvement in – and co-
construction of – ‘mental’ health experience. Second, I aim to search for appropriate 
analytic tools and concepts to re-infuse understanding of ‘mental’ health with the 
vibrating matter of physical life – ultimately signalling to a kind of depth ‘mental’ body, 
which I go on to term the ‘being-body’. This thesis thus enters into the critical medical 
humanities, where an emphasis on challenging ‘instantiations of the biomedical’ 
supports this domain of enquiry, as well gesturing towards future engagements with 
clinicians and policymakers.11 This Introduction now moves on to look at some of these 
overview areas in more detail.  
 
Background and Context: One in Four 
 
One in four adults experiences at least one diagnosable mental health problem in 
any given year. […] Mental health problems represent the largest single cause of 
disability in the UK. The cost to the economy is estimated at £105 billion a year – 
roughly the cost of the entire NHS.12 
 
                                                          
11 William Viney, Felicity Callard and Angela Woods ‘Critical Medical Humanities: Embracing Entanglement, 
Taking Risks’, Medical Humanities 41 (2015), 2-7 < http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medhum-2015-010692>. 
12 Mental Health Taskforce for NHS England, The Five Year Forward View for Mental Health: A Report from 
the Independent Mental Health Taskforce to the NHS in England (February 2016), p.4 
<https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Mental-Health-Taskforce-FYFV-final.pdf> 
[accessed 8 July 2017]. 
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In general medicine, research on the causes and cures of some physical illnesses 
has led to preventive interventions and/or more effective treatments, resulting in 
a decline in prevalence rates. In psychiatry, on the other hand, the general trend 
so far is not clearly in this direction, and may be running for some conditions the 
wrong way.13  
 
In this section, I begin to give some context and background to the work, which is then 
expanded and deepened in Chapter One wherein I aim to disentangle some of the master 
narratives and models of mental health that underpin psychiatric and political discourse 
in the UK today, as well as offering a brief overview of how these narratives have 
emerged historically.  
The language of ‘mind’ and ‘mental’ health and illness versus ‘body’ and ‘physical’ 
health and illness is set up in healthcare institutions (both clinical and policy-based), 
organisations and charities. Current UK government policy states that there should be a 
‘parity of esteem’ for physical and mental health14 15 and there is a ‘mental health act’ but 
not a ‘physical’ one.16 Mental health charities reflect their distinct territory in their 
nomenclature including: Mind, The Mental Health Foundation, Young Minds, and 
Together: For Mental Wellbeing, and, in 2016/2017, the birth of two new organisations: 
Heads Together and Headcase.17 ‘One in four’ adults is said to have a mental health 
problem in any given year, and psychiatry and psychiatrists specialise in the diagnosis 
and treatment of mental illness outside of general (i.e. physical) medicine. 
                                                          
13 Derek Bolton, What is Mental Disorder?: An Essay in Philosophy, Science, and Values (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), p. 239. 
14 Department of Health and The Rt Hon Norman Lamb MP, ‘Making Mental Health as Important as 
Physical Health’, Gov.uk, 23 January 2014 <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/making-mental-health-as-
important-as-physical-health> [accessed 8 July 2017]. 
15 Department of Health and The Rt Hon Norman Lamb MP, ‘Achieving Parity of Esteem between Mental 
and Physical Health’, 20 June 2013, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/achieving-parity-of-esteem-
between-mental-and-physical-health> [accessed 9 July 2017]. 
16 Eric Matthews, ‘Mental and Physical Illness: An Unsustainable Separation?’, in Law without Enforcement: 
Integrating Mental Health and Justice, ed. by N. Eastman and J. Peay (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999), pp. 47-
58 (p. 47). 
17 Headcase <http://www.inmyheadcase.com/> [accessed 8 July 2017]. 
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Despite the firm emphasis on minds as separate and distinct from bodies, 
psychiatry itself is not a homogenous field and psychiatrists speak in many different 
directions about their objects of enquiry. In recent years, the rapid growth in 
neuroscience and the promise of locating ‘mental’ dis/orders in certain brain chemicals 
or pathways has metabolised research looking at these problems as individual flawed 
brain functioning. Biological psychiatry targets the investigation of ‘neuropsychiatric 
disorders’ with its own professional society and journals.1819 This model, as social 
theorists Nikolas Rose and Joelle M. Abi-Rached argue in their book Neuro: The New 
Brain Sciences and the Management of the Mind, may well be a move ‘Beyond 
Cartesianism’ because if ‘mind is what brain does’ and the brain is an organ of the body, 
then ‘mind’ is physical.20 There is a further move that extends the materialist, biological 
model and is now appearing as part of the tissue of biological psychiatry in its research 
papers and journals.21 Embodied cognition, or the concept of the embodied mind, 
developed within cognitive science, situates the brain within a systems theory of biology 
and, thus, cognitive processes (and thereby thought, and thereby dysfunctional or 
disordered thought) stretch beyond brain matter towards an organism’s sensory-motor 
systems as well as in relation to the environment.22 Specifically, this impacts a 
conception of ‘mental’ dis/order by suggesting a much more networked emphasis on the 
brain and its relationship with other body systems (for example the immune, endocrine, 
nervous, or digestive systems). As with other biological models, the subject has gained 
much traction in research. However, psychiatrists are certainly not all aligned with a 
wholly neuroscientific model of mental health. Social psychiatrists argue for a much 
more situational and relational model of mental illness – deeply immersed in the 
                                                          
18 Biological Psychiatry: A Journal of Psychiatric NeuroScience and Therapeutics 
<http://www.biologicalpsychiatryjournal.com/> [accessed 8 July 2017].  
19 Society of Biological Psychiatry <http://www.sobp.org> [accessed 8 July 2017]. 
20 N. Rose and J. M. Abi-Rached, Neuro: The New Brain Sciences and the Management of the Mind (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2013), p.3. 
21 Pochu Ho and David A. Ross, ‘More Than a Gut Feeling: The Implications of the Gut Microbiota in 
Psychiatry’, Biological Psychiatry, 81,5 (March 2017), e35–e37 <10.1016/j.biopsych.2016.12.018> 
22 Fuchs and Schlimme. 
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problems of people’s social worlds and life events (this is not to say that a brain-based 
model totally negates this – via its models of plasticity and change – but for social 
psychiatry it is the primary focus). I will look at these models from psychiatry in more 
detail in Chapter One. 
The main manuals of psychiatry help psychiatrists across the world to negotiate 
the complexity of diagnosis in different ways. Although DSM is an American production, 
based on an American psychiatric context, its power and authority extend beyond the US 
and it is often referred to as ‘The Psychiatrist’s Bible’.23 The other principal manual is that 
of the International Standard Classification of Diseases, Injuries and Causes of Death 
(latest version ICD-10) – a global World Health Organisation-led ‘multidisciplinary and 
multilingual’ schema, which is internationally and cheaply available to all countries and 
contains ‘mental’ dis/order sections.24 While the ICD is the official classification system 
for psychiatrists working in the NHS in the United Kingdom, DSM is a hugely influential 
text (impacting on mass-media narratives about mental health across the world), 
therefore, I will also refer to its influence through the thesis. Both manuals of ‘mental’ 
dis/order have been updated and re-versioned a number of times over the past hundred 
years. The last iteration saw fifteen new disorders added to DSM-5 in 2013.25 These 
additions are oft critiqued by some corners of the field, and it should not be assumed 
that Psychiatry is one stable discipline to which this thesis can respond or address. In an 
example of this, Sir Simon Wessely, President of the Royal College of Psychiatrists in the 
UK, positions himself against DSM with its creation of ‘more and more disorders’. 
Wessely suggests the need to maintain the boundaries of psychiatry rather than extend 
them; to ensure that expectable responses to life problems or normal stages and changes 
                                                          
23 NHS Choices, ‘News Analysis: Controversial Mental Health Guide DSM-5’, 15 August 2013 
<http://www.nhs.uk/news/2013/08august/pages/controversy-mental-health-diagnosis-and-treatment-
dsm5.aspx> [accessed 8 July 2017]. 
24 American Psychological Association, ‘ICD vs. DSM’, Monitor on Psychology, 40, 9 (October 2009), 63 
<http://www.apa.org/monitor/2009/10/icd-dsm.aspx> [accessed 18 July 2017]. 
25 Jen Wieczner, ‘15 New Mental Illnesses in the DSM-5’, MarketWatch, 25 May 2013 
<http://on.mktw.net/1Kc3xS0> [accessed 8 July 2017]. 
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in childhood are not pathologized.26 For psychiatry, the line between order and disorder 
remains constantly ‘in flux’.27 
Despite these uncertainties about what does, or does not constitute an illness, 
phenomenologist, Havi Carel explains that ‘patients’ own understanding of their illness 
is influenced by medical attitudes and their encounters with the healthcare system’ and 
thus they are ‘quick to mimic the medical discourse’.28 In psychiatry, patient diagnosis 
comes from the psychiatrist, and it is the language of this diagnosis that shapes 
understanding of mental illness and what is – and is not – normal. The labels, forms and 
expressions used by psychiatry thereby disseminate into the public imagination as 
patients take ownership of the labels they are assigned, affirm the disorders as a part of 
their life, and communicate these problems to others. The powerful delineating labels 
are reviewed in a critical context by interdisciplinary sociologist Simone Fullagar, who 
looks through a Foucauldian lens at the ‘biopower that operates through health/illness 
discourses’ in regulating individuals specifically in a mental health context. Fullagar 
suggests ‘the rise of neuroscience is shaping mental health categories from schizophrenia 
to depression via new vocabularies and images of the brain.’ Indeed, in her study of 
women with depression, she found that they, ‘exercised agency through performing the 
subject position of the biomedical consumer as they engaged with the expertise 
generated by neuroscience and psy-expertise’.29 The neurological and psychological 
constructions of mental health inflect and underlie personal understandings and 
                                                          
26 BBC Radio 4, ‘Simon Wessely on unexplained medical syndromes’, The Life Scientific, 14 February 2017 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b08dnr3g> [accessed 8 July 2017]. 
27 Bolton, What is Mental Disorder? p.xviii. 
28 Havi Carel, ‘Phenomenology as a resource for patients’, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 37, 2 (2013), 96-
113. <http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/16205/2/Phen%20as%20patient%20resource%20JMP2011.pdf> [accessed 9 July 
2017] p.2. 
29 Simone Fullagar, ‘Foucauldian Theory’ in Routledge International Handbook of Critical Mental Health, ed. 
by B. Cohen (London: Routledge, forthcoming 2017) 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308919923_Fullagar_S_forthcoming_2017_Chapter_5_Foucauldia
n_Theory_In_Cohen_B_Ed_Routledge_International_Handbook_of_Critical_Mental_Health_Routledge_Lon
don> [accessed 8 July 2017]. 
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interpretations of ‘mental’ dis/order; these are the parameters within which mental 
illness is verified by medical knowledge. 
Beyond those formally diagnosed with mental illness, the ‘neuro’ language of 
biological psychiatry seems to have entered into the popular imagination and so, as Rose 
and Abi-Rached suggest, to a public immersed in brain culture, ‘mind seems visible in 
the brain itself’ [my emphasis].30 Rose and Abi-Rached point to a ‘spate of books for lay 
readers’.31 Indeed, whole sections of bookshop shelves have become dedicated to neuro-
explanations for selfhood and illness32 (something that I will explore further in Chapter 
Two). A 2016 BBC television series aimed at raising awareness of mental illness, entitled 
In the Mind (from which the title of this thesis is drawn), followed up this trend by 
focusing on the relationship between mental illness and the brain.33 The notion of brain-
based disorder has personal implications – shifting understanding of mental illness away 
from immaterial thoughts to a more organic conception of brain dysfunction, providing 
it with a concretised, individualised and physicalized location.  
In addition to the dispersal of psychiatric and biomedical knowledge, within a 
UK context, government agencies are responsible for shaping informational strategies for 
how healthcare is provided, divided and understood. The notion of integrated physical 
and mental healthcare has, in recent years, been inserted into healthcare agendas. The 
National Clinical Director for Mental Health in the UK has stated that ‘if we make as 
much progress in the next 3 years as we've made in the last 3, England can dump 
Descartes’.34 This notion of integrated care has been informed by research potently 
demonstrating the connections between mental and physical health outcomes, and has 
been specifically put forward by the Independent Mental Health Taskforce. The 
                                                          
30 Rose and Abi-Rached, p.5. 
31 Rose and Abi-Rached, p.1. 
32 Steven Poole, ‘Your brain on pseudoscience: the rise of popular neurobollocks’, New Statesman, 6 
September 2012 <http://www.newstatesman.com/culture/books/2012/09/your-brain-pseudoscience-rise-
popular-neurobollocks> [accessed 8 July 2017]. 
33 BBC Media Centre, ‘In the Mind’, 1 February 2016 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/latestnews/2016/in-
the-mind> [accessed 18 July 2017]. 
34 Strathdee, ‘Integrated Care’. 
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Taskforce was launched in 2015 by NHS England (an executive non-departmental public 
body working with the UK Department of Health), and in its Five Year Forward View for 
Mental Health report of February 2016, it sought to set out ‘how national bodies, 
including health agencies and government departments, should work together over the 
next five years to improve mental health.’ The first sentence of the foreword to the report 
argues: ‘For far too long, people of all ages with mental health problems have been 
stigmatised and marginalised, all too often experiencing an NHS that treats their minds 
and bodies separately.’ 35 Resultantly, the report sets out three main priority actions for 
the NHS by 2020/21; putting forward a series of recommendations that Public Health 
England and other partners must take forward in order to deliver ‘a fresh mind-set for 
mental health within the NHS and beyond’.36 An integrated approach is laid out as one of 
those top three priorities. This model sets out how:  
 
Mental health support should be made easily available across the NHS, and 
integrated services should ensure that health checks and programmes such as 
smoking cessation are made available for everyone with a severe mental illness. 
To work towards this priority, PHE will support commissioners to increase the 
offer and take up of information, tests and interventions for people with mental 
health problems, who are at greater risk of poor physical health. With our 
partners, we will also support Health and Wellbeing Boards to update their 
strategies to include mental health and comorbid alcohol and drug misuse, 
parenting programmes, and housing.37 
 
                                                          
35 Paul Farmer and Jacqui Dyer, Foreword to ‘The Five Year Forward View for Mental Health’, p.3. 
36 Five Year Forward, p.5. 
37 Kevin Fenton, ‘Public Health Matters: The new Five Year Forward View for mental health: opportunities 
for prevention and improving outcomes’, Gov.uk, 23 February 2016 
<https://publichealthmatters.blog.gov.uk/2016/02/23/the-new-five-year-forward-view-for-mental-health-
opportunities-for-prevention-and-improving-outcomes/> [accessed 8 July 2017]. 
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Within UK healthcare, the dismantling of dualism and the dumping of Descartes comes 
in the form of this ‘integration’, which is largely focused on the ‘physical’ health of those 
with diagnosed mental illnesses in the form of physical checks, programmes, information 
and tests. Mental and physical health are related and conjoined but remain separately 
articulated and structured.  
In terms of broader public health strategies, campaigns are disseminated via 
Public Health England (an executive agency of the Department of Health) whose role is 
to ‘protect and improve the nation's health and wellbeing, and reduce health 
inequalities’ by communicating messages directly to the public or through other (more 
local) partners, agencies and organisations.38 The emphasis within Public Health 
England’s (PHE) general wellness campaigns (Change4Life, SmokeFree, SugarSmart, 
OneYou, DaysOff) is largely on issues which are positioned as directly impacting 
‘physical’ health outcomes – exercise, smoking, diet and alcohol consumption.39 The 
Royal College of Psychiatrists has made a direct comment on this emphasis, suggesting 
that more should be done for ‘mental illness and mental well-being’, and articulating 
that, historically, public health strategies have overlooked how good mental health 
underpins the success of its initiatives.40 The emphasis within these general campaigns is 
on the rhetoric of self-improvement: the One You campaign (which provides a through 
line across all the key areas) encourages people to reappraise their lifestyle choices, put 
themselves first and commit to addressing their own health needs. It reminds people 
that it’s never too late to improve their health.41 Changes are focused on the individual, 
as people are asked to ‘reappraise’ and ‘do something’. A similar emphasis comes through 
                                                          
38 Gov.uk, ‘Public Health England’<https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/public-health-
england/about> [accessed 8 July 2017]. 
39 Public Health England, ‘Campaign Resource Centre’ 
<https://campaignresources.phe.gov.uk/resources/campaigns> [accessed 8 July 2017]. 
40 The Royal College of Psychiatrists, ‘No health without public mental health: the case for action 
Parliamentary briefing’, 2010 
<http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/PDF/Final%20PS4%20briefing_for%20website%20A4.pdf> [accessed 8 July 2017]. 
41 Public Health England, ‘One You’ <https://campaignresources.phe.gov.uk/resources/campaigns/44-one-
you/About%20One%20You> [accessed 8 July 2017]. 
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in PHE’s Change4Life dietary messaging. A 2017 strand of this campaign provides an app 
with which people can scan the food they are buying to understand how much sugar, 
saturated fat and salt is in products. The campaign ‘Be Food Smart’ advises parents to 
‘take control of their children’s diet’ by ‘empower[ing] families’ with the scanning 
application.42 Health is positioned as an individual project, and it is the person’s own 
responsibility to control themselves; scanning the shelves and seeking out the healthy 
produce. Looking after the body is positioned in terms of a project of physical 
improvement, and associations with ‘mental’ health are less overtly emphasised. These 
campaigns arguably fit into a neoliberal social climate, with ‘choice’, ‘responsibility’ and 
‘empowerment’ the key watchwords.43 (I will return to the concept of neoliberalism 
throughout this thesis – mindful that my use of this arguably sweeping term needs some 
definition. I draw here on the work of Wendy Brown who defines neoliberalism broadly 
as a political rationality where individuals have responsibility for their own states of 
health and broader life quality.)44 In such a healthist and body-conscious culture, 
battling with rhetoric around the obesity crisis, the desired and correct body shape is one 
that is tough enough to stand up against the commercial pull of cheap, processed food, 
an increasingly sedentary working life and a socially acceptable drinking culture – and, 
to do so, means being autonomous, self-controlled, and disciplined. The body should be 
moulded and sculpted in dieting and exercise and ‘listened to’ when it comes to health 
and wellbeing. It ties in with a broad cultural script of mind over matter which 
reinforces, or, indeed, actively mobilises dualist ideas and firmly undoes the idea of mind 
and body as one.  
The Faculty for Public Health UK (the standard setting body for specialists in 
public health in the United Kingdom) argues that in order to make progress with the 
                                                          
42 Public Health England, ‘Be Food Smart’<https://campaignresources.phe.gov.uk/resources/campaigns/55-
be-food-smart> [accessed 8 July 2017]. 
43 Ruth Barcan, Complementary and Alternative Medicine: Bodies, Therapies, Senses (London: Berg, 2011), p.37.  
44 Wendy Brown, ‘Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy’ in Edgework: Critical Essays on 
Knowledge and Politics ed. by W. Brown (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp.37-59. 
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‘physical aspects of public health’ it is necessary to challenge ‘the firmly held attitudes 
and beliefs in both health care and public health about the mind-body dichotomy in 
which mental and physical health are seen as separate’. Indeed, the FPH explains that 
despite evidence on interventions to promote ‘mental wellbeing’, at present ‘services are 
provided to address mental health issues independently from services to address 
unhealthy lifestyles, and although lifestyle interventions are increasingly informed by 
psychological insights, they do not aim to promote mental health and wellbeing as an 
important part of the treatment package’. 45 Public health messages tie together, but at 
the same time cleave apart the psychological from the physical. In the next section of 
this Introduction, I turn to how the language of mental and physical health 
problematises attempts to move past a dualistic framework, despite research evidence 
that demonstrates their interdependency. I then consider how a critical medical 
humanities theoretical framework helps me to approach this problem. 
 
The Problem: The Impasse of Language  
 
Most clinical practitioners know (although often in a non-theoretical and 
intuitive way) that mind and body are inseparable in the experiences of sickness, 
suffering and healing, although they are without the vocabulary and concepts to 
address – let alone to probe – this mindful body.46 
 
Despite attempts at integration in healthcare policy, and the work within systems 
medicine focused on the embodied mind, and the traction within professional bodies 
and public health agencies to insert mental health into public health strategies, an 
                                                          
45 The Faculty of Public Health, Relationship with physical health and healthy lifestyles 
<http://www.fph.org.uk/relationship_with_physical_health_and_healthy_lifestyles> [accessed 8 July 2017]. 
46 Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Margaret M. Lock, ‘The Mindful Body: A Prolegomenon to Future Work in 
Medical Anthropology’, Medical Anthropology Quarterly, New Series, 1, 1 (March 1987), 6-41, p.30.  
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individual’s mental and physical health are still distinctly and separately understood. 
Strategies targeted at recognising the intersection and cross relation of mental health 
problems and physical health problems do nothing to counter dualism – mind and body 
remain separately understood as discrete areas of interest. The language (and narratives) 
of mental health across psychiatry, policy, public health, and into wider public or lay 
consumption thereby (often unintentionally) reinforce mind-body dualism. Mind over 
matter models of hierarchy and control are emphasised in public health discourse and 
connect up with models of neuro-selfhood and individual brain-mind functioning. (At 
this point it is important to recognise that it might be argued that dualism is either a 
natural or useful position to occupy – detaching the ill body from the self, for example, in 
chronic illness, or in examples where the power of the ‘mind’ is harnessed in recovery. 
However, as I will come to argue throughout this thesis, the separation of mind and 
matter is problematic in a number of ways: leading to bodily dissociation and 
objectification and impeding the evidence that shows the power of what would be 
considered ‘physical’ approaches to healing from ‘mental’ illness. I will discuss these 
ideas more fully as the thesis continues.)  
A medical model often struggles to find a vocabulary to articulate an integrated 
perspective and is thereby left in a land of hyphenated moves which try and cross mind, 
body and world, with phrases such as ‘psycho-social’ and ‘psycho-somatic’ or ‘mind-
body’. While there have been some critical attempts to discuss the issue of dualism in 
healthcare47 48 or to question the language used in articulating ‘mental’ health and 
                                                          
47 Neeta Mehta, ‘Mind-body dualism: A critique from a health perspective’, Mens Sana Monographs, 9, 1 
(2011), 202-209 
<http://www.msmonographs.org/article.asp?issn=0973-
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48R. E. Kendell, ‘The Distinction Between Mental and Physical Illness’, The British Journal of Psychiatry, 178, 6 
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disorder,49 50 51 52 these positions have often emerged from one disciplinary perspective, 
and while they have pointed to areas of need that are not answered by a tunnelled or 
anatomised biomedical approach, a broader perspective – able to engage with the 
complex cross-permeations of ‘mental’ health in social, individual and medical 
frameworks – is needed to approach the multiple dimensions of life affected and 
implicated in mental health. Indeed, while it is encouraging that dualist structures are 
being challenged from within healthcare, and discussed in critical terms, an approach 
that can more radically insert itself in between theory, and practice and policy, is 
required. While the mind/body enmeshment has been critiqued, re-theorised and 
problematised, this does not straightforwardly translate into practice and the spaces of 
public health. Without this intervention, there remains an ongoing capitulation to 
dualist structures and assumptions. Biomedicine cannot fully explain the cultural and 
social aspects of ‘mental’ dis/order, nor is it adequately equipped to consider their deep 
imbrications in people’s emotional and physical lives. The ‘tools of biomedicine’ simply 
do not and cannot stretch this far.53 
 
Framework: Critical Medical Humanities  
 
Because psychiatry deals specifically with ‘mental’ suffering, its efforts are always 
centrally involved with the meaningful world of human reality. As such, it sits at 
the interface of a number of discourses: genetics and neuroscience, psychology 
                                                          
49 Simon J. Williams, ‘Reason, Emotion and Embodiment: Is ‘Mental’ Health a Contradiction in Terms?’, 
Sociology of Health and Illness, 22, 5 (2000), 559-581. 
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53 J. Macnaughton and H. Carel, 'Breathing and breathlessness in clinic and culture: using critical 
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and sociology, anthropology, philosophy, and the humanities. Each of these 
provides frameworks, concepts, and examples that seek to assist our attempts to 
understand mental distress and how it might be helped. However, these 
discourses work with different assumptions, methodologies, values, and 
priorities. Some are in dispute with one another. At various times in the history 
of psychiatry, a particular form of understanding has become dominant and 
worked to marginalize the contributions of others.54 
 
To move beyond the impasse of language, I turn to a transdisciplinary, critical medical 
humanities framework, which provides an impetus to articulate ‘across and between 
disciplines’55 and to establish some alternate vocabularies for understanding and 
articulating human distress. First, I briefly give some background on mental health 
criticism, before suggesting a space of connection between mental health scholarship 
and the critical medical humanities. I suggest that the critical medical humanities can 
provide a framework for engaging in questions of language and policy that gesture 
towards different conceptual models in which to emphasise the inseparability of physical 
life and ‘mental’ health. Finally, I set the approach of this thesis as a transdisciplinary one 
– aiming to generate knowledge beyond the specifics of conflicting disciplinary 
boundaries articulated in the above quotation by psychiatrists Bracken and Thomas.  
While mental health has risen to the top of a national agenda, framed within an 
advancing and growing biomedical and neuroscientific knowledge base, critical 
communities have also grown in tandem questioning the notion that ‘mental’ dis/order 
is an individual brain disease or abnormality. 56 57 From the 1960s onwards, the anti-
psychiatry movement made the notion of the ‘critical’ central to studies of mental health 
                                                          
54 Pat Bracken and Philip Thomas, ‘From Szasz to Foucault: On the Role of Critical Psychiatry’, Philosophy, 
Psychiatry, & Psychology, 17, 3, (September 2010), 219-228, (p.219). 
55 Viney et al, ‘Critical Medical Humanities’. 
56 Critical Psychology, <http://www.criticalpsychiatry.co.uk/> [accessed 8 July 2017]. 
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as it interrogated the social, political and economic structures that dominated the lives 
of ‘patients’ thereby challenging the notion of the self separated from the environment, 
as well as showing the power structures implicit in the man-made lines between order 
and disorder. In his book The Myth of Mental Illness (1961) Thomas Szasz (a key figure in 
the anti-psychiatry movement) argued that mental illness was metaphorical (not a 
disease), claiming that suffering was not a medical issue, that there should be no forced 
treatment, and that psychiatry’s imposition on lives was a negation of civil liberty.58 The 
anti-psychiatry movement provides a powerful example of the enmeshment of psychiatry 
and politics and how a critical community can stretch to intervene in medical issues and 
the policies underlining them. 
The issues emanating from the anti-psychiatry movement, interrogating the 
context for ‘mental’ dis/order, continued over subsequent decades in various critical 
guises, leading to a movement of critical psychiatry in the early 21st century.59 Bracken 
and Thomas (members of the critical psychiatry network) argue that critical psychiatry 
has largely built on the work of Foucault, outlining the way in which medical power and 
knowledge is at play in shaping forms of disorder or disease. As an example – oft cited to 
advance the notion that ‘mental’ dis/order is socially defined and works to chastise 
certain behaviours or marginalise or exclude certain bodies – homosexuality, which was 
once categorised as mental illness, was removed from DSM-III in 1974. Criticism 
continues to fall on the revisionary nature of the DSM and the expanding list of 
disorders. In current mental health criticism, a question particularly emerges about the 
globalisation of these malleable ‘mental’ dis/orders. As psychiatrist Derek Summerfield 
argues, the stakes are high. Summerfield protests that psychiatry ‘can’t define [its] 
primary object’ and essentially has ‘no answer to the question: what is ‘mental’ 
dis/order?’ except via its own devised way of working. Despite this, the manuals of 
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psychiatry are used, he argues, as if they are ‘facts of nature identifiable “out there”’, and 
diagnostic, written criteria of clustered symptoms are interpreted as ‘real’ indicators of 
mental disease, ‘as is, say, a tree or a broken leg’ even though the demarcation of 
different illnesses does not arise from any natural fact, but is based on the decision-
making of psychiatric committee members. 60 Indeed, Summerfield complains that, even 
with this uncertainty, researchers keep researching Western psychiatry’s devised 
disorders in global populations, labelling those populations, and claiming to educate 
them about their mental health.61  
In a 2016 publication outlining the project of the critical medical humanities, Ann 
Whitehead and Angela Woods and examine how the field can mobilise the notion and 
practice of critique and how the critical medical humanities relates to other critical turns 
(such as those highlighted above). For Whitehead and Woods, the medical humanities 
can provide both a ‘challenge and corrective to the hierarchies of evidence that have 
come to define, theoretical, practice-based and policy-orientated instantiations of the 
biomedical’,62 empowering those within the field to get involved more explicitly in what 
Viney et al describe as, ‘ontological questions – in particular, of aetiology, pathogenesis, 
intervention and cure’.63 In this way, a critical medical humanities theoretical framework 
helps leverage questions about the dominant dualistic and brain-based models of mental 
health, focusing both on how these models are enacted but also enmeshed with clinical 
spaces, healthcare structures and policies. An example of this sort of work within the 
critical medical humanities is Jane McNaughton and Havi Carel’s work on Breathing and 
Breathlessness in Clinic & Culture, in which they argue that the physiological expression 
of breathlessness cannot be wholly explained by biomedicine because ‘so much that 
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influences that expression derives from a cultural context, emotional response, and how 
illness is interpreted and understood.’64 When it comes to understanding the meaning of 
‘mental’ dis/order, there is a similarly broad context; affecting the whole person, and 
bound up with social norms and lines of acceptability, stigma, and the invisible dividing 
line between problems assessed and understood as being in the mind, and those 
affecting the organic, physical body. 
A critical medical humanities’ framework for this thesis also provides a further 
opportunity to engage with disciplines that the first wave of medical humanities work 
(with its focus on narrative practice, medical education and ethics) may not have yet 
explicitly connected.65 Indeed, in one example of work of this kind, Volker Scheid’s 
critical medical humanities chapter on Holism, Chinese Medicine and Systems Ideologies 
engages with medical systems beyond those of Western biomedical practice to suggest 
that in a climate of ‘criss-crossing globalisations’ a narrow focus on biomedicine negates 
the importance and relevance of other medical models or fields of enquiry.66 This 
informs the work of this thesis, where I turn to complementary and alternative medicine 
(CAM), Somatics practices, as well as ‘Eastern’ philosophies in Chapter Four thus 
expanding beyond the realms of Western biomedicine. The aim here will be to both 
examine, and learn from ‘bodily practices that claim not to be based in dualisms’ in order 
to think through the term ‘mental’ in non-dualist ways.67 In discussing the remit of the 
critical medical humanities, medical humanities scholar Jo Winning writes that we need 
to find a way to ‘create a productive interface between critical theory and clinical 
practice in order to restore biomedicine to a more holistic sense of the human body’.68 
Arguably a person with a diagnosed ‘mental’ dis/order is unable to feel this holistic sense 
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of embodiment, if the medicine that attends to her still thinks in surfaces, body parts 
and Cartesian splits. I, therefore, speak to this critical medical humanities position in 
trying to find ways across the divide, exploring some helpful language and models with 
which to do so. The notion that the unruly, fleshy ‘body’ is a threat to the controlling self 
in the ‘mind’ is deeply problematic. Thus, changing the understanding of ‘body’ is 
charged with critical and political import, as it contests this hierarchical supposition.  
 
Transdisciplinarity: A Diffractive Reading 
With a critical medical humanities framework in place, I now turn to articulate my thesis 
as ‘transdisciplinary’. In her book Complementary and Alternative Medicine, cultural 
studies scholar Ruth Barcan, outlines her project as one which hopes to articulate a ‘truly 
integrative medicine’. She suggests that to reach towards this, specialisation is required 
not only from Medicine and CAM science but an engagement with what she terms 
‘critical humanities’, and specifically from people willing to ‘combine or traverse several 
disciplines of fields of practice’.69 This line of thought sums up my entry here into a 
transdisciplinary space as I traverse across disciplinary boundaries to start to take down 
some of the walls created by the language of physical and mental healthcare. At this 
point, I gesture forwards to the feminist work of this thesis – borrowing from feminist 
critic Sara Ahmed – I argue that the mental/physical binary is held up by ‘histories that 
have become as solid as walls’.70 The notion of the transdisciplinary is useful not only 
from a theoretical perspective but, because of its non-dualist genealogy, it helps to 
dismantle some of these walls between disciplines, between subjects and objects and 
between mind and matter. 
In terms of the notion of the ‘trans’-disciplinary, I draw on the work of Romanian 
physicist Basarab Nicolescu, whose name is attributed to a Charter of Transdisciplinarity 
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developed in 1994, and who has subsequently taken the lead in developing a theory and 
program for transdisciplinary work. In this work, Nicolescu articulates how the 
imperative in the transdisciplinary is the unity of knowledge rather than disciplinary 
lines and margins themselves. This new knowledge arises from that which is ‘between, 
across and beyond disciplines’.71 Importantly, for this work of this thesis, as Jay Bernstein 
writes on a review of this type of research practice, Nicolescu ‘urges scholars to go 
beyond the dichotomous, either/or mentality that, in his view, produced many of the 
problems that now plague humanity’. 72 Therefore, the notion of the ‘trans’ has important 
implications for this thesis, which seeks to begin to develop new concepts to articulate 
the experience of human distress across and beyond mind and body binaries.  
It is perhaps also important to make a distinction between the notion of 
transdisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity in this work. Nicolescu argues that 
interdisciplinarity might be best conceived as that which involves ‘the transfer of 
methods from one discipline to another’.73 This resounds with the notion I am critiquing 
around ‘integration’, where mental and physical health are conceived as feeding into one 
another but remain separate; the ‘inter’ does not go far enough. For that matter, neither 
does the ‘multidisciplinary’ – a well-trodden concept in healthcare where disciplinary 
specialists are brought together in a multidisciplinary team meeting (MDT) to discuss 
and contribute to patient cases, but where that knowledge (for example a surgeon, 
alongside a nurse and a physiotherapist) still remains separately articulated and siloed.74 
At the start of the section on the critical medical humanities framework, I quoted 
Bracken and Thomas’ broad-reaching critical context for psychiatry at the ‘interface’ of 
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different disciplinary discourses that aim to provide concepts and paradigms within 
which to interpret, analyse and assist in understanding ‘mental’ dis/order. As a 
transdisciplinary medical humanities’ thesis, which recognises the deep entanglement 
and the hidden connections within different disciplines, I think here not about the 
‘dispute’ between disciplines or the ‘marginalisation’ of certain ideas identified by 
Bracken and Thomas, but more in terms of a ‘diffractive methodology’. Karen Barad’s 
work on this particular transdisciplinary approach, thinks through this term from 
physics (related to the combination and overlapping of waves and the bend and spread 
as they meet and how this can be a constructive point as opposed to simply one of 
contest).75 Generally, this mode of thinking provides me with the ground to take a 
transdisciplinary approach; finding the intersections, overlaps and unity of knowledge, 
rather than the lines between discourses. I will return to Barad’s new materialist frame 
within a feminist context later in this Introduction. This affirmative way of reading 
across disciplinary spaces now turns to how I insert my work specifically into a critical 
medical humanities context, and how this project seeks to call out the lines and divisions 
that divide up minds and bodies in healthcare today. 
 
Being Critical: Meanings and Manifestations 
As intimated thus far, being ‘critical’ in the context of mental health, has largely meant 
being critical of the power of psychiatry and the problematisation of the medicalisation 
of distress, or the individualisation and implicit self-responsibility for the flawed 
personality, as opposed to the implications of wider social issues. In this thesis, I 
examine mental health as an area of practice infused with historical, cultural and 
philosophical biases that are often overlooked in the clinical context. While I am not 
attempting a historiographical trace of the development of the area of ‘mental’ illness, it 
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is useful to draw upon the idea – taken from Foucault – that certain ideas and structures 
came to be, and certain understandings were normalised often because of particular 
historical powers and interests. As Bracken and Thomas articulate in their analysis of 
critical psychiatry, what Foucault’s work is able to do, is to open up the idea that mental 
illness might, actually, have been conceptualised in a very different way, and that current 
models of madness situated in the head and brain were not the necessary trajectory for 
knowledge and understanding.76 This opens a space for alternative future conceptions of 
mental life beyond Cartesianism as necessarily embodied, material and deeply 
implicated in the environment, as this thesis will go on to argue.  
Along with Macnaughton and Carel, I consider it the responsibility of an ethical 
medical humanities endeavour, not only to circulate ideas and improve understanding in 
the medical humanities field but to fill ‘epistemic gaps’ in clinical practice and to gesture 
towards eventual shifts in policy.77 Given that critical theory and disciplines from beyond 
the sphere of psychiatry have been able to raise momentum around certain issues, the 
entry into the political feels entirely apt. However, given the diffractive and 
transdisciplinary nature of this thesis, my ‘critical’ is not a direct criticism of biomedicine 
from any kind of outside or all-seeing perspective (I would contend such a perspective is 
not possible given the entanglement of biomedicine in culture), nor does it aim to set up 
any further binaries between scientific knowledge and that which emanates from the 
humanities. Instead, my project engages with – and builds upon – the critical medical 
humanities in a number of ways. First, I suggest that there is a sense of urgency, or a 
critical imperative, that an intervention is made in the language and narratives of mental 
versus physical health, given how rapidly cultural scripts about brain or neuro- 
explanations have been disseminated. Further, as I will argue in Chapters One and Two, 
conflicting models of the meaning and location of ‘mental’ dis/order mean that dualism 
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is often being reinforced and the language used in clinical and political contexts is one of 
the major factors in perpetuating the split. Second, this thesis speaks to the critical 
medical humanities as it connects with social movements (feminism in this case) in 
identifying structures of domination: mind over matter, head over body, rational over 
emotional and, individual over the environment. These structures are deeply 
problematic in isolating ‘mental’ dis/order to individual brains and creating dissociations 
between self and body, and self and world. By being critical in this way, I draw upon the 
notion of making an intervention, as opposed to just circling around issues with layers of 
discourse. Third, as alluded to above, I draw from a Foucauldian oppositional critique; 
that which (as Woods and Whitehead argue in their introduction to The Edinburgh 
Critical Medical Humanities Companion), resists ‘presumptuous reason and the specific 
effects of power’.78 In this case, my specific aim is to break down some of the commonly 
articulated assumptions about mental health. Finally, I aim to open up to 
complementary and alternative medical practices, with the same intention as Scheid, 
who sets out in his work on Chinese medicine to analyse these practices, ‘not as objects 
of enquiry but as resources for thinking critically about the fundamental issues of our 
time’.79 My emphasis (while recognising the limitations of a PhD thesis) is to create a 
space for a critical conversation about the language of mental health and healthcare in 
the UK. I situate my work as a space to theorise, and while I recognise that this 
theorisation is not immediately transferable to policy, it gestures towards it, makes 
critical links to policy, and engages with questions right at the heart of existing policy-
making around mental and physical healthcare. 
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Aims and Argument: Staging an Intervention 
It is my aim in this thesis to stage an intervention into the ways we think of healthcare in 
the UK today by attending to the naturalisation and sedimentation of dualistic language 
within psychiatry as well as health policy and public health discourse – and how this 
affects and shapes cultural scripts of ‘mental’ dis/order. I aim to consider the 
relationships between public understandings, individual experience and clinical practice, 
and the spaces and moments in which dualism is supported or mobilised. I think here 
about the power of narrative and its relationship to conceptions of ‘selfhood’ and ‘mind’, 
often at the expense of the sensory and bodily aspects of life. I will then go on to offer 
some examples of non-dualistic practice that might help convey the embodied nature of 
mental health (including and exceeding those of cognitive science) and make specific 
links to their role (or potential role) in healthcare.  
This thesis argues that the division between mental and physical health is 
unsustainable and unhealthy. I argue that a dualist language within healthcare 
problematically affects and sustains a model of mind over matter, which negates the 
social world and its imbrications in mental health, as well as de-valuing the materiality of 
human life, thereby re-inscribing other problematic binaries. I argue for the re-infusion 
of ‘mental’ health with notions of physicality and create a new term ‘being-body’ to 
articulate how distress and disorder implicate the whole person in very material and 
energetic terms. I suggest that although dualism (and its inference of the power of the 
immaterial mind over the lapsing or faulted matter) might be popularly conceived as a 
form of control or self-determination, it is a problem in relation to mental illness, which 
is oft actually experienced in palpably material and physical terms (for example on an 
NHS website detailing the symptoms of clinical depression for the public, there are a 
long list of ‘physical’ symptoms).80 When it comes to therapeutic approaches, dualism 
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matters because the notion of mind over matter problematises any explanation given to 
how and why ‘physical’ movement or self-awareness of the body would be a therapy for 
‘mental’ health. I will suggest in this thesis how policy and public health narratives – far 
from dumping Descartes – end up re-inscribing dualism, and how ‘integrating’ mental 
and physical health might not do enough to counter the deep roots of Cartesian 
thinking. I argue that the language and narratives told about mental health (and its 
connection and yet separation from physical health) within healthcare and clinical and 
psychiatric spaces, sweat into other areas of life; over spilling on to the ‘values, morality 
and experiences of everyday spaces’.81 Working through a feminist, new materialist lens, I 
argue that I am never only discussing the linguistic or narrative, but the imprint on 
becoming and being (discussed below). 
Ultimately, the solution to separated-out care domains is not simply fixed by 
connecting mental to physical healthcare so that one talks to the other, knows what the 
other is doing or considers the possible impact of the other – but that the patient 
him/herself is understood as a whole person; a person whose ‘mind’ and ‘mental’ health 
are not as clearly differentiated from their ‘body’ and ‘physical’ health as healthcare 
policy makers might think. How to move beyond the existing terms or to re-infuse 
existing terms with a deeper, less binary-based understanding requires a close look at 
language and at the terms that I will return to building throughout the thesis. 
 
Developing Terms: Towards the ‘Being-body’ 
Before I start to construct or suggest alternative terms or concepts, I want to lay down 
some of the theoretical lineage for these terms to more fully ground them before 
discussing them in detail later in the thesis. This introductory manner will inevitably be 
partial, but I will return throughout the thesis to expand and develop these 
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conceptualisations further. I begin by placing some limits on the existing terms used to 
describe mental health issues. The words mental illness, ‘mental’ dis/order, mental 
distress and mental health are used interchangeably, but it is from the dominant 
discourse of psychiatry that the term ‘mental’ dis/order’ emerges and is supported.82 To 
use the terms of this debate, but at the same time to rupture the meaning inherent in the 
steeped-in-dualism ‘mental’ dis/order, I once again reach to Foucault. In the preface to 
Foucault’s, The Order of Things, he suggests the ‘propinquity’ of words or concepts might 
be established only by, an ‘and’ or an ‘in’ or an ‘on’.83 In the forward-slash I make in the 
phrase ‘mental dis/order’, I want to question the wholeness and separateness of disorder 
as a concept in itself, and re-establish its fragile boundary with order; to suggest that one 
necessarily lies within the other. In Madness and Civilization, Foucault draws back to a 
‘zero point’ where madness is an undifferentiated experience. He writes that ‘Here 
madness and non-madness, reason and non-reason are inextricably involved: inseparable 
at the moment when they do not yet exist, and existing for each other, in relation to each 
other, in the exchange which separates them.’84 It is this exchange that the forward slash 
represents; it is a merging point – a line on which to consider the edges of experiences 
and to blur and blend some of the distinctions and certainties that are formed in 
diagnostic labelling. The inverted commas I place around the word ‘mental’ again 
acknowledge the potency of language and attempt to inject some uncertainty into the 
language that dominates discussions around people’s lived experiences of distress. 
Despite the usefulness of the forward slash and inverted commas, the language is 
inevitably restrictive in its positioning of ‘mental’ health as something which is not 
‘physical’ health. To develop a new concept for the experience of a depth mental body – 
which is not limited to the space between the ears (either in brain tissue or immaterial 
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thoughts, or both), I need to approach some vocabulary that itself involves deep roots 
and histories. It is always going to be problematic developing alternate terms for 
expressions of different subjective states, but, without them, we get no closer to breaking 
down problematic language structures. I draw here again from Ahmed, and with a 
feminist position for this thesis, to attempt to establish a useful term which gets past the 
impasse of ‘familiar and repeated’ language. As Ahmed attests (with reference to sexism 
and racism), ‘the familiarity and repetition are the source of the difficulty; they are what 
need to be explained’.85 Ahmed’s argument resonates with the breadth and depth of 
critical material around the mind and body which – although may be ‘familiar and 
repeated’ – and known to both academics and clinicians – often falters in practice and 
policy. Indeed, the habitual, sedimented and naturalised terms are involved not only in 
naming, labelling and defining, but also affect the process of becoming and being. 
Segmenting mental life away from material life or, indeed, word from body, fails to take 
account of the deep interrelationships between them.  
In considering how to relay the experience of the whole person – rather than in 
divided parts – I am reminded of philosopher Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between 
different bodily experiences – the ‘habit body’ for example – and how, in order to 
perform some sort of analysis of what it is to get to the grain of bodily experience, he has 
to cultivate and curate these terms.86 This notion of reaching for language to convey 
experiences and problems typically considered as ‘mental’ or of the ‘mind’ but deeply 
embodied, reveals that I need to engage with a vocabulary centred in the body first of all. 
In foregrounding ‘the body’ in my development of the idea of the being-body, I do not, of 
course, want to set up yet another binary. Instead, my aim is to infuse the ‘body’ with 
attributes of conscious materiality, vibration, energy, memory and a kind of thinking and 
understanding which – via dualism – is normally associated with the immaterial mind, or 
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brain only. There is no perfect term to describe how distress and illness of any kind can 
engulf a person, but with my term being-body I hope to lean into the way in which this 
lives throughout systems and energies and cells, not isolated parts – affecting a person’s 
very being and becoming. I will now address these two words ‘body’ and ‘being’ in some 
more detail. 
While it is not the aim or intention of this thesis to explicitly synthesise the huge 
breadth of theoretical enquiries into the body, it is vital to appreciate the multiple 
meanings and experiences located in this word. In using the term ‘body’ I am not 
thinking so much in terms of the anatomical vocabulary of medicine, but am drawing on 
different traditions which consider the body as multiply layered, interacting in its 
environment, and with energetic dimensions. I think particularly here of models of the 
body drawn upon in complementary and alternative medicine, where the whole body is 
felt to be a ‘site of memory’ and where the space of the body is conceived of quite 
differently to contemporary Western medicine, consisting of ‘fluids and energy’ rather 
than only a ‘solid mass of bones, muscles and viscera’.87 In doing so, I also draw from 
feminism and new materialism to support the revitalisation of matter and the reinfusion 
of the language of distress and disorder with an understanding of the physical and 
vibrational body interacting in the world. I also build on affect theory and its recognition 
of the body in – what humanities critic Ruth Leys terms – the ‘dynamic, energistic, 
nondeterministic terms that emphasise its unpredictable and potentially emancipatory 
qualities’.88  
I attach and hyphenate the word body with ‘being’. This again brings with it 
theoretical lineage perhaps, most prominently, again from phenomenology and 
Heidegger’s notion of ‘being-in-the-world’.89 For Heidegger, as Havi Carel articulates, the 
term is used to ‘denote the human being in the broadest sense. Being in the world 
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includes the biological entity, the person and her environment in meaningful 
connections.’90 Phenomenology has been a prominent lens within the medical 
humanities, particularly in terms of how it might be used to understand the nature of 
illness and the experience of the patient by focusing on ‘the lived experience of 
embodiment.’91 However, the notion of ‘being’ is still knotty and complex. Indeed, ‘being’ 
has been conceptualised as ‘static and fixed’ and juxtaposed against the idea of 
becoming, which articulates that things are ‘uncertain and constantly in motion’.92 It is 
not my intention here to be drawn into the philosophical differences enacted here but, 
instead, to see the term being-body, not in opposition to a conceptualised becoming-
body but actually drawing upon it. The idea of inter-relationality – of the always-
imbrication of subject and object or mind and matter in a process of becoming – is useful 
because bodies are not bounded but involved in fluid, dynamic relationality – always able 
to be differently formed. This has particular implications for ‘mental’ dis/order which – I 
argue – cannot ever be wholly individualised or interiorised. Karen Barad conceives in 
her theory of agential realism that ‘the entangled practices of knowing and being are 
material practices’.93 As Barad explains, ‘[w]e do not obtain knowledge by standing 
outside of the world; we know because “we” are of the world. We are part of the world in 
its differential becoming’.94 Barad’s foregrounding of the materiality of being and the 
interconnectedness of person, environment, biological body in a process of becoming, 
describe the ways in which ‘being’ is fluid and practised, not static at all. To expand upon 
this, in Chapters Three and Four, I will draw on concepts of body and being from outside 
of Western biomedicine as well as those which are recognised and used within the NHS 
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– such as yoga with its focus on asana practice and breathwork, which reach to different 
body states, and acupuncture, where an energetic life force ‘Qi’ dismantles distinctions 
between the mental and the physical, and works in a systemic way through the person. 
In such cosmologies, there are understood to be multiple bodies beneath the visible, 
physical body – interrelated layers – and the energy within those body layers relates to 
the energy of the wider world. 95 The being-body is thus an attempt to undo the 
unhelpful, familiar and repeated language of mental illness and to find some new terms 
infused with the sensory, energetic and material dimensions of life, to break through the 
impasse of language.  
 
Developing Terms: Embodied Mental Health 
 
One might […] claim that embodiment is what makes cognition possible. If this is 
right then it tells us something important about the ‘self’. For if the self is that 
which perceives, acts, and thinks, and perceiving, acting, and thinking must be 
understood in bodily terms, then the metaphysical lesson is obvious: the self is, 
first and foremost, an embodied self.96 
 
The title of this thesis describes a move towards a new model of embodied mental 
health. In this way, it builds on but exceeds the work of cognitive science which 
considers the role of embodiment in cognition.9798 My concept of the being-body is 
arguably broader – thinking not only about cognitive processes but extending into 
vibratory materialism and the energetic body, which are not harnessed in these accounts. 
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In articulating the embodied nature of selfhood – as articulated in the above quotation 
from philosopher, Quassim Cassam – I come up against two main alternate conceptions 
of selfhood – one of ‘neuroselfhood’ (where the self is located in ‘brain spheres and 
chemistry’)99 – understood as the ‘brain-body’. In this framework, the rest of the 
anatomical body is important and relevant for mental health but mostly in terms of its 
relationship to the brain. The second framework for selfhood is that of the narrative self 
– emanating more from a Cartesian model, the observing, reflecting and narrating self is 
the mindful self, and this is positioned against the object body, which might experience 
or react to the thoughts of the narrating self either in a metaphorical or somatising way. 
Both of these conceptualisations are largely reliant on an individualised model of 
selfhood and health. This, in turn, presses upon conceptions of ‘subjectivity’ and 
‘experience’; both of which have been centralised in medical humanities work as related 
to the personal understanding of illness against the biomedical, dehumanizing script and 
often related to the ability to narrate. I will return to these words and ideas, particularly 
in Chapter Two when I examine how ‘embodied experience’ and the sensate and sensory 
elements of subjectivity emerge or are negated in a narrative context. As I develop and 
flesh out how the being-body emphasises the material depth of mental health, I will look 
to alternative models where embodied knowledge is foregrounded.  
Beyond cognitive science, the paradigm of embodiment has been explored in 
numerous ways, but Thomas Csordas’ counter-dualist emphasis seems useful to draw 
upon as I develop a theory of embodied mental health. Embodiment, in Csordas’ view, is 
something which goes beyond or is added to the physical body and is concerned with the 
ways in which people ‘inhabit’ their bodies. The body, he writes, is the ‘existential ground 
of culture’. Embodiment is not simply the body, in this reading, but is about the social 
and intersubjective being. Developing from Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account, 
Csordas’ view recognises the perceptual and active body but moves towards how the 
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social is embodied, obfuscating the dualism of the body versus the social world; there is 
no demarcated and bounded individual in such an embodied account. 100  
Embodiment considered in its social, cultural and perceptual dimensions leads 
me to specifically think in more detail here about the feminism and why it is so powerful 
and potent as a methodology in this thesis to think through embodiment in a social 
context, as it aims to affect cultural change beyond the academy and to move from 
theory to practice. Feminist philosopher Elizabeth Grosz helpfully articulates the value of 
a feminist philosophy carving out an embodied subjectivity understood ‘not as the 
combination of psychical depth and a corporeal superficiality but as a surface whose 
inscriptions and rotations in three-dimensional space produce all the effects of depth […] 
understood as fully material and for materiality to be extended and to include and 
explain the operations of language, desire, and significance’.101 It is this depth and three-
dimensionality of experience that I will return to throughout the thesis as I shape an 
argument about the whole person’s being-body in the world as involved in ‘mental’ 
wellbeing. 
 
Methodology: ‘Matter Matters’  
 
Language structures how we apprehend the ontological, it doesn’t constitute it.102 
 
This thesis speaks from within – and builds upon – a tradition of feminist theory that 
provides a particularly engaging way of thinking through body roles, and the subjugation 
of the body in its material, emotional conception, set against the rational, dominant, 
cognitive mind. It speaks alongside several critical medical humanities pieces infused 
                                                          
100 Thomas J. Csordas, ‘Embodiment as a Paradigm for Anthropology’, Ethos, 18, 1 (March 1990) 5-47. 
101 Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism, (Bloomington, IN: Allen and Unwin, 1994). 
102 Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman, Material Feminisms (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 
p.98. 
40 
 
 
with an ‘energising and dynamic undercurrent’ of feminist theory – used to engage with 
questions of ‘the medical, the gaze, the body, affect, power and resistance’. 103 It uses 
feminism as a methodology to think about ways in which critical work can aim to move 
and affect social spaces. In this way, I follow Sara Ahmed to think of feminism as not 
‘only a tool in the sense of something that can be used in theory, only then to be put 
down or put away’ but to think of it in ‘world-making’ terms. 104Ahmed thinks of the 
citations she uses as the feminist materials from which she then generates and 
disseminates knowledge. In this way, I return throughout the thesis to feminist thinkers 
and writers (inside the academy and without it). I think of these writers as providing a 
through line of knowledge and scholarship for the thesis (although, unlike Ahmed, I am 
not limiting myself to them in this particular project) and argue that a range of theories 
are required to make sense of the multi-dimensional embodied self. 
Working with a feminist methodology, I also turn explicitly to Stacy Alaimo and 
Susan Hekman in their work Material Feminisms (as highlighted in the opening quote to 
this section) working to undo the privilege of discourse over matter. As Whitehead and 
Woods attest (in relation to a critical medical humanities framework), Alaimo and 
Hekman ‘observe that without a sophisticated discourse for describing bodily materiality 
“it is nearly impossible for feminism to engage with medicine or science in innovative, 
productive, or affirmative ways”’.105 This head-on engagement with corporeality comes as 
feminist criticism has wrestled over time with how to think about the body and its 
meaning and role for women. Indeed, as cultural theorists Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der 
Tuin write, ‘feminist theory is one of the key sites of critical reflection upon substance 
dualism.’106 Historically, women’s bodies were commoditised, seen as an object for others 
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and over which women had to fight to gain political and social control. In this fight for 
‘control’ over the body came a sort of implicit dualism because the body was ‘something 
over which the self had rights’. 107 A phenomenological take on female embodiment by 
Simone De Beauvoir – it has been argued – moved away from this dualist emphasis 
towards the way in which women lived in their bodies in objectified ways108 (this work 
influenced Iris Marion Young whose essays on feminism will be drawn on throughout 
this thesis).109 However, in the final decade of the twentieth century, and, in particular, 
with the work of Judith Butler and her book Gender Trouble (1990), theory turned 
towards discourses about the female body which, she argued, were constitutive of the 
identities they aimed to describe.110 For Butler, there was no unmediated, pure access to 
an internal experience because of dominant, cultural discourse and the impossibility of 
separating the body from its social world.  
New materialist feminism arose in reaction to Butler’s work, seeking to 
understand bodies not only in their discursive or constructed forms but to think about 
the ‘weightiness’ of the body – its materiality. Alaimo and Hekman’s work, for example, 
sought to put the matter of the body at the heart of the work and to unsettle the 
privileged discursive mode in order to give attention to ‘lived experience, corporeal 
practice and biological substance’.111 This work was positioned as urgent political and 
environmentally-driven action. It followed in the footsteps of feminist science critics 
including Donna Haraway, whose work Cyborg Manifesto argued for the indivisibility of 
nature and culture.112 It also links to the work of Karen Barad and her theorisation that 
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matter ‘feels, converses, suffers, desires, yearns and remembers’113 and that the 
‘denigration of nature and the disregard for materiality cannot be entirely 
disaggregated’.114 Indeed, these critics articulated that a dangerous human environmental 
disrespect paralleled an indifference to the objectified material body. Re-instating the 
value and meaning of the physicality and materiality of the flesh sought to address this 
ethical problem. 
The work of the new materialists is particularly relevant in shifting the ground 
for an embodied model of mental health because of its ‘ongoing, mutual co-constitution 
of mind and matter’.115 Karen Barad argues that ‘being is threaded through with 
mattering’ and, therefore, the nature of materiality itself ‘is an entanglement’.116 The idea 
that the body is simply an object – to be done to and controlled by the elevated, thinking 
mind – is particularly problematised as feminist new materialism critiques a separated-
out version of mental life and troubles the notion of mind against matter. Within the 
Chapters that follow, I shall engage further with feminist new materialism, to unfold how 
the matter of the human body is not stagnant and reactive, but active, moving and 
always ‘entangled’ with the world.117  
 
The Limits: Spaces and Locations 
In their paper on fat activism in a critical medical humanities framework, Bethan Evans 
and Rachel Cooper discuss how: 
 
In the spirit of feminist scholarship, we first contend that one element in the 
development of a critical medical humanities must be greater transparency and 
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reflection on the modes of knowledge production within the field itself. This 
requires acknowledging the forms of privilege and the positions from which we 
write. 
 
Evans and Cooper go on to situate their knowledge within their own ‘lived and embodied 
biographies’.118 It is my intention to do the same here, firstly, because as I move towards 
an account of embodied mental health and develop the concept of the being-body, I 
suggest the importance of embodied knowledge. Second, because this thesis is inevitably 
limited by a particularised perspective from the UK, from within a privileged Western 
healthcare system. I come to this work as an author of an illness narrative memoir and 
someone who has wrestled with how to find a form to inscribe the rhythms and energies 
of a ‘mental’ dis/order into words. While this thesis is not an autoethnography, it is the 
notion of how to convey the materiality of ‘mental’ dis/order in linguistic terms that first 
brought me to this subject. I was further interested in how the physical, sensory and 
sensate body is objectified in forms of mental illness and its treatment. It is as a feminist, 
a student of literature, a former mental health service user, and as a writer on mental 
health that I root my knowledge and particularise my perspective. Further, my work in 
an NHS hospital and universities as a researcher in Health Sciences/Applied Health 
Research grounds my expertise in the practical and financial context of the NHS and the 
way in which evidence is prioritised and implemented. I recognise that my position is 
limited by the geographical and societal context for this research as well as my own 
experiences. Indeed, I am cognisant that the meaning of ‘mental’ health and dis/order is 
different in different places. In order to address this, I aim to primarily consider the way 
in which knowledge is constructed and distributed in the particular context of the UK.  
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Mental health implicates not only those labelled with a disorder but a wider 
population of health consumers working on their individual wellbeing. It affects – and is 
translated – into numerous areas of life, from economic issues of welfare (in a publicly 
funded NHS context) and insurance (in a privately funded healthcare system); to the 
impact of life circumstances and social context on the development of (as well as the 
relationships between) brains, minds and the environment and whole human biological 
systems. In this thesis, my ability to connect these areas, and do so in the depth each of 
them might require, is limited, so at the same time as recognising the benefit and need 
for transdisciplinary enquiry, I am mindful of making generalisations or dealing with 
universals. Although I aim to discuss issues relating to the ‘big picture’, I remain 
grounded in my own location, seeking to work from the small space of my own personal 
and professional contexts. Drawing again on the work of Susan Hekman (in her feminist 
analysis of Foucault), rather than a presentation of universal values, I hope to focus on a 
concrete analysis of a particular national context in an attempt to provide a better 
understanding of social change.119  
In developing a concept of the being-body and moving towards an integrative 
medicine with its emphasis on holism, there are a number of potential areas which I 
approach with caution. First, in Chapter Four as I draw on ‘Eastern’ conceptions of mind 
and body and practices such as yoga, I am wary of potential complicity with a form of 
Orientalism; of the Western appropriation of ‘the East’ and of unintentionally negating 
the very different and complex layers that these practices actually entail.120 Second, as I 
engage with Somatics practices (and broader complementary and alternative medicine 
ideas), I am aware that I might be challenged to consider some of the ‘uncritical rhetoric’ 
which emanates from some of this material.121 Third, there has been recent critical 
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analysis of the idea of holism – and the need to be wary around attaching to some sort of 
unquestioned romanticised idea of ‘the natural’ and the holistic. Ruth Barcan’s book on 
complementary and alternative medicine provides a useful basis for thinking critically 
about these issues and, like Barcan, rather than dispensing with the idea of wholeness or 
the possibility of a ‘truly integrative medicine’, I see this thesis as an attempt to ‘think 
more complexly about what wholeness could mean or might be.’122 In my case, this is 
embodied mental health, affecting the whole being-body in the world. Finally, while I 
attempt to dissect and disentangle the meaning of ‘mental’ life, I do not have as much 
space or time to construct as thorough a dismantling of the numerous theorisations of 
the ‘body’. However, underlying my development of the term being-body is recognition 
that different paradigms model or anatomise the body in different ways. Indeed, it is 
through these alternative conceptualisations, that a very different way of conceiving of 
materiality is explored; one that helps to reconfigure ‘the distinction between thought 
and matter to dissolve any ontological difference between them.’ 123 
Finally, despite the focus here on interrogating the various labels and forms of 
‘mental’ dis/order I still need to use some of psychiatry’s diagnostic clusters as a 
jumping-off point for discussion. Terms such as anorexia or OCD have become part of 
the vernacular of contemporary Western societies and are necessary to communicate to 
popular and academic audiences when discussing issues, even if the classifications of 
disorder are contentious and often critiqued. I need to drill down below the vast 
generalisation of the terms mental illness or ‘mental’ dis/order to find some of those 
smaller spaces to explore. I, therefore, delimit some sections of my discussions to focus 
on case studies within the ‘neurosis’ end of psychiatry’s spectrum of dis/orders as 
opposed to those considered as psychotic illnesses. The Mental Health Foundation 
provides this definition: 
                                                          
122 Barcan, pp.24-25. 
123 Barcan, p.66. 
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‘Neurotic’ covers those symptoms which can be regarded as severe forms of 
‘normal’ emotional experiences such as depression, anxiety or panic. Conditions 
formerly referred to as ‘neuroses’ are now more frequently called ‘common 
mental health problems.’124 
 
In the UK ‘combined anxiety and depression is the most commonly diagnosed mental 
health problem, followed by anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder [PTSD], “pure” 
depression, phobias, eating disorders, OCD [Obsessive Compulsive Disorder] and panic 
disorder’.125 I take a case study approach, in that I mostly focus my discussion around 
some of these diagnoses (anorexia, anxiety, depression and PTSD), but the thesis is not 
led by them. I will choose to reflect on certain dis/orders at certain junctures because 
they are raised by particular texts or critiques, or where there is a particular issue – for 
example, disembodiment – where discussing particular symptoms or experiences feels 
resonant and useful in moving a point forward.  
To give some context to some of these issues, I want to pause briefly on those 
main case study areas while recognising the limitations of such a brief introduction to 
complex forms of distress. Eating disorders are in themselves broad ranging, but most 
are commonly categorised into anorexia, bulimia and binge eating disorder. Within this 
thesis, I will primarily touch on anorexia nervosa (partly led by my own experience and 
knowledge of this area). Anorexia is defined by the eating disorders charity B-eat as ‘a 
serious mental illness where people keep their body weight low by dieting, vomiting, 
using laxatives or excessively exercising’.126 Anorexia is an interesting case study for this 
                                                          
124 Mental Health Foundation, ‘What are Mental Health Problems?’ <https://www.mentalhealth.org.uk/your-
mental-health/about-mental-health/what-are-mental-health-problems> [accessed 9 July 2017]. 
125 Matt Haig, Reasons to Stay Alive (Edinburgh: Canongate Books, 2016), p. 55. Further references to this 
edition are given after quotations in the text. 
126 B-eat: Beating Eating Disorders, ‘Anorexia’ <https://b-eat.co.uk/about-eating-disorders/types-of-eating-
disorder/anorexia> [accessed 9 July 2017].  
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thesis because it seems to exacerbate the schism between mind and body and because its 
feature of distorted self-perception raises questions about the nature of embodied 
experience. There are a number of disorders that form around the concept of anxiety. I 
do not intend to pursue specific disorders and their explicit and specifically defined 
symptomatology, but I do want to focus on the experiences of anxiety that might throw 
into sharp relief the idea of the bodily expression of ‘mental’ illness. I also touch upon 
depression, which is particularly useful because of the problems that seem to develop 
around language and when words struggle to reach the feelings it induces. As 
Psychiatrist Femi Oyebode writes, there are ‘noticeable changes in the volume and 
intonation of speech in depressed patients’ who ‘speak very quietly with a monotonous 
voice’. In the most extreme cases, this can produce speech made only of ‘unintelligible 
syllables, often of a moaning nature’. 127 Finally, I also consider trauma (PTSD) and its 
visceral, deep imprint on the body and how this is particularly relevant in forging an 
embodied account of mental life and ‘mental’ dis/order. I now turn to the chapters ahead 
and the work this thesis will do to articulate towards a new model of embodied ‘mental’ 
health. 
 
Moving Forwards: The Chapters Ahead 
In Chapter One, I directly address the clinical, cultural and political imaginings of 
mental health, by carefully attending to the language and narratives of some of the main 
‘models’ of ‘mental’ health in UK healthcare policy, public health and psychiatry (and 
their imbrications in popular and mass media representations). Whilst overlapping, I 
attempt some disentangling of these models and how they forge and form knowledge 
about ‘mental’ dis/order. Here, I consider some of the cracks and contradictions in 
existing integrated structures and in communication about mental health to the public. I 
                                                          
127 Femi Oyebode, Sims' Symptoms in the Mind: An Introduction to Descriptive Psychopathology, Fourth 
Edition (Baillière Tindall, 1988: repr. Saunders Elsevier, 2008), p.178. 
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will describe a range of existing models – from a metaphysical understanding of 
Immaterial Thoughts to those more connected with neuro-explanations for mental 
illness in a Brain Disorder model. Although these are not totally independent or 
formally articulated, these models appear to sit beneath these narratives and often 
perpetuate a mind/body or mind/world split. Across the range of articulations and 
explanations I analyse, depression, anxiety, anorexia, and other ‘mental’ disorders are 
largely attributed to chemical imbalances, genes, or disembodied ‘thoughts’, all of which 
detach the problem from the world and place it into the confines of the isolated 
individual. Problems are either located in brain chemicals – thereby putting disorder into 
individual neuro-dysfunction and moving away from notions of choice or responsibility – 
or chastising the patient for failing to control or manage their unhelpful or irrational 
thoughts. 
The emphasis of the medical humanities in its development as a field across 
recent decades has been determinedly a narrative one – focused on the subjective 
experience of the patient and the narrative framework of the clinical encounter. Medical 
humanities scholarship showed medicine its own innate narrative structures and offered 
up narrative as a way of interpreting, analysing and understanding the experience of 
illness and the clinical encounter. In terms of mental illness – the often seemingly 
incommunicable and internalised distress provides a challenge in terms of linear 
narrative expression – but words are often attached to healing, catharsis and triumphant 
overcoming. In Chapter Two, I consider how the dominance of narrative and language 
(both in personal accounts and therapeutic responses to mental illness) might reinforce 
a model of individual, internalised, narrated self-management of ‘mental’ dis/order, and 
consider how a mind over matter model might get in the way of a fully integrative 
medicine. I build on the questions of the anti-narrative or post-narrative positions raised 
by some medical humanities critics, to look at how narrative forms and functions 
support and reinforce mind against body models of ‘mental’ dis/order. I look at some 
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contemporary narrative accounts of mental illness to show how a mind/body binary 
continually underscores attempts to describe embodied experience. I argue that looking 
at this language and attending to what is meant in different shapes and versions of 
‘mental’ dis/order expressed there, is a starting place for carving out alternative 
approaches. I then look backwards – at modernism – and towards literary texts, which 
suggest that narrative should not be dispensed with, but in their ‘experimental and non-
realist modes’ are able to offer a useful model for representing illness.128 I discuss how 
authors play with form and function, using rhythm, cadence, ellipsis and other devices to 
engage with a full palate of affecting, sensate experience. Indeed, I analyse how these 
texts offer up sound, dance and music to explore non-dualist accounts of distress and 
breakdown. In doing so, I argue that words and language do not have to be set in 
opposition to the being-body, but can draw close to it, emanating from the body with its 
breath, gesture and pulse. However, I conclude that a focus on narrative as a direct 
expression of internal thoughts and thereby ‘mental’ life is reductive.  
The sonic and the affective strands of modernist texts take me towards Chapter 
Three – Haptic Sounds and Moving Music – where I approach an account of the 
vibratory matter of the being-body. Sound – despite being linked to interiority and 
individualism – emerges from and affects the body thereby complicating Cartesian lines. 
If language fails because the words ‘physical’ and ‘mental’ are layered in dualism and, 
that even in connecting them, we arrive at an implicit schism, sound and music engage a 
different register of experience. This register is already used in medical practice – for 
example in the percussing skills of medics, or, very differently, in the use of music 
therapy – but in this chapter, I explicitly link this to a more ‘holistic’ and less 
anatomically sheared-apart version of the human body. I use theories of music and the 
emotions to stretch this idea further – specifically taking sound towards movement and 
                                                          
128 Laura Salisbury, ‘Aphasic Modernism: Languages for Illness from a Confusion of Tongues’ in The 
Edinburgh Companion to the Critical Medical Humanities, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 
444-462. 
50 
 
 
space. Music literally moves us, outwardly and inwardly, activating imagination and 
creating spaciousness. If sound and music help show a whole person as affected – 
moving and moved – then emotional life cannot be contained within existing ‘mental’ 
parameters and instead needs to be realised through an account of the whole ‘being-
body’ in the world. 
Building on the work in Chapter Three, I then turn to working models of 
embodiment in Somatics and bodywork practice. My aim in Chapter Four – Knowing 
Bodies – is to foreground knowledge through the whole being-body as opposed to 
directed from the head in a mind over matter conception. In this way, I begin to develop 
an account of the active, thinking and remembering being-body as opposed to the 
critical, textual or narrated body. I again emphasise the ways in which the focus on 
narrative and language often precludes engagement with the embodied state, and the 
potential problematic for emphasising disembodiment or the split in ‘mental’ dis/order. 
Somatics (as a collective name for body practice) draws upon the whole body and its key 
practitioners articulate how understanding, ethical knowing, and change, come through 
the body (in its multiple levels and layers). This is work for the whole human being – 
rather than designated into mental or physical spheres. This chapter creates a different 
non-vertical understanding of knowledge, wisdom and being. In turning to embodied 
practices, I speak within a body-centred methodology, which learns and develops out of 
the body’s practical knowledge and understanding. Body work in trauma therapy and 
yoga for ‘mental’ dis/orders are growing areas within health research, and I here build on 
this ground but suggest that the evidence points to the need for a richer vocabulary to 
discuss health for the whole being-body. With these different realms explored as ways 
through the mental/physical health impasse, I return to language and narrative to 
suggest how different vocabulary might help excavate the full meaning and significance 
of the being-body, so that the body is more than the brain, and the mind is more than 
the head, language and narrative. 
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In the Conclusion, I return to think about the broader UK health context, and to 
reiterate the suggestion that health policy should not divide individuals unhelpfully into 
arbitrarily, and in many cases quite wrongly, separated parts. I suggest that while 
medicine in some places recognises the failure of Cartesianism – and is offering a 
plethora of new research into mind-body connections and interactions – it often lacks 
the terms and vocabularies to articulate beyond it. Further, I suggest that the mind/body 
distinction has often led to an unhealthy and unsustainable bodily objectification, which 
might end up feeding and perpetuating ‘mental’ dis/orders even further.  
This Introduction has set out the context and background for the need to develop 
and fully flesh out an embodied model of ‘mental’ health. The Cartesian model of 
immaterial mind versus mechanistic body has left medicine struggling to see from an 
integrated perspective. Despite the critique, re-versioning and attempts at integration it 
still reinforces a variety of explanations and underpinnings for accounts of mental health 
and mental dis/order. It is to a deeper understanding of these models that Chapter One 
now turns towards. 
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Chapter One: The Problem of the ‘Mental’ in ‘Mental’ Dis/order 
 
Chapter Aim and Summary 
In this chapter, I focus on the language and narratives of some of the main models which 
seek to account for and locate ‘mental’ dis/order. These are not formalised categories of 
understanding as such, but my interpretation of – and delineation between – the 
dominant (and conflicting) theories that explain ‘mental’ dis/order. This chapter 
undertakes a discursive analysis, to show how language within and between these 
narratives continually falls back into splits and binaries and reproduces dualist 
understanding. The work of this chapter, therefore, contributes towards the first aim of 
the thesis to interrogate the way in which mental health is understood in the UK today. 
The narratives I consider emanate from very different spaces: government health 
policies, public health materials, psychiatry and medical research, cultural scripts from 
popular media, literary texts and online cultures. However, as explored in the 
Introduction, my perspective here follows a critical health perspective, which 
understands that neurological and psychological understandings of mental health mould 
and support personal understandings. With this in mind, although I move somewhat 
freely between narratives produced from different spaces, I remain cognisant of how the 
dominant medical models and discourses define how ‘mental’ dis/order is discussed 
more broadly.  
There are four primary models on which I focus in this chapter, that move 
(somewhat progressively) towards including bodies in their accounts of ‘mental’ 
dis/order. In working through these models, however, I aim to demonstrate how the 
language of the ‘mental’ forecloses truly integrative accounts of minds and bodies and 
how the ‘body’ in its various forms and expressions is flattened by the dominant mind. 
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This chapter thus locates the limits of existing models of ‘mental’ dis/order and sets up 
the need for a much more embodied account in physical and social terms.  
The first model is a metaphysical understanding of mental illness situated in 
Immaterial Thoughts and located in the language of the ‘mind’. In this section, I 
consider Cartesian dualism, the relation of thought and inner speech, and therapies for 
‘mental’ dis/order that focus on irrational or distorted thinking. I articulate how 
biomedicine subscribes to this model in the way that it separately treats and attends to 
physical and mental health and, relatedly, to the organic (real and detected on scans, 
tests and objective measures) and the functional (undetectable symptomatic problems). I 
problematise, in particular, the inner/outer binary that this model elicits, as well as the 
missing non-linguistic elements of experience, for which the model fails to account.  
The second model provides a neuro-explanation for mental illness in a Brain 
Disorder model; pinning the language of mind to the brain. In this approach, the ‘body’ 
is involved because the brain is part of the body and ‘mental’ dis/order is attributed to 
individual brain dysfunction. I suggest that this model lacks an appreciation of other 
body systems as it works in a top-down approach and, in some cases, 0ver-individualises 
mental health issues.  
The third Interacting Mind and Body model supports an integrated model of 
mind and body but keeps cracks and contradictions in its attempts at integration as 
cognition occurs in the head, and the ‘body’ reacts accordingly. Across these models, 
mental health problems exist in either brain chemicals thereby making them into a 
matter of internal dysfunction, or in irrational immaterial thoughts that need to be 
managed by an agentic individual. Dualism is underlined in the language used to 
connect or carve up physical and mental health.  
The final model I turn to gestures towards a much more systemic understanding 
of ‘mental’ dis/order. The Body Systems model brings the body’s intelligent systems to 
the fore. Within this model, I look at concepts around the ‘embodied mind’ in 
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neuroscience and new turns in biomedicine working on brain and whole-body 
interactions. While this model articulates a systems-driven account, rather than one 
driven by heads and brains, it still often stops short of challenging the separated 
language of mind and body (as it is biomedically orientated its remit is more on the 
cellular and genetic than the linguistic). The chapter concludes by outlining the 
implications for these multiple models of mental health, and the powerful cultural work 
they do in shaping mental health narratives and experience. I end the chapter signalling 
towards Chapter Two by starting to critique, in particular, the way in which language 
intervenes in attempts to overwrite dualism and how an overemphasis on the power of 
narrative (as a healing agent, as the method of communicating experience and as 
providing access to the internal state of ‘mental’ disorder) cuts off access to embodied 
and sensory states of being.  
As I turn towards the models, I aim to problematize their discursive implications; 
showing first of all where the language comes from and how it is deployed to support 
and sustain divided conceptions of minds and bodies. While the aim here is to provide 
some discursive disentangling to review the trace and imprint of language around 
‘mental’ dis/order, all discourses are populated and expanded by others. For example, the 
Interacting Mind and Body model draws upon some metaphysical understandings as 
well as those neuro-based concepts from the Brain Disorder model. The single most 
prominent model of psychiatric discourse – DSM – employs both the language of 
psychology and biology, so none of these categories can stand alone. Furthermore, this 
chapter cannot possibly map all of the literature on the huge topic of ‘mental’ dis/order. 
Instead, the examples used are intended to provide an indication of the range of the 
different discursive meanings underlying conversations about the meaning of ‘mental’ 
dis/order, rather than to review the empirical evidence in each territory.  
This chapter is defined in relation to the whole by its engagement with the 
critical medical humanities. In this chapter, I turn to the idea of ‘biopedagogy’. This term 
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was developed from Foucault’s concept of ‘biopower’, which described how people are 
governed and controlled through ‘practices associated with the body’. In a paper on 
biopedagogies and the obesity epidemic, Jan Wright uses the notion of biopedagogy to 
argue that ‘truths’ about obesity have ‘become recontextualized in different social and 
cultural sites to inform and persuade people on how they should understand their bodies 
and how they should live their lives.’ 1 In a similar way, I use the term in this chapter to 
think about how ‘mental health’ is made the project of the individual and the power of 
that individual to enact self-change. I also consider how ‘truths’ about mental health are 
situated and disseminated in government policy and public health initiatives, as well as 
in the clinic and educational settings and how ‘popular media texts can be understood as 
a crystallisation’ of these dominant discourses.2 The language and narratives 
underwriting moralising messages about mental health may be subtle – almost 
imperceptible at times – but signal how ‘mental’ life feeds into a discourse of body 
management in prescriptions of mind over matter. In one example, critical psychiatrist 
Derek Summerfield looks at the translation of the psychiatric manual ICD into Latvian 
and how the Latvian concept of ‘nervi’ was categorised instead as ‘depression’. 
Summerfield argues how the ‘traditional language of (largely somatic) distress’ 
embedded in ‘disorder or dysfunction outside the self, in wider society and politics’, was 
thus cut away into the individualised diagnosis of depression, thus providing, 
‘internalisation of a heightened sense of personal accountability for one’s life 
circumstances’.3 The narrative structure of accounts of ‘mental’ dis/order shapes how 
citizens are told to enact and understand their bodies and minds as individual, 
controllable containers. The line between self-control and accountability and that of 
blame is a fine one, and, I argue, a dangerous one too.  
                                                          
1 Jan Wright, ‘Biopower, Biopedagogies and the obesity epidemic’ in, Biopolitics and the 'Obesity Epidemic': 
governing bodies, ed. by J. Wright & V. Harwood (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp.1-14 (p.1). 
2 G. Rail and M. Lafrance, ‘Confessions of the flesh and biopedagogies: discursive constructions of obesity on 
Nip/Tuck’, Medical Humanities, 35, 2 (2009), 76-9, (p.76). 
3 Summerfield, ‘Against Global Mental Health’. 
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Background: Divided Medicine 
Before I approach these models in detail, I will briefly consider some historical context 
for the deep roots of dualist understandings of mental and physical health in the medical 
model. For many cultural theorists, Rene Descartes (1596-1650) most clearly expressed a 
set of ideas, which are the precursors of biomedical conceptions of the palpable body 
versus the intangible mind, found in Western medical ideas about health and morality.4 
Descartes separated out the ‘physical’ body, as something that could be studied by 
scientific means and ‘the immaterial, mental spirit’ – a gift from God – something that 
science could not access. Although Descartes believed that mind and body were able to 
communicate and relate, his belief was that they were separate.5 By the nineteenth 
century – as psychiatrist R.E. Kendell argues – Cartesian thinking had found an ally in 
medical dissection which showed that patients diagnosed with forms of madness did not 
show ‘the obvious pathological change’ that was physically located in other diseases.6 As 
science writer Jo Marchant outlines, the development of the autopsy, alongside the 
invention of the microscope and stethoscope, meant that doctors could assess patients 
based on ‘structural, visible changes’, so that, rather than being defined by the patients’ 
own reports of their illnesses, disease could be identified ‘by the physical condition of the 
body’.7  
Cartesian thinking and medical developments were coupled with high profile 
cases that influenced public perceptions. Kendell cites the case of the ‘madness’ of King 
George who was successfully treated for his problems by a clergyman rather than a 
physician. He further points to the opening in 1796 of the York Retreat, which treated 
patients for distress and brought the term ‘disorders of the mind’ into common use. If 
                                                          
4 Scheper-Hughes and Lock, p.9. 
5 Jo Marchant, Cure: A Journey into the Science of Mind over Body (Edinburgh: Canongate Books, 2016), p.xv. 
6 Kendell, ‘The Distinction between Mental and Physical Illness’, p.490. 
7 Marchant, Cure, p. xvi. 
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madness was a ‘disorder of the mind’ rather than a corporeal problem, it was felt that 
this should be treated with philosophic insight and guidance rather than medical 
opinion.8  
By the middle of the nineteenth century, medicine started to reclaim mental 
illness. Historian Mark S. Micale explains how, within a movement of positivist 
philosophy across Europe, empirical science was hailed as a new research specialism. 
This was especially the case in Germany, with the emergence of new materialist schools 
of psychiatry. In Berlin, Wilhelm Griesinger (1817-1868), became the first professor of 
psychiatry and authored the Pathology and Therapy of Mental Diseases, arguing that 
mental illnesses were diseases of the brain. Griesinger’s work led to changes within 
German mental health systems and influenced subsequent academic-psychiatrists who 
turned towards positivist, materialist frames with more ‘secure and reliable’ methods of 
science than the views of Romanticism offered. However, as Micale argues, this evidence 
was often ‘speculative’ and ultimately ‘the medical effort to collapse the mind into the 
body failed’.9 
Medicine, and its specialism of psychiatry, continued to wrestle with this 
problem; if disease was defined as a pathological change in the organ then it had to 
conclude that ‘mental’ dis/order is in the all in the ‘mind’ and that nothing is actually 
‘wrong’ or something had to be found in the brain to account for it. The demarcation of 
functional (cases without visible lesions) from organic disorders (with clear somatic 
pathology) enabled this kind of distinction to be made.10 Cartesian influences continued 
to haunt the language and understanding: functional illnesses were thought of as being 
‘all in the mind’ and therefore ‘not real’, and ‘psychogenic’ causes for ‘mental’ dis/orders 
(non-physical, non-substance-like) underpinned influential theories and techniques of 
                                                          
8 Kendell, p. 490. 
9 Mark S. Micale, ‘The Psychiatric Body’, in Companion Encyclopedia of Medicine in the Twentieth Century, 
ed. by Roger Cooter and John Pickstone (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 323-47 (p. 326). 
10 Kendell, p. 490. 
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psychoanalysis – at the end of the nineteenth and start of the twentieth century – and 
also influenced psychiatric models. I will now move on to look at how the legacy of this 
vocabulary and understanding is implicated and involved in these dominant models in 
the UK context today. 
 
The Immaterial Thoughts Model 
 
…anxiety is from our thoughts. Show me where are thoughts physically. [sic] 
They are illusions and not phisical, [sic] therefore illusion. Anxiety is not real. 
You create it in your mind.11 
 
The above comment is taken from a thread of an online discussion about anxiety on a 
popular health news website. It exemplifies a conceptualisation of ‘mental ‘dis/order’ (in 
this case anxiety) as thought-bound, word-led and bodiless. In this account, embodied 
experience cannot be implicated or involved because there is no ‘physical’ cause for the 
anxiety, which is only present as thought that does not tangibly exist and is, therefore, 
understood to be immaterial. The person in this online discussion theorises that a 
disorder of the ‘mind’ – because it cannot be seen or materially examined through a 
microscope as an invasion of cells or tissues – must be self-created and self-sustaining. 
This is only one small comment circulating among thousands and thousands of online 
health discussions, but it is something of a microcosm of wider ideas circulated and 
promoted about the immateriality and metaphysical nature of mental illness.  
In this model of Immaterial Thoughts, I argue that the legacy of Western 
Cartesian subjectivity underpins and drives an understanding of the mindful, managing 
self that overrules its object body. This model defines ‘mental’ dis/order as embroiled in 
                                                          
11 ‘What Anxiety does to your body’, GreenMed TV (Health), 1 June 2014 
<http://tv.greenmedinfo.com/anxiety-body-infographic/> [accessed 10 July 2017].  
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problematic, irrational thoughts with little relationship to the embodied self, which only 
emerges as an afterthought or a sometime-carrier of the symptoms of mental distress. In 
this model, the self is an immaterial substance, joined to its body, but distinct from it. 
The ability to have good mental health is linked to ‘managing’ thoughts, with notions of 
resilience or self-control foregrounded. This model emanates historically from the 
growth and spread of psychology in the twentieth century12 and in some aspects of 
cognitive psychology today, where psychopathology is based on a thought-word-
behaviour correlative, and where research focuses on inner mental life, which takes place 
in words in the head.13 The emphasis is on conscious cognition and how to shape or 
affect thinking with individualised efforts. In current thinking, this model is not 
necessarily opposed to a neurological or brain-based account for ‘mental’ dis/order, but 
what it chooses to foreground is the immateriality of thoughts, the power of ‘the mind’, 
which is made up of those thoughts, the ‘psychology’ of the individual, and the concept 
of ‘mind over matter’. In this way, this model – often fluently and without contemplation 
– breaks apart ‘mental’ from ‘physical’ health. 
In the Immaterial Thoughts model of understanding ‘mental’ dis/order, 
thoughts are ‘just thoughts’ that can be changed or re-shaped with the power of thinking 
and words. This idea is articulated by author Matt Haig who explains how, ‘unlike many 
physical illnesses talk can itself be medicine with mental illness. Because talk can shape 
thoughts, and minds are all thought.’14 There is nothing physicalized or embodied in an 
account where ‘minds are all thought’. This idea is expressed in a lot of public-facing 
communication on mental health from charities trying to normalise and reduce stigma 
around mental health issues. In one example, the charity Mind’s website explains it thus: 
‘If you feel low or depressed, you may think, "I can't face going into work today. I can't do 
                                                          
12 Rose and Abi-Rached, p. 7. 
13 Charles Fernyhough and Simon McCarthy Jones, ‘Thinking Aloud About Mental Voices’ in, Hallucination: 
Philosophy and Psychology, ed. by F. Macpherson, & D. Platchias (MIT Press Scholarship online, 2014) 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262019200.001.0001>. 
14 Matt Haig, @MattHaig1 Twitter, 17 April 2017. 
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it. Nothing will go right." As a result of these thoughts – and of believing them – you may 
call in sick.’15 This discourse may acknowledge the reality of being low or depressed, but 
in a sense, it is arguably not that far removed from the ‘illusion’ of anxiety cited in the 
opening citation of this section. In an understanding where mental illness involves 
irrational or distorted thinking, there is the suggestion that mental health can be 
resolved on an individual level, which de-materialises it and which keeps it neatly 
boundaried inside individual heads. In another example, the UK mental health charity 
Sane circulated an image describing mental illness in exactly this way; separated from 
the ‘body’ with the text clearly announcing that: ‘Mental health has no visual […] because 
it’s in my head, not my body.’16 The body in an Immaterial Thoughts account is public 
and physical, and the mind (where ‘mental’ dis/order lives and festers) is private and 
internal – therefore not really a matter of substance at all.  
 The influence of this model is such, that the main treatments recommended by 
the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) – for example for 
depression – are Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) as an initial treatment and 
‘mindfulness-based CBT’ once feeling better ‘to stop you from becoming unwell again’.17 
Mindfulness, as Professor Mark Williams, former director of the Oxford Mindfulness 
Centre explains, ‘allows us to become more aware of the stream of thoughts and feelings 
that we experience’.18 Thoughts are the object of these therapies, which focus on the 
mind, and its invisible material, trying to observe and watch those thoughts, which are 
intimately involved with language processes.  
Words are particularly important in this model of ‘mental’ dis/order. As medical 
humanities and literary scholar Laura Salisbury articulates, within Cartesianism, 
                                                          
15 Mind, ‘Cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT)’ <http://www.mind.org.uk/information-support/drugs-and-
treatments/cognitive-behavioural-therapy-cbt/> [accessed 9 July 2017]. 
16 SANE, @CharitySANE Twitter, 4 August 2016. 
17 Rethink Mental Illness, ‘Talking Therapies - NICE Guidelines’ <https://www.rethink.org/diagnosis-
treatment/treatment-and-support/talking-treatments/nice> [accessed 10 July 2017]. 
18 NHS Choices, ‘Mindfulness’ 6 January 2016, <http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/stress-anxiety-
depression/pages/mindfulness.aspx> [accessed 10 July 2017]. 
61 
 
 
language’s specific role is as a ‘mental attribute’ not a bodily one.19 And in this dualist-
influenced model, there is a short step from the thought-led model of the mind, to the 
theory that ‘mental’ dis/order must involve a problem with language in some intrinsic 
way. In a book on depression and narrative, philosopher Jennifer Radden suggests this in 
her observation that: 
 
Psychiatric symptoms regularly compromise the capabilities required for the 
expression of any symptoms, so understood – speech, and the shared, 
intersubjective responses that allow words to successfully convey meanings, 
actions to make apparent sense, and understanding and communication to take 
place.20  
 
In the Mental Status Examination conducted by psychiatrists, ‘mental’ dis/order is 
defined through an assessment of the ‘appropriate’ nature of a patient’s speech and 
language including its rate, rhythm, pitch, intensity and fluency.21 The voice, and the 
sound of the voice, supposedly tells psychiatry about someone’s internal mental state.22 
Words define and diagnose.  
The model of worded disruption in an Immaterial Thoughts reading of ‘mental’ 
dis/order reflects the idea that ‘the wounds do not heal’ in the course of narrating 
experience ‘so much as insist in the form and language of the narrative’. 23 The shape, 
texture and construction of words are thought to provide insight into the inner 
experience of ‘mental’ dis/order in therapies designed around the idea that talk shapes 
                                                          
19 Salisbury ‘Aphasic Modernism’. 
20 Jennifer Radden, ‘My Symptoms, Myself: Reading Mental Illness Memoirs for Identity Assumptions’, in 
Depression and Narrative: Telling the Dark, ed. by Hilary Clark (New York: State University of New York 
Press, 2008), pp. 15-28 (p.24). 
21 T. M. Luhrmann, Of Two Minds: An Anthropologist Looks at American Psychiatry (New York: Vintage 
Books, 2000), p.38.  
22 David C. Martin, ‘Chapter 207: The Mental Status Examination’ in Clinical Methods: The History, Physical, 
and Laboratory Examinations, ed. by H.K. Walker and others, 3rd edn (Boston: Butterworths, 1990).  
23 Hilary Clark, Depression and Narrative: Telling the Dark (New York: State University of New York Press, 
2008), p.8.  
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thought, and that talking can be cathartic. However, this model takes the idea further. 
‘Mental’ dis/order is not only evident in speech patterns, but in this theorisation, it takes 
place on the ‘inside’ too. As psychologist Charles Fernyhough argues, thinking is 
‘conscious and it is active. […] It is dialogic: it has the quality of an internal conversation 
between different perspectives. […] And it is linguistic.’24 In Fernyhough’s dialogic-
thought argument, ‘mental’ dis/order – which happens in the ‘head’ and in the thoughts 
of that head – must have some relationship not only with the spoken word but 
specifically with inner speech.  
If ‘mental’ dis/order takes place in immaterial thoughts, then one theory is that 
inner speech in ‘mental’ dis/order evolves into an extreme version of what might be 
considered its natural or normative dialogical form.25 In a paper on anorexia nervosa – 
for example – psychologists Sarah Williams and Marie Reid suggest that the eating 
disorder exists in the very ‘conflict between the anorexic voice’ and the ‘primary self’. In 
this particular eating disorder, they argue that mental life becomes primarily ‘about’ this 
conflict and the multi-voiced self becomes ‘dysfunctional’.26 If this is the case, then the 
implication is that ‘mental’ dis/order is somehow created and sustained by this inner 
speech illness, which is locked in the head.  
Psychologist Russell Hurlburt’s phenomenological study of the eating disorder, 
bulimia, advances this argument. His research finds that some bulimic patients report 
there are two voice streams operating simultaneously – one which appears to be at the 
front of the head and that sounds like the person’s own voice – and a voice at the back 
                                                          
24 Charles Fernyhough, ‘What Do We Mean By Thinking?,’ Psychology Today, 16 August 2010 
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25 Lev Vygotsky, Thought and Language, ed. by Alex Kozulin, 2nd edn (Russia, 1934; Cambridge, MA: MIT 
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that seems softer and quieter. This ‘clutter of simultaneous thoughts’, Hurlburt suggests 
in an article on his work, can ‘often be cleared by [bulimic] purging’.27  
Psychologists Paul Trapnell and Jennifer Campbell argue that inner speech in 
‘mental’ dis/order might be problematised because of increased rumination.28 
Rumination is considered to be primarily a verbal process where thoughts are stuck, or 
where there is an obsessive focus on negative past experience and – within psychology 
research by Fernyhough and others – it is linked to both depression and anxiety.29 30 If 
inner speech within ‘mental’ dis/order is over-productive, dialogic, multiple-voiced or 
ruminative in some way, and if it no longer coordinates, processes or is silent (in the way 
that it is thought to normally function),31 then there is tangible sense of a language-based 
and thought-based internal ‘mental’ space emerging. Dis/order exists in this space and 
cognitive psychology chooses to put its therapeutic focus there.  
Several assumptions are inscribed in this model which I contest: first the idea 
that there is a neat division between inner and outer worlds – between what is internally 
created versus externally made – as well as an assumption that to be able to discriminate 
between the two is healthy and normal. Indeed, what is an internal sensation and what is 
an external feeling, and how can such a divide really exist? Some small and particularised 
examples that unsettle the clarity of this distinction might include: a song which pops 
into the head; the memory of a teacher’s voice echoing; the sound of a baby’s cry 
imagined by an anxious parent. Are these internal or external? And where do they begin, 
start from or generate from? At a broader level, in my emphasis on the power of medical 
and political discourse to shape bodies and minds (in the biopedagogies of biopower), 
                                                          
27 Jascha Hoffman, ‘Taking Mental Snapshots to Plumb Our Inner Selves’, The New York Times, 21 December 
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this sort of divide is intangible and unrealistic. Second – as some of the research on inner 
speech tentatively acknowledges – inner speech is only one part of human experience. 
Where is the space for the non-linguistic within these accounts? Can inner speech really 
be equated with, or responsible for, the sensory, the visual and the kinaesthetic, as some 
researchers in the field claim?32 Certainly, some of the methods of extracting or sampling 
people’s inner speech experiences (as per the work of Hurlburt et al) seem to be 
underpinned by a latent dualism, wherein thoughts are verbal and formed in language 
and are not attached to any particular sense of substance (apart from an implicit 
attachment to brain states).33 For proponents of this model, embodiment is simply not 
an issue of concern. ‘Mental’ dis/order is all in the head, and this is not a space in which 
to dwell on extended meanings of ‘the body’.  
The Immaterial Thoughts model is embedded in dualist language and ideals. 
The focus is on thoughts in the head; in thoughts which make up the mind, and on the 
language, that articulates or further ‘shapes’ thoughts, pushing physicality out of view. 
Drawing back to a question mooted in the Introduction: What are the implications of 
this? Is dualism unhealthy in itself? Indeed, one German study from 2012 provides 
reasons as to why dualism might actually exacerbate mental health issues. The study, 
looking at the effects of dualism on health behaviour, hypothesised that ‘holding 
dualistic beliefs leads people to perceive their body as a mere “shell” and, thus, to neglect 
it’. The research confirmed that ‘participants who were primed with dualism reported 
less engagement in healthy behaviours and less positive attitudes toward such 
behaviours than did participants primed with physicalism’.34 Arguably, those who adhere 
to dualist tendencies, if facing a ‘mental’ health crisis will assume that the solution must 
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lie within the level of the ‘mind’. They might admit that exercise, for example, helps 
them feel better, but think that the ‘real’ therapy has to come from something 
‘psychologically’ focused. The dualist narrative of mind and body problematises any 
explanation given to how and why physical engagement or awareness – for example – 
might improve mental health, if it’s all in the head. Language, in this sense, cuts into any 
attempt to articulate the embodied nature of mental health, when it is considered to be 
immaterial, floating in thoughts and psychogenic experience, and unrelated to the 
material body. 
 
The Brain Disorder Model 
  
Biological psychiatry: is there any other kind?35 
 
As foregrounded in the Introduction, in recent years, the growth and trajectory of 
neuroscience has developed evidence to locate ‘mental’ dis/orders in certain brain 
chemicals or pathways; seeing these problems as individual flawed brain functioning. 
‘Biological psychiatry’ drives new research into genes and behaviour via ‘genome 
scanning, proteomics, electrophysiology, neuroimaging and cognitive function tests’.36 
The argument runs that psychiatric disorders that previously lacked empirical 
explanation are now better understood due to advances in brain science. Conditions 
once described as functional (or non-organic) can now be described within a 
neurobiological model.37  
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A model of ‘biological psychiatry’ came to the fore in the second half of the 
twentieth century with the identification of a possible genetic component of ‘severe 
mental disorders’ coupled with the discovery of medications such as lithium and 
diazepam. Psychiatrist and neurologist Henrik Walter explains how these ‘quickly 
became a major pillar of psychiatric treatment’ and how ‘mental’ dis/orders started to be 
explained via neurochemical imbalances. This was followed up by progress in molecular 
psychiatry, cognitive neuroscience and neuroimaging. Neuroimaging, in particular, 
Walter argues, led to several, oversimplified, headline-grabbing stories about a number 
of topics including a ‘gene’ for schizophrenia which circulated a popular narrative of 
‘mental’ dis/order as a brain disease. 38  
Reductive narratives have been distilled in media accounts, often over inflated in 
accounts by popular science writers seeking to explain this new vision of humanity. The 
implications for explaining and intervening in ‘mental’ dis/order in this model of the 
brain as mind are vast. As psychologist Peter Kinderman explains, to make mental health 
problems into brain illnesses is to ‘change the way we think about personal 
responsibility’; it ‘locates the problems within the individual’, at the same time 
engendering ‘sympathy’ because the illness is legitimised.39 Advocates of the Brain 
Disorder model suggest that, by defining mental illness as a brain problem, the 
ambiguity of the Immaterial Thoughts model is taken away. Resultantly, the thorny 
issue of personal or moral culpability for mental health issues and the problematic 
boundaries of socially informed disorder appear to be out-manoeuvred. 
In a model of ‘mental’ dis/order supported by disease structures, the body 
definitely has a role because the underlying conceptualisation is a biological one. 
Specifically, neurochemical imbalances are highlighted as being a primary cause of 
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‘mental’ dis/order, with the ‘dopamine […] norepinephrine and serotonin systems’ all 
implicated.40 The argument that ‘mental’ dis/order cannot be seen under a microscope or 
located on a body scan with ‘organic’ proof is put to the test. Indeed, for some forms of 
‘mental’ dis/order – for example, autism or schizophrenia – it is argued that ‘structural 
and functional abnormalities’ can actually be identified in imaging or post-mortems.41 
This line of argument takes immaterial thoughts and gives them a material location. 
Even though the evidence from imaging and post-mortems does not apply to most 
‘mental’ dis/orders, the view that brain chemistry is responsible has consequences for 
treatment, as pharmacological interventions are targeted to address imbalances, and as 
drug companies create new solutions for newfound dysfunctions. Those who argue for 
the individual brain imprint of each disorder are confident in their language and 
evidence base as the following quote from the National Institute of Mental Health 
(NIMH) in America attests: ‘Through research, we know that mental disorders are brain 
disorders. Evidence shows that they can be related to changes in the anatomy, 
physiology, and chemistry of the nervous system’.42 In some cases, the case is so strongly 
articulated as to infer that another label should be created for some mental illnesses. The 
Brain & Behavior Research Foundation in America argues that some ‘mental’ dis/orders 
should be named ‘brain and behaviour disorders’ instead, stating that: ‘Out of the 10 
leading causes of disability identified and tracked in the United States and other 
developed countries; four are brain and behavior disorders: major depression, bipolar 
disorder, schizophrenia and obsessive-compulsive disorder’.43  
The implications of a biological model stretch beyond psychiatry’s remit and 
have a financial impact. In America, for example, insurance companies can pay out for 
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legitimised, diagnosed disorders only, and drugs are marketed and targeted to each 
different neurochemically identified problem. As a result of this disorder-insurance-drug 
triangulation, a psychiatric manual under revision is reported as big news by the 
financial trading press.44 As Rose and Abi-Rached suggest – providing examples from 
Europe and an American context – the new brain sciences moved from specialised 
science journals and literature in the mid- to late twentieth century and – after the s0-
called ‘Decade of the Brain’ as named by President George W. Bush in the 1990s – it 
began to be taken on and considered in relation to broad reaching government policies.45  
One of the more extreme consequences of a Brain Disorder model is the further 
medicalisation of psychiatry. In this model, ‘mental’ dis/order is understood entirely as a 
‘medical concept’ through, ‘the biological and neurological basis of “real” mental illness’ 
and via the ‘authority of the psychiatric, medical consultant’. 46 There is little chance of 
disorder being confused or conflated with more day-to-day issues. This view is famously 
illustrated in the US case of the director of NIMH – Thomas Insel – who objected to the 
lack of validity and objective measurement within DSM-5 and promulgated that ‘the 
NIMH will be re-orientating its research away from DSM categories’.47 For Insel, genetic 
advances, imaging data, and cognitive evidence are the future of psychiatry, not general, 
clustered symptoms that cannot be objectively verified or casually explained.  
With a medicalised, brain-biology model, ‘mental’ dis/order is situated in 
physical terms. This conceptualisation has implications for individuals in very personal 
ways. If ‘mental’ dis/order is not the illusory, intangible, metaphorical business of the 
mind, but is embedded in brain chemicals, then it can be argued that it is the brain that 
has the problem. Author and recovering anorexic, Emma Woolf takes up this model to 
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explain her own experiences. Woolf writes that ‘Anorexia is not a choice […] people 
blame the sufferer but that’s not right – you don’t blame someone who has epilepsy or 
eczema, you know they didn’t bring it upon themselves. For too long, anorexia has been 
treated as a choice and it’s not a choice, it’s a brain disease’.48 Woolf feels that the model 
offers a level of understanding and acceptability for an illness that is often seen as an 
attention seeking cry for help, or as a socially derived and socially contagious illness. In 
Woolf’s analysis, it is figured much more securely as a ‘brain’ problem. The ‘body’ as an 
entity (and a noun) extends to everything within the person’s physical being; this 
includes the brain which sits in the head. The mind, in this model, is the brain, the brain 
is the body, and everything comes down to how it functions. The mind is not anything 
mysterious because ‘consciousness is the activity of the brain’.49 The other parts of the 
body are of interest only because they are under the brain’s control.  
Although this model of ‘mental’ dis/order oversteps dualistic notions by making 
human mental life all about biology and brain processes (and, therefore, putting the 
mind into the body), it firmly establishes ‘mental’ dis/order as identifiable in localised 
and internalised spaces. It may well be argued – as Abu-Rached and Rose suggest – that 
with this model we can ‘consign the Cartesian mind and body split to history’, but I 
argue that this model remains problematic in a number of ways.50 First, it focuses on the 
cause but not on the symptom or effect; it provides an explanation, but not a meaning 
for the individual, and arguably subsumes personal voice and feeling under a medical 
model of faulty brain wiring. Where behaviour is deemed irrational and due to an illness 
or disease, it becomes separated from the ‘human reasons’ for the person’s feelings.51 
Indeed, as eating disorders scholar and activist, Emma Louise Pudge suggests, the 
                                                          
48Amy Stone, ‘“Anorexia is Not a Choice” – Interview with Emma Woolf’, Medical Humanities at the 
University of Sheffield <http://mhs.group.shef.ac.uk/interview-with-emma-woolf/> [accessed 17 July 2017]. 
49 Steven Pinker, ‘The Brain: The Mystery of Consciousness’, Time, 29 January 2007  
<http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1580394,00.html> [accessed 28 August 2016]. 
50 Abu-Rached and Rose, p.8. 
51 Kinderman, p. 4. 
70 
 
 
biological, neurological and/or genetic basis for eating disorders suggested in the Brain 
Disorder model actually ends up consolidating the ‘stigmatised, pathological identity’. 
In saying that there is something fundamentally wrong with the person – it creates an 
‘all-consuming’ identity, reducing expectations for recovery. Instead, Pudge asks the 
seminal question: ‘What is the practical use for this biological insight?’ Indeed, how 
might it actually be damaging? What does it mean to ignore the personal, social and 
cultural circumstances, and the complexity and lived reality of people’s lives – including 
gender, socioeconomic conditions, sexuality – as well as the political climate of 
neoliberalism; the context in which lives are playing out?52 This takes me to my second 
point that some researchers working in neuroscience who are fixed to a Brain Disorder 
position, seem to have no problem swallowing the social world inside their model. In one 
example, brain scientist Eric Kandel argues that social and environmental factors ‘do not 
act in a vacuum […]. They act in the brain’.53 This brain-centric model throws up 
numerous ethical and environmental issues. Returning to the feminist materialist view 
worked through in the Introduction, if everything is directed from above – from the 
controller that is the human brain, there is a sense that matter does not matter in and for 
itself, only in limiting anthropocentric terms; meaning that complex lived and embodied 
experience is overwritten. Third, a model of the disorder of the brain that pins 
everything on genetic causes or reduces everything to biological difference stands on 
shaky evidential ground with studies often underpowered, ‘approximately replicated’ and 
with ‘stable effects only found in extreme comparisons’.54 55 Furthermore, some 
explanations of psychiatric illness relate to imprecise evidence about neurotransmitters, 
which is often critiqued.56 Despite this uncertain evidence, the ‘biological, pathological 
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identity’ is widely circulated and used. Fourth, if taken to the extreme, where all mental 
states are understood to be brain states, then the word ‘mental’ is redundant and all 
mental activity is just brain activity, or mental activity is effectively powerless.57 This 
seems like an incredibly extreme position to occupy, and while it is not the aim of this 
thesis to account for every angle of philosophy of the mind, what is clear from this model 
is that if the individual, localised brain structure is the epicentre of all existence, then the 
physical flesh of the body moving among other bodies and interconnecting in the 
expanse of a complex and often-challenging world, feels blithely overlooked.  
 
Interacting Mind and Body Model 
The third model, which I discuss and present here, re-inserts bodies (beyond brains) into 
concepts of mental health. This model takes pieces of the Brain Disorder model and 
Immaterial Thoughts model but connects them up in an attempt to offer a type of 
mind-body map of ‘mental’ dis/order. This model presents a vertical line from head and 
brain into the rest of the body. The body is of interest here because it interacts with the 
mind; it is related to it. How the mind functions might affect how the body works, and 
vice versa. Typically, within this model, the body (as a singular physical entity, which is 
poorly defined but is largely conceptualised as physical life from the neck down) is a 
project; a set of organs and functions that need maintenance. Powered by a neoliberal 
ideology, this model – disseminated through government policy and public health 
literature – foregrounds the notion of biopedagogy asking citizens to manage and 
discipline their bodies. It is fuelled by the connections demonstrated between mental 
and physical health outcomes (which impact and put a strain on the NHS) and it models 
a vision of dealing with these connections with an integrated healthcare approach.  
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The body is implicated in this model, because poor mental health affects, or 
shows symptoms, in the connected body. Indeed, this model readily acknowledges the 
often-debilitating physical effects of having a ‘mental’ dis/order, but these are 
understood to be symptoms or results of mental illness and remain separate from it. A 
treatment that is aligned with this model of ‘mental’ dis/order is CBT. The NHS Choices 
website (the official website of the National Health Service in England – and the UK's 
biggest health website accounting for a quarter of all health-related web traffic)58 
explains that in this therapy, ‘you will work with your therapist to break down your 
problems into their separate parts such as your thoughts, physical feelings and actions’. 
Subsequently, ‘You and your therapist will analyse these areas to work out if they are 
unrealistic or unhelpful and to determine the effect they have on each other and on you. 
Your therapist will then be able to help you work out how to change unhelpful thoughts 
and behaviours’.59 This example demonstrates how CBT separates out ‘thoughts’, 
‘physical feelings’ and ‘actions’ into individual parts. These elements are seen as 
‘affect[ing]’ one another and it is understood that negative ‘effect’ can be undone by 
changing ‘unhelpful thoughts’. The theory here is that thoughts can be cognitively 
reappraised, changed and replaced. If thoughts are changed, then physical feelings and 
actions might resultantly be improved. This is a head-down model. If we take this model 
to understand panic attacks from anxiety, for example, a person’s ‘body’ might feel 
extreme stress formed in the tightening of the chest or a tingling sense, which they sense 
in the arms and hands. These symptoms might cause the person concerned to feel as 
though they are experiencing a heart attack. The ‘physical’ symptoms are acknowledged, 
and the body is important and relevant to mental health in this Interacting Mind and 
Body context, but the person is repeatedly told that it is their ‘unhelpful’ thoughts that 
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need to be challenged and targeted, and that this will then undo the sensations that 
occur in their separate body parts. The mental health charity Mind further articulates 
this idea in its own explanation of CBT: 
 
[CBT] focuses on how you think about the things going on in your life – your 
thoughts, images, beliefs and attitudes (your cognitive processes) – and how this 
impacts on the way you behave and deal with emotional problems. It then looks 
at how you can change any negative patterns of thinking or behaviour that may 
be causing you difficulties. In turn, this can change the way you feel.60  
 
The model of CBT espoused here (‘this impacts’ and ‘in turn’), is one of a vertical top-
down system. However, there is much more at stake in this vertical model of head over 
body than individual dissociation between parts of the self. If ‘mental’ dis/order is caused 
by negative thoughts, which can be shifted by being broken down and recreated, and if 
physicalised symptoms are seen as a by-product of negative thoughts, then the onus for 
the ‘mental’ dis/order rests firmly with the individual to get better and to overcome 
those unhelpful thoughts. Recovery lies in cognitive ‘self-management’ strategies.61  
The focus for this model might not be as pointed as the oft-critiqued stigma 
around ‘mental’ dis/order that simply tells people to ‘perk up’ or ‘get over it’, but the 
emphasis is certainly on the individual’s self-control. In her work about embodiment and 
voice hearing, feminist body studies theorist, Lisa Blackman writes that ‘[within] 
psychiatry […] the hero is one who is able to accept their diagnosis (I have “depression”) 
[…] the victim-to-victor narrative is one where mental distress becomes both a site of 
self-knowledge and identity work’.62 This model of Interacting Mind and Body ‘mental’ 
                                                          
60 Mind, ‘Cognitive Behavioural Therapy’. 
61 Rethink Mental Illness, ‘Tools for Recovery – Self-management’ Rethink.org, 
<https://www.rethink.org/living-with-mental-illness/recovery/tools-for-recovery/self-management> 
[accessed 18 July 2017]. 
62 Lisa Blackman, ‘Psychiatric Culture and Bodies of Resistance’, Body & Society, 13, 2 (June 2007), 1-23 (p.8). 
74 
 
 
dis/order adheres to this biopedagogical trajectory where recovery is a heroic 
overcoming. The acceptance of the diagnosis of the ‘mental’ dis/order places the 
individual in a position of self-responsibility. However, there is a dangerously short step 
from telling people that they need to accept and manage their problems, to a view which 
intimates that those same problems might be self-created or self-sustained.   
This view appears to underpin public health messaging with an attempt to 
integrate and connect mental and physical health. The emphasis within public health 
campaigns embedded in the Interacting Mind and Body model is on the rhetoric of 
self-improvement: the ‘One You’ campaign encourages people to reappraise their 
lifestyle choices, put themselves first and commit to addressing their own health needs. 
It reminds people that it’s never too late to improve their health.63 Changes are focused 
on the individual, as people are asked to ‘reappraise’ and ‘do something’ about their 
lifestyle.  
The model of mind over matter may work in terms of economics – shifting the 
work away from clinical spaces and on to prevention and self-management. However, 
‘computer counselling’64 (as offered by the NHS to patients with some mental health 
issues), which features online modules of e-learning to ‘Beat the Blues’65 or to be a ‘Fear 
Fighter’66 uses the warrior-like language of ‘fighting’ and ‘beating’ to sustain and 
reproduce a specific battling rhetoric around ‘mental’ dis/order. Even if this kind of 
online therapy is only meant to be temporary – for people on waiting lists to see a 
therapist in person, or for those with ‘mild’ depression or anxiety – there is a strong sense 
of how ‘mental’ dis/order exists, where it exists and what to do about it. It is not possible 
to say that severe depression sits in a different model once this location and these tools 
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are proposed. The overriding take-out is that people with mental health issues should 
address the thoughts, calm the mind and fix the object body as a result. This model of 
‘mental’ dis/order is focused only on wrong-headed worded thoughts, which can be 
changed. The body takes only a bit-part in proceedings. Psychotherapist, Susie Orbach 
agrees that since the ‘mentalist turn’ of the 1950’s ‘the body [has been] seen as dustbin 
for that which the mind cannot cope with’.67 Certainly, this idea of the dustbin resonates 
within this model where there is a trade one way from mind to body. 
Judy Segal, writing on the rhetoric of medicine, argues that the dominant 
preferred plots of individual resistance form part of a ‘textual culture’, which has the 
power to inform how experience is reported and even how we ‘experience experience’.68 
Mental health becomes a battle, something to be worked on and includes overcoming 
the unruly body. Indeed, this idea (and this Interacting Mind and Body model) finds 
itself expressed in alternative health and popular health and wellbeing books, that take 
on the mantle of self-improvement and sell different solutions to this end. ‘Motivational 
author’69 Louise Hay’s affirmation that ‘every single thought you think and every word 
you speak’ affect the cells in your body; or the idea that illness cannot exist in a person 
who thinks positively (Rhona Byrne, The Secret)70 encapsulate the idea of mental life 
implicating and affecting physical life. As Ruth Barcan analyses, a lot of this kind of work 
harks back (perhaps unwittingly) to a kind of Freudian model of mind transferring into 
matter; of the body, ‘holding and ultimately reflecting emotional or psychological 
patterning’.71  
Popular science writers attempt to separate themselves from the unevidenced 
and ‘New Age’ alternative and lay explanations for mind transferring into body illnesses, 
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but come back to the same language divides and Cartesian structures. In an example of 
this, in her 2016 best-selling book Cure: The Science of Mind Over Body, Jo Marchant 
offers up a theory of mind-body medicine wherein she argues that thoughts and 
perceptions (what she terms our ‘mental states’) affect our physiology. The mind and 
body are labelled separately but they also interact. Marchant is interested in how to 
harness the placebo effect to improve patient care, as well as, ‘meditation, prayer, 
conditioning, and hypnosis’ – ways in which the mind may be able to alter bodily states 
and symptoms. Marchant argues that the mind (in the brain) can change the body, but 
the mind (in the brain) needs to work hard within certain areas to alter long-term 
patterns and interrupt cyclical habits (as in the case of stress). The conclusions Marchant 
reaches disassemble Cartesian concepts by attaching mental thoughts and feelings to 
physical processes, but they do not make the leap to interrogate mind and body 
separation in the first place. Indeed, while Marchant’s book is an attempt to look at the 
real ‘science’ of ‘mind-body’ medicine, as opposed to the new age’s ‘wishful thinkers’ and 
‘cynical salesman’ (which she disparages) the distinctions and divides in the language 
Marchant uses, shows the legacy of Cartesianism holding sway.72 
The seeds of the vertical model of mental health shaping bodily symptoms and 
physicality are found in the often-murky waters of psychosomatic illness. The water is 
murky because definitions are thick with attributions of patient blame and denials of 
physical symptoms: psychosomatic approaches might treat stomach issues (without an 
identifiable ‘organic’ cause) as a somatisation of emotional difficulties, which are seen as 
somehow unreal or under an individual’s control. Issues of the mind translate or fall 
down to the soma (the way in which ‘psycho’ precedes ‘soma’ in the word itself indicates 
this relationship). In a contemporary context, psychosomatic illness finds itself relabelled 
in health literature as ‘medically unexplained symptoms’ (this is defined by the NHS as 
‘physical symptoms that lack an identifiable organic cause’ and for which there is often 
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no clear referral pathway).73 The language of mental and physical health interacts but 
struggles to break out of its containers, meaning that problems that appear to sit betwixt 
mind and body find themselves lost in metaphorical territory, routeing back to organic 
(real) and functional (not real) divides. 
In an Interacting Mind and Body model, policy and research prefer to deal with 
diagnoses that sit firmly in one camp or the other, and impact one another. Integrated 
care is thus driven by research evidence which has shown that ‘mental’ dis/order can 
adversely affect ‘the prognosis of a range of physical illnesses, especially heart disease, 
diabetes and cancer’.74 In the same vein, it is recognised that when someone has a 
physical problem it might affect their mental wellbeing: ‘According to NICE, people who 
are diagnosed with a chronic physical health problem […] are 3 times more likely to be 
diagnosed with depression than people without it.’75 The result of these connected (but 
separate) systems means that evidence is mounting which demonstrates that ‘physical 
and mental health comorbidities are common’.76 The research investigating these co-
morbidities takes the terms ‘mental’, ‘physical’, ‘wellbeing’, ‘health’ and ‘illness’ for 
granted, but the critical meaning behind separated-yet-connected elements is 
overlooked. In the expression of the relationship between physical and mental health, 
there is already a presumed disconnection and difference. With the split so engendered 
in medical practice, it feels almost impossible to go against the grain of language that 
segments and splits. Thus, while the concept of integrated mental and physical health is 
raised, the explanation tends to be that one thing causes the other, is a symptom of the 
other or affects the other, but the mental illness and the physical illness remain as 
distinct, particularised elements. Even though this Interacting Mind and Body model 
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attempts to go beyond biomedicine’s ‘tunnels of specialised knowledge’, it still, once 
again, ends up in splits and unhelpful binaries.77  
 
The Body Systems Model  
 
Embodiment is the surprisingly radical hypothesis that the brain is not the sole 
cognitive resource we have available to us to solve problems. Our bodies and 
their perceptually guided motions through the world do much of the work 
required to achieve our goals, replacing the need for complex internal mental 
representations. This simple fact utterly changes our idea of what “cognition” 
involves, and thus embodiment is not simply another factor acting on an 
otherwise disembodied cognitive processes.78 
 
While the Immaterial Thoughts model, the Brain Disorder model, and the 
Interacting Mind and Body model all end up circularly coming back to Cartesian lines 
in some way, there is one further model which – as I touched on at the start of this 
chapter – progresses to a much more whole-bodied account of ‘mental’ dis/order. This 
Body Systems model leads towards a much more sophisticated and nuanced account of 
embodiment. Indeed, as touched on in the Introduction, embodied cognition, or the 
concept of the embodied mind, developed within cognitive science, situates the brain 
within a systems theory of biology and, thus, cognitive processes stretch beyond brain 
matter towards an organism’s sensory-motor systems as well as in relation to the 
environment.79 A Body Systems model exposes the Brain Disorder model as an 
internalised theory; one that neglects the fact that the brain is situated – it is embodied. 
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When the embodied and extended model is applied to ‘mental’ dis/order it makes it 
impossible to say that ‘mental’ dis/order only lives in brain circuitry. Instead, the body’s 
‘realisation of cognitive abilities’ and relation to the outside environment, mean that 
processes ‘external to the brain’ are ‘constitutive’ not only for ‘mental processes’ but also 
for ‘disordered, pathological mental processes’.80 The original theories of the embodied 
mind (Varela et al, 1991)81 spawned a number of seminal articles and books by 
neuroscientists such as Antonio Damasio emphasising the close connection of ‘brain 
structures, whole body functions and aspects of the mind’.82 As a leading example, 
Damasio’s work on somatic markers and the emotions changes the shape of the 
relationship between mind and body. He argues that physical signals pre-empt the work 
of the ‘mind’; giving physical life and the emotions much more emphasis, as he suggests 
the importance of the visceral body that senses first before the brain makes its 
interpretation and produces a feeling of what has happened. Compared to the dustbin of 
the Interacting mind and body model, or the Immaterial Thoughts model, which 
barely pays heed to the function of the body, this is a much more complex form of 
understanding embodiment that has an interest beyond the brain. 
Beyond the work of neuroscientists like Damasio, who remain largely focused on 
cognition and often siphon off physical response from subsequent cognitive 
interpretation, there are burgeoning fields of work underpinning a Body Systems model 
of ‘mental’ dis/order by suggesting more networked emphasis on the brain and its 
relationship with other body systems (for example the immune, endocrine, nervous, or 
digestive systems). As with the Brain Disorder model, the focus of this work (which 
constructs bodily functions and organs as holding much more than metaphorical value 
in mental life) has gained traction in scientific research and, more recently, has found 
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leverage in popular science/lay texts – in particular related to gut health and childhood 
experience. I turn to three specific examples of this – psychoneuroimmunology, the gut-
brain axis and epigenetics – to suggest the ways in which the Body Systems model 
thinks about mental health beyond the head. These are huge and complex fields, and so 
this can only provide a very brief and cursory overview, but this work is important in 
establishing certain convergences around a Body Systems model and how some of this 
research is translating into practice and public understanding, and what this 
understanding does for different conceptualisations of mental health. 
Psychoneuroimmunology (PNI) is the study of the connections between what it 
distinguishes as the mind (psycho), the nervous system (neuro) and the immune system 
(immunology).83 In this work, it has been shown that the immune and nervous systems 
act in a ‘highly reciprocal manner’ and that ‘brain-to-immune interactions are highly 
modulated by psychological factors which influence immunity and immune system-
mediated disease’.84 The outtake is that ‘physical’ and ‘mental’ processes are collaborative 
– psychological feeling and experience is not cut off in its own separate world of the 
‘mind’; it is influential and meaningful throughout the whole body. This field has now 
made specific connections to psychiatry and it has been proposed that there even might 
be a new term to define the field – ‘immunopsychiatry’.85 As psychiatrist Carmine M. 
Pariante writes, in an article in the medical journal Lancet Psychiatry, in support of the 
definition: 
 
it suggests that our brain no longer governs the immune system, but, on the 
contrary, that our behaviours and emotions are governed by peripheral immune 
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mechanisms. You cannot cure yourself of a fever by meditation, but fever can 
make you sad and grumpy.86 
 
This is what Pariante calls a ‘hierarchical shift’ – the brain is no longer in charge. Mind 
over matter is turned on its head.  
In a similar vein, research into gut health considers that it is not the brain that 
rules the rest of the body, but that ‘an unhappy gut can be the cause of an unhappy 
mind’.87 With this model, the top-down, body-as-object conceptualisation is undone as 
the brain is not transferring problems to the stomach because of depressed or anxious 
thoughts arising there; the gut is storing, remembering, feeling and ‘thinking’ in itself. 
Indeed, researchers are considering how a disturbance in the early life of the developing 
‘gut microbiota can impact on the central nervous system and potentially lead to poor 
mental health outcomes’.88 This research is not only examining aetiology but possible 
diagnostic and therapeutic interventions. Indeed, a review looking at the ‘microbiome-
gut-brain axis’ has made links to how such work might target treatment future treatment 
for depression.89  
Epigenetics is a further developing frontier within biomedicine that dovetails 
with a Body Systems model of mental health and confirms the impact of life 
experiences on the whole system. At a broad-brush level, epigenetics is explained as: 
 
Additional information layered on top of the sequence of letters […] that makes 
up DNA. | If you consider a DNA sequence as the text of an instruction manual 
that explains how to make a human body, epigenetics is as if someone's taken a 
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pack of highlighters and used different colours to mark-up different parts of the 
text in different ways. | [As a result] any outside stimulus that can be detected by 
the body has the potential to cause epigenetic modifications […] from chemicals 
to lifestyle factors to lived experiences. 90  
 
Rachel Yehuda, professor of psychiatry and neuroscience at Mount Sinai School of 
Medicine explains, in her work on trauma and epigenetics, that ‘something that happens 
to you generates a biological response’; things ‘lodge’ in our bodies. Yehuda argues that 
this can be seen in the effects of trauma. She explains that, when ‘cataclysmic’ events 
happen, people often say, ‘“I'm not the same person. I've been changed. I am not the 
same person that I was.”’ Her epigenetic research has shown that this is because the 
environmental influence is so overwhelming that an enduring transformation is forced; 
biological systems are ‘reset and recalibrated’. Whereas medicine might have once 
thought that the body would bounce back like an ‘elastic band’ in a model of 
homeostasis, at the level of the ‘whole entire person’, Yehuda argues, this is not the 
case.91  
The legacies and understandings of all of this (very different and complex) work 
are slowly translating into the public domain via the work of public health agencies and 
researchers, as well as through popular media and science writing. Public Health Wales 
recently commissioned research looking into the way that early life trauma affects 
neurological, immunological and hormonal development and its impact on future 
health.92 Ideas around ‘Toxic stress’ and ‘Adverse Childhood Events’ and their impact on 
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future disease have been made into a documentary film directed by a Hollywood film 
star and are increasingly reported in the national press.93  
The outtake of these very different systemic approaches is that responses once 
thought to be ‘psychological’ and thus (in dualist terms) not ‘physical’, and so 
manageable only by individual behavioural change, have a deep cellular imprint, which it 
is not possible to simply ‘get over’ by ignoring. As the Brain Disorder model has 
captured the attention of the public and harnessed a more physicalized understanding of 
‘mental’ dis/order, this sort of research is capturing the public imagination but currently 
remains at the fringes of practice (there are few examples of practicing ‘integrative 
psychiatrists’ in the UK94 as well as a British College of Integrative Medicine95 and British 
Holistic Medical Association).96 Returning to a point made in the Introduction from 
critical psychiatrists Bracken and Thomas, there is a way in which it might be perceived 
that this particular form of understanding (with the funding and prioritisation of 
biomedical research behind it), will become dominant and marginalise others 
understandings. Like all of the models presented here, it works with its own 
‘assumptions, methodologies, values, and priorities’; formed from a materialist approach, 
focused on individual bodies, powered by a biological focus, rather than panning 
outwards to social issues.97 It is not possible to look at any of these models without 
considering the factors that influence and shape their becoming and dissemination into 
popular understanding.  
One of the interesting drivers behind the wider discussion around this model in 
popular and cultural material is its synergies with complementary and alternative 
medicine in terms of beliefs about whole body interactions. As Ruth Barcan explains, 
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alternative therapies are ‘an increasingly popular new form of cultural practice bound up 
in new forms of bodily understanding and perception and new forms of selfhood’.98 As 
Barcan continues, bodies ‘know, think, communicate and intersect in radical ways’.99 
These different ways of knowing about the body (beyond the body-as-object) – radically 
invested and involved in selfhood and not all directed from the thinking brain alone – lay 
a fertile ground for the popularised ideas about the Body Systems model. Indeed, the 
biomedical systems view of the body resonates with notions of the energetic body in 
alternative medicine – understood as a ‘set of unbounded bodies, most of which are 
invisible to ordinary perception’. These energetic layers are found in the ‘subtle’ body 
model that underpins traditional Chinese Medicine – including acupuncture – where the 
subtle energy is chi and yoga where the energetic life force is named prana. Barcan 
makes the point that the connection with biomedical Body Systems models is via their 
(albeit different) understandings of relationships within the body. The flow and 
exchange of information in body systems go deep into the DNA, moving around the 
body in constant process, and in ‘ebbs and flows’.100 This sort of connection – between 
biomedical practice and alternative therapies – drives forward the transdisciplinary lens 
for this thesis, and resounds with the idea of a ‘diffractive methodology’ looking at 
constructive connection rather than conflict.101 Indeed, yoga and acupuncture both have 
their place in NHS practice and are an increasing focus in health research from cancer to 
depression. Yoga has been offered under social-prescribing schemes in the UK,102 and 
acupuncture is available in many NHS general practices, as well as the majority of pain 
clinics and hospices in the UK.103 
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Despite these synergies and connections, the divides remain driven by different 
interpretations of what constitutes evidence and knowledge. The NHS Choices page is 
keen to differentiate between ‘Western medical acupuncture’ and ‘Traditional 
acupuncture’ and is clear to demarcate for which conditions the evidence base 
affirmatively supports its use (migraines and pain). 104 This kind of attitude towards 
acupuncture speaks of what Barcan calls ‘incorporation’ rather than ‘opening out to 
other paradigms or other experts’.105 The Western evidence based practitioner very much 
remains the ‘expert’ here and medical discourse dominates understanding and 
interpretation. Furthermore, among the formal medical associations set up to drive 
forward an agenda of integrative or holistic medicine, there is a message that they are 
now drawing away from their association with CAM fields by constructing their 
definitions of what ‘holism’ means and aligning themselves with the language of 
evidence-based biomedical Body Systems research.106 As Ruth Barcan discusses, the 
concept of holism remains a challenging one; for so long the central tenant of CAM 
practice pulling together ‘full human functioning’ including social, emotional and 
biological facets and opposed to biomedical segmentation, but strongly critiqued. 
Sociologists have conceived of these practices as a mechanism for self-surveillance – and 
part of an increased medicalisation of social issues – or viewed them as ideologically 
problematic in appropriating Eastern traditions, or related to uncritical and universalist 
theories around the ‘natural’ and or the ‘human’.107 While these issues cannot be easily 
reconciled, it is the aim of the next chapters of this thesis to build on some of the 
connections of these different discourses, and to suggest that these alternative ways of 
thinking about the body, might provide an entry point for thinking differently about 
mental health beyond the head, going beyond dualism.  
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 Before turning to the implications of these different models of ‘mental’ dis/order, 
I want to touch briefly on the way in which phenomenology connects with the Body 
Systems model, and how it has been used by critical medical humanities scholars to 
think about the embodied experience of illness. Havi Carel, for example, has put forward 
the idea of a toolkit of phenomenology for patients as a way to try and move beyond 
confining or limiting scripts for illness, which, she argues, are provided in contexts where 
illness experience is discussed.108 This is a very different conceptualisation to that of a 
bodiless selfhood driven from the head. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty’s work The 
Phenomenology of Perception focuses on embodied knowledge; the importance of the 
body and its ‘being in the world’. The ‘body’ is the ‘core of existence and the basis for any 
interaction with the world’.109 The body is not a fact like other things in the world 
because it is a vehicle through which that world is experienced. It, therefore, cannot be 
considered in the same way as an object or a mechanical thing because we ‘are’ our 
bodies; we do not just ‘have’ them.110 Indeed, Merleau-Ponty argues that the body has its 
own knowledge and its own way of knowing, which perceives, relates to, and makes 
sense of the world. This is not a matter of a separated mind or consciousness telling the 
body how to do things, but a deeply embodied knowledge.  
Carel uses the work of Merleau-Ponty to suggest how the body is, ‘central to any 
notion of agency or subjectivity or achieving any goal’ and how illness impairs and affects 
this. Illness – Carel suggests – deepens the understanding of normal embodied 
experience. However, for illnesses like anorexia, the shift is complex, and the emaciated 
physical body contrasts with the lived experience of fatness.111 Listening to, and valuing 
this embodied experience, might be able to contribute something radically different to 
understandings of ‘mental’ dis/order – something diametrically opposed to the medical 
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model with its dominant expertise. Indeed, in another example of a phenomenological, 
embodied interpretation of ‘mental’ dis/order, in a paper on body dysmorphic disorder 
(BDD), philosopher Katherine Morris suggests that some sufferers of eating disorders, 
‘feel as if they are fat’ in a comparable way to how an amputee might, ‘feel as if he has a 
limb’. This is not a mind in the head, thinking floating, disembodied thoughts, but a 
mind very much embodied.112 Some body-image activists might argue that ‘fat is not a 
feeling,’ but, in a reading that is grounded in the body’s position and interaction with the 
world, fat actually is a feeling – it is a bodily feeling with substantial form and meaning 
for the individual.113 Phenomenology starts to open up space where ‘mental’ dis/order 
might be understood as related to some kind of discord of bodily experience because the 
body cannot but be implicated in its account of being in the world. The body is not just 
an object to be dumped into from the head down, or relevant only because it ‘contains’ 
the brain, but because – as Merleau-Ponty argues – it is the ‘core of our existence and the 
basis for any interaction with the world’.114 
The Body Systems model of ‘mental’ dis/order admits that the body as a whole is 
not a disconnected vessel or an object, and, in some ways, parts of the theories that 
underpin it create a sense that the body in itself is able to ‘think’. However, that 
‘thinking’, is often still separated and split off from brain cognition, even at the same 
time as it demonstrates an implicit and explicit connectivity. This model takes us 
towards interesting convergences and spaces for transdisciplinary work to diffract and 
towards the meeting points and methods from historically conflicted disciplinary 
territories. However, to really engage with the meaning of embodied mental health, or to 
break out of the trappings of the ‘mentalistic vocabulary’115 there is a way in which – as 
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feminist critic Iris Marion Young writes – ‘thematised bodies […] analysed bodies or 
discourses about bodies as texts’ need to be truly ‘felt in the flesh’.116 I return here to the 
feminist materialist work gestured to in the Introduction (that provides a through-line 
for this thesis), which asks for an acknowledgement of the sensory and sensate 
intelligence of being. CAM’s blithe focus on an idealised holism might be conceptually 
problematic, but its alternative understandings of knowledge drawn from the body – and 
from body experiences themselves – provide a way through and beyond dualistic ideas 
and language. In the chapters that follow, I suggest that it is from some of these non-
dualistic models that we might be able to garner a new language with which to think 
about the ‘body’ in less objectified ways. 
 
The Implications of Crossing Models 
Before moving on to consider a more useful and coherent model of embodied mental 
health that radically challenges dualism and implies a new structure for thinking about 
‘mental’ dis/order, it is worth pausing on the implications of the contrasting models 
presented in this chapter. The conflicting positions (pitched within the models outlined 
here) that sit beneath the words ‘mental’ dis/order are powerful, and there is a great deal 
at stake in the linguistic markers attached to them. The discourses driving and funding 
the mental health agenda – public health, psychiatry, policy, biomedicine and 
neuroscience – shape and feed into public perceptions and understandings.  
The latent dualism that underscores the terms ‘mental’ and ‘physical’ health cuts 
across all of these models to some extent. Even an arguably radically different Body 
Systems model struggles to disconnect from those terms. Complementary and 
alternative health practices despite their often ‘counterculture’ emphases have grown 
within a ‘neoliberal present’ and ‘consumer culture’,117 where the idea of self-
                                                          
116 Iris Marion Young, On Female Body Experience: Throwing Like a Girl and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), p.6.  
117 Barcan, p.37. 
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responsibility and self-control are the dominant frameworks for understanding health 
and wellbeing. When it comes to ‘mental’ health, a neoliberal climate focused on 
personal responsibility assumes that people should be able to think their way out of a 
thought-based problem. Furthermore, the neoliberalist body project dissociates 
individuals from their object bodies as it teaches them ways to buy into modifications 
and improvements. Despite the interest in seeing mind and body as one, or investing in 
the idea that mental and physical health are deeply implicated, the cultural axiom to 
‘listen to your body’ already inherently creates a split: 
 
Me was a floating head […] I began to see my body like an iPad or a car. I would 
drive it and demand things from it. It had no limits. It was invincible. It was to be 
conquered and mastered like the Earth herself. Vegetarianism, not smoking – all 
forms of disassociation – like planting a vegetable field on a freeway.118  
 
As author and activist Eve Ensler suggests, in describing how she re-became her body 
after cancer, the typical model in Western culture is of a ‘floating head’ directing and 
mastering its dissociated, moving object body. This imprint of dualism affects how 
people want to be treated and how they understand treatment to work – so asking 
someone to take a perceived ‘physical’ treatment for ‘mental’ dis/order is confusing and 
contrary to their understanding. A lived dualist model means that people may observe 
their bodies, or exercise them, but will not see the movement as a part of their mental 
health, only something that separately and consequentially makes their mental health 
feel better.  
The effect of the legacy of Cartesianism and biomedical clinical practice focused 
on individual anatomical structures has meant the loss of bodily integrity. Resultantly, 
                                                          
118 ‘Eve Ensler: Suddenly, My Body’, TEDWomen, online video recording, December 2010 
<http://www.ted.com/talks/eve_ensler.html> [accessed 18 July 2017]. 
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we are left with the idea of what anthropologists Scheper-Hughes and Lock call ‘the 
selfless body’.119 This is the ‘body as a project’; to be flattened or toned with diet and 
exercise and monitored and measured with health technology applications – biotech – in 
a biopedagogical imperative. The ‘mind’ is less well theorised as it hovers between the 
above models; it emanates from – or is related to – the brain, it is composed of thoughts, 
it is linked to language, it is largely considered an individual and internal property in 
either immaterial or material locations. N. Katherine Hayles in her book How We 
Became Posthuman considers how the body of liberal humanism is ‘possessed’ but ‘not 
usually represented as being a body’ [my emphasis]. 120 Biopolitical power defines ideal 
neoliberal citizens as those who manage, monitor and track their owned bodies. It is my 
aim in gesturing here towards an alternate model of the Being-Body, to draw away from 
this emphasis by focusing on being not possessing. Indeed, the work of this thesis is to 
try and find some ways of conceptualising mental life as deeply enmeshed in physical 
life. This cannot be done by re-circling over all of the above arguments, or by admitting 
defeat and inserting some slashes and inverted commas around words, or adding ‘so-
called’ before writing or speaking about mental or physical health.  
 
Conclusions  
In this chapter, I have examined the language and narratives of some of the main models 
of ‘mental’ dis/order. I have analysed some of the sources of these models, and how the 
language within and between the narratives they produce, falls back into splits and 
binaries and reproduces dualist understanding. I have considered how certain dominant 
discourses from medical, psychiatric and political spheres define how ‘mental’ dis/order 
is discussed and the implications of the divergent understandings of what is meant by 
the ‘mental’ of ‘mental’ dis/order do to people trying to understand and locate their own 
                                                          
119 Scheper-Hughes and Lock, p.22. 
120 N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and 
Informatics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), p.5. 
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distress. In this closing section of the chapter, I suggest that language is a particular 
problem – not only in naming ‘mental’ and ‘physical’ disorders as separate – but in 
focusing on narrative as a way of dealing with the problematic thoughts of ‘mental’ 
dis/order in a dualistic paradigm. 
When a person is engulfed by trauma; in a prickly, edgy state of anxiety or feeling 
heavy, languid and depressed, or starving and divided; when too much is happening in 
the head and there is a feeling of bodiless-ness, these sensations are not ‘just thoughts’, 
they are not all able to be addressed by ordered words. Language plays a huge role not 
only in naming, defining and diagnosing but also in treating mental illness. Talking 
therapies are a keystone in the treatment of many mental illnesses. However, language 
has become very detached from an embodied context in its association with particular 
functions of the brain, and with the research focus, in particular, on inner speech, which 
turns language inside, and localises it.121 Narrative accounts of ‘mental’ dis/order are not 
just confined to the discourse of government policy and public health but are 
increasingly shared by service users, disseminated in online spaces, and popularised in 
memoirs and media articles. As argued in the Introduction, scholars in the field of the 
medical humanities have turned to narrative as a way to reclaim the intimate and 
individual experience of the patient against the powerhouse of reductive biomedicine. 
Borrowing from, supporting, and replicating the models of ‘mental’ dis/order in this 
chapter, narratives of personal experiences of mental illness, as well as fictional 
representations, offer up an insight into ‘thoughts’ from the head. Language is modelled 
in a Cartesian framework as uniquely positioned to draw upon those thoughts, and often 
analysed as taking the shapes of overcoming, healing or battling disorder in agentic, self-
actualising terms. Narrative is powerful and speaking and opening up is considered 
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healthy and cathartic. However, arguably the emphasis on language feeds the mind over 
matter model, which separates words and thoughts from the flesh. 
In Chapter Two, I consider how the dominance of narrative and language (both 
in personal accounts, in therapeutic responses to mental illness and in medical 
humanities criticism) might reinforce a model of individual, internalised, narrated self-
management of ‘mental’ dis/order. In doing so, I find a number of problems in the 
reliance on words which – despite attempts to foreground the experiential end up being 
drawn back into the expert medical discourse – trapped in the language of ‘mental’ 
illness, which confines and boundaries experience and attaches sensory or corporeal 
experience to symptoms alone. As I move through the next chapter and towards 
Chapters Three and Four, I start to argue that words and language do not have to be set 
in opposition to concepts of the body but can draw close to it, emanating with breath, 
gesture and, sound, vibration and pulse. Coming back to the depth and three-
dimensionality of Elizabeth Grosz’s notion of embodied subjectivity, I aim to reconnect 
language with physicality and materiality. In doing so, I intend to challenge the dualistic 
understanding of ‘mental’ dis/order, as thoughts dropping in vertical lines from head to 
‘body’ as the dominant models of this chapter have problematically consolidated and 
continue to reproduce.122 
 
 
 
                                                          
122 Grosz, Volatile Bodies. 
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Chapter Two: Narrating ‘Mental’ Dis/order: ‘Anxiety in the soles of 
my feet’ 
  
 
One woman said depression was like 'a black pit', another said it was like 'a 
million bees buzzing' in her head. One man said it was like 'trying to run through 
treacle.' Still another man said it was like 'rotting in the depths of hell.' A number 
of people described the way they felt totally cut off from their feelings and from 
other people'. It was like being 'locked in' and isolated behind Perspex or ‘inside a 
very thick balloon’ […] People had trouble knowing anything solid about 
themselves during depression. One man described it as if ‘your whole self gets 
put into the mixer and could come out in any old form’.1 
 
Chapter Aim and Summary 
In this chapter, I think through the tight-knitted relationship between mind, ‘mental’ 
dis/order and language, and the well-developed argument in the medical humanities 
that language – specifically in the form of narrative – conveys, unpacks and represents 
experience. I pay close attention to how these understandings serve to reinforce the 
concept of mind over matter, and how the primacy of narrative might be problematic in 
certain dis/orders where narrative is somehow linked to the experience of distress itself. I 
build on the questions of the anti-narrative or post-narrative positions raised by some 
medical humanities critics, to suggest that attributing too much power to the potential 
for narrative to cross boundaries between patients and clinicians, to ‘truthfully’ represent 
experience, or to act as a healing agent needs to be questioned and critiqued.2 I do not 
suggest that we give up on language in its entirety, nor do I deny that telling stories can 
                                                          
1 Healthtalkonline, ‘Depression’, HealthTalk.org <http://www.healthtalk.org/peoples-experiences/mental-
health/depression/experiencing-depression> [accessed 10 July 2017]. 
2 For example, ‘Angela Woods, ‘Post-narrative – An appeal’, Narrative Inquiry, 21 (2011), 399-406 
<http://dro.dur.ac.uk/8918/1/8918.pdf?DDD45+DDC51+DDD24+dac4ss1> [accessed 11 July 2017]. 
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be helpful and therapeutic in many cases. However, I suggest that we must be careful not 
to unintentionally reinforce a dualism by over-emphasising the power of narrative. This 
doesn’t mean a flight from language altogether, but a much more critical position vis a 
vis the primacy that narrative takes in medical humanities criticism and in clinical 
practice itself.  
I consider where there might be space for writing about ‘mental’ dis/order which 
does not objectify the body. I will look at two broad areas. First, I will discuss 
contemporary mental illness memoirs and the sorts of dominant shapes and scripts that 
are emphasised here (drawn from the leading models described in Chapter One) leaving 
little room for an embodied context for mental health. In once again reaching an 
impasse in the language that divides mental and physical health, and the overriding 
dualist principle of mind over matter, I then turn to modernist texts, which in their 
‘experimental and non-realist modes’ are able to offer a very different model for 
representing illness in language.3 I consider how selected texts from this period – by Jean 
Rhys, Virginia Woolf and Emily Holmes Coleman – write about ‘madness’ without a top-
down objectified stance on the body. I excavate how the embodied, unruly woman is a 
problem and how bodily acts become subversive ones by defying the confining shapes 
set for them by medical discourse. I discuss how these texts foreground the palpable 
materiality or physicality of ‘mental’ dis/order. Furthermore, I start to develop the idea – 
drawing from these literary works – that other registers of experience outside of 
narrative (sound, music, dance, for example) can tap into, intuit and represent embodied 
experience. 
When examining literary sources, once again, I embed my work within a literary 
critical medical humanities frame, which is – as Whitehead and Woods set out –
‘concerned more with opening up new perspectives on the history of ideas (including 
about the nature of mind, imagination and affect), and examining in detail the aesthetic 
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and narrative strategies through which literary texts model cognitive and affective 
processes’, rather than using literary texts as a window into the illness experience, for 
therapeutic value, or as an educational, humanistic endeavour.4 I understand this 
approach to literary texts to prioritise the contexts that are being underlined in these 
representations, rather than a way through which subjective experience can be re-
inserted into medical understanding.  
Psychiatrist Femi Oyebode articulates how manifestations of distress change over 
time; so how distress is signalled in terms of signs and symptoms is not a constant (he 
points towards early twentieth-century hysteria and early twenty-first-century anorexia 
to illustrate this). Resultantly, what is used to represent that distress alters too, and how 
a text indicates to its reader that it is talking about ‘mental’ dis/order moves within the 
culture of its production.5 I suggest Oyebode’s theory also resonates with different 
narrative forms because how narrative represents the experience of ‘mental’ dis/order is 
dependent on the shapes promoted or prioritised by the dominant discourses or 
available models of literature at the time. Specifically, for my research question 
embedded in a contemporary UK context, the very fact that ‘mental’ dis/order is 
interpreted, diagnosed and re-told first and foremost in narrative terms is important. In 
this chapter, I consider how this absolute emphasis on narrative might be damaging or 
oppressive, re-articulating mind and body divides.  
I do not aim to negate the power of narrative altogether but to be more cautious 
about its ability to heal and help and to thicken it with other sensate and sensitive 
understandings. It would be foolish to dismiss a century and more of therapeutic 
approaches offered in talking therapy or the research supporting them. This is not the 
idea here, but to suggest some spaces where this emphasis is troubled in relation to 
                                                          
4 Whitehead and Woods, ‘Introduction’, p. 17. 
5 Femi Oyebode, ‘Madness at the Theatre’, Beckett and Brain Science workshop, 18th September 2012, 
University of Warwick, audio recording 
<http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/arts/english/research/currentprojects/beckettandthebrain/warwick/> 
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dis/orders that are disturbed by words. In the case of anorexia nervosa, for example, 
narrative overrides body in such a way that the notion of mind over matter is 
problematically re-inscribed. Depression often causes a sinkhole in external language but 
causes deep, troubling narrative rumination. Furthermore, I seek to extinguish the 
binary of word versus body, or written expression against other expressive forms. A full 
range of expression is necessary to reflect the full palate of human experience. Language 
(more readily when taken apart from constricted narrative templates) can reflect and 
draw upon other textures, movements and embodied feeling beyond the linearity and 
control promoted in strands of illness narrative criticism.  
This chapter takes forward the questions of the thesis to understand the 
relationship between narrative and mind over matter dualist ideas. It gestures towards 
the chapters which follow that seek to insert fully embodied experience back into an 
understanding of mental life, and how this might include but exceed linguistic forms. It 
suggests that narrative can only take us so far. In keeping representation and articulation 
to constructed and shaped narrative forms, a disembodied expression of ‘mental’ 
dis/order continues to rule. 
 
Narrative Power: A Medical Humanities Approach 
In a first-person narrative about her experience of anorexia nervosa, journalist Habiba 
Khanom describes how she was asked in therapy to write a letter from her body to her 
‘self’.6 Khanom publishes the letter in her newspaper column and ends it thus: 
 
You only have one body. Please don’t hurt me anymore. Please please take care of 
me. Haven’t I been tortured enough? 
Lots of love, 
                                                          
6 Habiba Khanom, ‘Anorexia: A Letter from my Body’, Huff Post, 14 February 2017 
<http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/habiba-khanom/anorexia-a-letter-from-my_b_14692188.html?> [accessed 
10 July 2017). 
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Your body 
 
Khanom’s letter appears to maintain this split between her ‘self’ and her ‘body’ as she 
writes from one to the other, but there is a further division which she also invokes 
between her ‘self’ and anorexia. She writes: ‘I know anorexia was the one who made you 
do those things. But you are better than that.’ Khanom’s injection of a split between her 
‘mental’ dis/order and her ‘self’ resonates with approaches from narrative therapy. 
Therapists using this approach help eating disorder clients to create alternative and 
separate stories for themselves against the anorexia, which is positioned as an invader or 
intruder.7 Placed into a narrative structure, the ‘self’ is rearticulated in words. In this 
example, anorexia is pushed into a corner, away from what is pieced together as the ‘self’, 
which is located in the mind and within the words in the head. This therapeutic 
approach reflects the wider prominence of illness narratives as cathartic, able to pull 
order from chaos, or providing access to a renewed sense of identity.  
Narrative has come to have a powerful place in medical humanities scholarship. 
As Catherine Belling writes, ‘The humanities have, in their application to medicine, 
become almost synonymous with narrative’.8 Angela Woods takes this further, 
suggesting that the field has been ‘under the thrall of narrative’.9 In explaining this 
synonymy, in a chapter on narrative in The Edinburgh Companion to the Critical Medical 
Humanities, Brian Hurwitz and Victoria Bates explain that it has emerged as a valuable 
response to a ‘confusion of tongues’ between doctor and patient (each of which speaks a 
different language) and has been essential in countering hegemonic discourses by 
focusing on individual subjective experiences.10 Narratives in the clinic are those told by 
                                                          
7 M. White and D. Epston, Narrative Means to Therapeutic Ends (London and New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1990). 
8 Catherine Belling, ‘A happy doctor’s escape from narrative: reflection in Saturday’. Medical Humanities, 38 
(2012), 2-6. 
9 Woods, ‘Post-narrative – An appeal’. 
10 Victoria Bates and Brian Hurwitz, ‘The Roots and Ramifications of Narrative in Modern Medicine’ in The 
Edinburgh Companion to the Critical Medical Humanities, pp. 559-576. 
98 
 
 
patients communicating their experiences to health care professionals and are re-formed 
by medicine and psychiatry in case reports. Beyond communication in the clinic, 
narratives of illness circulate widely – in memoirs, on social media and blogs, in 
qualitative research – contributing a personal and apparently subjective voice against 
reductive biomedical discourse. More broadly still, a narrative turn in the humanities 
and social sciences has linked narrative to the ability to give meaning to experience, as 
necessary for identity formation, and as a universal and omnipresent activity – as 
narrative scholars have asserted that everything is a narrative or requires a narrative to 
be represented.111213 Illness has been analysed as rupturing this story-making, but 
overcoming that temporary fracture with words sees a person triumphant, successful 
over their chaotic experience and returned to their former (if somewhat altered) self.14 
Sociologist, Arthur Frank’s influential account of illness narratives suggests that telling 
one’s story is a form of testimony and that it is the patient’s job to make that story a 
‘good’ one.15 Anne Hunsaker Hawkins, in her book Reconstructing Illness: Studies in 
Pathography, feels that the written form of illness narrative should strive for clarity, 
purpose and order. She writes that narrative form gives experience ‘a definite shape’, and 
writing what she calls a ‘pathography’ (an illness story), involves ‘an individual’s mastery 
of a set of circumstances’. It is, she claims, ‘[the] act of constructing’ [illness experience] 
‘into a coherent whole’.16 Narratives master, order and sort thereby providing explanation 
and guidance to what is a confusing and self-altering experience. 
The same argument is applied to narratives of ‘mental’ dis/order. Public Health 
academic, Deborah Flynn – thinking specifically about depression – argues that 
narratives assist those diagnosed with mental illness to maintain or reclaim previously 
                                                          
11 Marya Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).  
12 Rita Charon, Narrative Medicine: Honoring the Stories of Illness (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
13 Jerome Bruner, Making Stories: Law, Literature, Life. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002). 
14 Arthur Frank, The Wounded Storyteller: Body, Illness, and Ethics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1997). 
15 Frank, p.60. 
16 Anne Hunsaker Hawkins, Reconstructing Illness: Studies in Pathography 2nd edn (West Lafeyette: Purdue 
University Press, 1999), p.25. 
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established notions of self.17 In a straightforward analysis of the illness narrative, it might 
be argued that the embodied experience of dis/order can be articulated in words; that 
the subjective, affective, physicalized experience represented in narrative form does 
something to answer back to the discourses of Chapter One. The notion of narrative as 
subjective insertion is a powerful one; it motivates people to speak up, and speak out. It 
is an attempted reclamation of experience from psychiatric criteria and labelling.  
The healing and transformative power of words for mental illness, of course, has 
deep roots in the past century with Freud’s development of psychoanalysis and the 
influence of psychodynamics on psychiatry. Talking therapies remain a key part of 
treatment for many ‘mental’ dis/orders.18 19 This notion within the clinic that talking is 
cathartic and healing arguably underpins the idea that narrative is needed to think 
through and articulate suffering more broadly. Certainly, in terms of campaigning and 
activism around ‘mental’ dis/order, a great deal of emphasis has been put on talking 
about, discussing and narrating experience to diminish stigma. The circulation of 
narratives has been given powerful ethical weight – to narrate is to open up, to counter 
stigma and misunderstanding and thereby to make a personal (and indeed political) 
change. The emphasis on the inequities in mental and physical health in funding, policy 
and practice has led to a seemingly louder and more vocal presence from mental health 
campaigners and mental health service users, who aim to break the silenced position 
‘mental’ dis/order has commonly held. The mental health awareness movement ‘Time 
for Change’ holds a national ‘Time to Talk’ day. 20 These things are linked. Talking is 
change. Narrative is power. Personal experience tells all.  
                                                          
17 Deborah Flynn, ‘Narratives of melancholy: a humanities approach to depression’, Medical Humanities 36 
(2010), 36-39 (p.37). 
18 Mental Health Foundation, ‘Talking Therapies’ <https://www.mentalhealth.org.uk/a-to-z/t/talking-
therapies> [accessed 11 July 2017]. 
19 NHS Choices, ‘Benefits of Talking Therapy’ <http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/stress-anxiety-
depression/pages/benefits-of-talking-therapy.aspx> [accessed 11 July 2017]. 
20 Time to Change, ‘National Time to Talk Day’, February 2017 <http://www.time-to-change.org.uk/about-
us/about-our-campaign/time-to-talk> [accessed March 2017]. 
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Narrative is so entrenched, and often unquestioned, as the method of both 
understanding and describing experiences that a question may occur as to what else 
would be possible to help people engage with and communicate their experiences, 
especially those classified as ‘mental’ experiences with their link to internal thought and 
language. Indeed, some narrative proponents suggest that every experience, at some 
point, requires narrative representation to be externalised, even if at first it is presented 
in corporeal or visual terms.21 In this way, such critics argue that in order to 
communicate humans require narrative, in order to make sense of our selves we need 
narrative: narrative becomes a defining characteristic for selfhood – for expressing, 
representing and understanding who we are. Leading this line of thought, philosopher 
Marya Schechtman argues that, ‘a person creates his identity by forming an 
autobiographical narrative – a story of his life’. In her ‘narrative self-constitution view’ of 
selfhood, Schechtman draws on two sets of ideas. The first is that ‘persons are self-
creating’ and the second is that ‘the lives of persons are narrative in form’. 22 In the next 
section of this chapter I suggest that this assumption is limiting; articulating a view of 
subjectivity led entirely through self-determined mind over matter; narrative here is 
internalised, individual, shorn from the world and reducing everything to ordered forms 
of language. 
 
Narrative Limits  
In a challenge to the narrative focus within medical humanities scholarship, questions 
have been raised as to whether narrative and its link to selfhood and improvement or 
self-knowledge might be damaging and even oppressive, failing to take account of other 
non-storied ways of being. Angela Woods questions the assumptions: ‘Tell us your story, 
because it is true (to the human condition), because it is yours (an authentic expression 
                                                          
21 Claire Charlotte McKechnie, ‘Anxieties of communication: the limits of narrative in the medical 
humanities’, Medical Humanities, 40 (2014), 119-124. 
22 Schechtman, p. 93. 
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of your individual experience), and because it is good for you (as part of the healing 
process).’23 I will use Woods’ questions here to start to think through the way in which 
narrative forms dominate and shape mental dis/order, and how the emphasis on 
narrative might be potentially problematic and even dangerous in some cases.  
Woods raises questions over how narrative is presumed to access – to act as a 
window to – internal subjective truth. Carel expands on this idea arguing that ‘even in 
contexts where illness experience is discussed (e.g. support groups, online patient fora, 
‘pathographies’) dominant and culturally specific approaches to illness provide a script 
for the ways illness “should” be experienced’.24 It is clear that patient experience and 
engagement has shifted up the health agenda in health research and that experience is 
often relayed in the form of words. In one example, a growing website or ‘patient fora’ 
Healthtalk.org ‘provides free, reliable information about health issues, by sharing 
people's real-life experiences’ and allowing people to voice their stories. The mental 
health section has funding support from the Department of Health. In the opening long 
quotation of this chapter, taken from the website, patients’ words are used to articulate 
the discombobulation of depression. While these words usefully present the corporeal, 
all-encompassing nature of depression, which is hardly limited to metaphysical spaces, 
these ‘free’, ‘reliable’ and ‘real-life’ stories have arguably been subsumed back into 
medical discourse – becoming part of a health website funded by a government 
department. These testimonies may not be as reliable and real as those who give them 
think, or those who reproduce them claim, as they are shaped by the aims and objectives 
of research and the research questions being asked – the boundaries set by the 
researcher, to research the categories or criteria of the ‘mental’ dis/order. Indeed, 
reliability is a troubling concept when it comes to narrating illness or disorder. 
                                                          
23 Woods, ‘Post-narrative’ <http://dro.dur.ac.uk/8918/1/8918.pdf?DDD45+DDC51+DDD24+dac4ss1> p.4. 
24 Carel, ‘Phenomenology as a resource for patients’. 
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Those who choose to write books about ‘mental’ dis/order may find themselves 
speaking to texts and ideas already written and circulated; a memoir is not an isolated 
individual act, but one replicating and fitting in with existing examples. As humanities 
scholar Rebecca Garden rightly illustrates, a book is not a straightforward articulation of 
experience packaged into words. 25 Books about mental illness speak to those that have 
gone before them (often making explicit reference to those texts);26 they are moulded 
and often altered by editors and publishers, and they are often asked (either explicitly or 
unconsciously replicating the narratives around them) to take preferred forms all of 
which might translate an initial account into something very different. Author David 
Adam explains in his account of obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) that when he was 
initially offered Prozac for his illness, ‘Elizabeth Wurtzel’s best-selling account of her 
depression, Prozac Nation, had made those little green and cream pills almost a fashion 
accessory.’27 A narrative of personal experience represented (and at the same time 
enabled and made acceptable) taking a pharmaceutical drug for mental illness. 
Narratives of subjective experience are involved in what Susan Sontag describes as a 
‘struggle for rhetorical ownership’.28 It is difficult to articulate an inner sense of ‘mental’ 
dis/order without drawing upon other references or metaphors that have already been 
used. As critics of narrative have posited, there is no unmediated raw experience, which 
is then produced into words, and seen through a clear window.  
In the two memoirs that I draw upon here as contemporary examples of 
narratives about mental illness, (Reasons to Stay Alive by Matt Haig and The Man Who 
Couldn’t Stop by David Adam), references to other narratives are peppered throughout 
the texts; structurally underpinning the exploration of personal experience. These 
                                                          
25 Rebecca Garden, ‘Telling stories about illness and disability: the limits and lessons of narrative’, 
Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, Winter,53 (2010), 121-35. 
26 Emma Seaber, ‘Reading Disorders: Pro-Eating Disorder Rhetoric and Anorexia Life-Writing’, Literature and 
Medicine, 34, 2 (2016), 484-508. 
27 David Adam, The Man Who Couldn’t Stop (London: Picador, 2014), p.186. Further references to this edition 
are given after quotations in the text. 
28 Susan Sontag, Illness as Metaphor and AIDS and its Metaphors (New York: Anchor Books, 1989), p.181. 
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different texts recount what are palpably different experiences, and it is not the intention 
here to give a detailed reading of them, but to suggest that the features and structures of 
these texts tell us something about the way in which ‘mental’ dis/order and narrative fit 
together, and how ownership of a neuro-model of selfhood is addressed.   
The review of Adam’s book in the London newspaper the Evening Standard coins 
the phrase ‘neuro-memoir’ for this type of writing that blends ‘brain-science and 
personal history’.29 Personal and biological narratives are woven together within the 
cultural context of a rising neurobiological basis for mental illness. Matt Haig’s 
bestselling book – a memoir about depression – is a story that is also constructed 
between a wide range of contemporary cultural and scientific references. He cites 
publicly-successful bestselling texts such as Ben Goldacre’s Bad Science. He cites other 
people’s mental illness memoirs (including David Adam’s). He cites statistics from the 
World Health Organisation, national newspapers and mental illness charities. He draws 
on Tweets from members of the public, and the research theories of evolutionary 
psychologists. Haig’s sources suggest the bio-social context for 21st-century personal 
experiences of ‘mental’ dis/order, which can never be wholly inner or uniquely internally 
subjective because they are a part of an age of technology that diffuses and circulates 
theories about ‘mental’ dis/order like particles in the air.  
These books re-create the narratives gone before them, and add their own stories 
to debates about ‘mental’ dis/order. The reviews for Adam’s The Man Who Couldn’t Stop 
praise the way in which Adam has such a scientific approach to writing about a personal 
experience. The Literary Review applauds Adam’s ‘humour and detachment’ and The 
Sunday Times argue that Adam is ‘uniquely placed’ to examine mental illness because of 
his background as a science writer and editor at the journal Nature.30 Adam’s memoir is 
                                                          
29 Melanie McGrath, ‘When worry consumes our whole being’, Evening Standard, 10 April 2014 
<http://www.standard.co.uk/lifestyle/books/when-worry-consumes-our-whole-being-9251181.html> 
[accessed 11 July 2017]. 
30 David Adam, Book jacket reviews. 
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as thick with historical narratives, articles and scientific research as it is with his own 
story. Indeed, this is an attempt to explain, justify and elucidate obsessive compulsive 
disorder as much as it is to write out his personal experience among complex and 
opposing contexts and a ‘mass of vague terms and a mess of overlapping meanings’ 
(p.61). In a contemporary context, ordered narrative, scientific form and empirical 
explanation are favoured over narrative experimentalism. The neuro-memoir puts 
together fragmented subjective experience with grounding, objective material.  
The complexity of the relationship between narrative and truth has powerful 
implications, as readers may be emotionally invested and looking for templates, 
guidance or advice to relate to – or deal with – their own experiences. Within medical 
humanities criticism, illness narratives have been analysed as a space in which to 
overcome, order and control. For Arthur Frank, illness is a state of narrative chaos and 
wreckage, and new ordered stories are needed as therapy to draw experience towards 
meaning.31 Indeed, the type of healthy narrative shape emphasised has been one of 
reconciliation, sense-making and continuity. As literary scholar Shlomith Rimmon-
Kenan points out, in contemporary post-modern times, ‘when fragmentation is both 
prominent and valorised in postmodern writing, it is strange that illness narratives tend 
to preserve, even strive for, coherence and continuity’.32 However, in a culture where ‘Get 
Well’ continues to be the answer to illness and ‘recovery’ is a key term for mental health, 
the imperative to be mended arguably thwarts other kinds of stories or emphases.33 As 
Rimmon-Kenan explains, when it comes to published first-person accounts: ‘publishers 
tend to favor the nonfragmentary, for reasons of intelligibility, but also because 
coherence is likely to be interpreted as a sign of control or mastery, and readers usually 
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prefer stories of triumph’.34 Fragmentation is threatening and does not provide the 
answers or explanations, which are favoured in a culture where mind can solve the 
problem of unruly matter. A conservative model with a linear approach to getting better 
and managing and resolving problems is a perfect neoliberal cultural fit in terms of mind 
over matter, self-control and self-determination. If readers want to see weakness and 
raw, unmediated language, they also want to see that there is a way beyond this; that 
there is recovery and an afterward.  
In some narratives, the idea of salvaged chaos, of doing good and of clarifying 
subjectivity in recovering from a ‘mental’ dis/order, is problematised because of the 
nature of that dis/order. Anorexia nervosa provides a case here of troubled narrative, 
because of its attached notions of contagion and transmission through words. Medical 
humanities scholar Emma Seaber, in a paper on how the rhetoric of a pro-eating disorder 
culture feeds off anorexia life-writing, suggests that:  
 
there does appear to be a special relationship between particular writing and 
reading practices and anorexia identity formation and maintenance for some 
readers with a predisposition to eating disorders. Certain experiences and 
accounts of anorexia […] seem to rely upon peculiar ways of approaching, 
producing, and consuming written texts.35  
 
In this way, narrative (reading the narratives of other anorexics) may be actively 
damaging as it propagates (albeit unintentionally on the part of the author) the 
dis/order. Seaber uses the example of the bestselling anorexia memoir Wasted by Marya 
Hornbacher as an example of how a book becomes an object of ‘devotion’ for anorexia 
nervosa patients looking ‘to exacerbate their anorexic thoughts and behaviors’; arguably 
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anorexics may feed their anorexia with narrative.36 Thus, while Woods questions the 
notion that narrative will always alleviate suffering, instead foregrounding its potential 
capacity to ‘harm and hinder’, I suggest that anorexia provides an especial example of 
this potential.37 Indeed, while narrative may be co-extensive with the notion of control 
and order – and while these can be potentially empowering and self-determining 
concepts – words may also (more troublingly) be twisted and over-emphasised, 
problematising the concept of embodied subjectivity. 
Language, in Cartesianism, is a ‘mental’ attribute, not a bodily one; it directs from 
above.38 Arguably, in reinforcing the importance of words, in both the clinic and in the 
context of scholarship, which seeks to understand and analyse personal experiences of 
‘mental’ dis/order, this may unwittingly replicate the form and shape of the illness itself, 
which thrives in words or obsessive thoughts. Indeed, a question arises as to whether this 
‘urge to narrativize overrides the invitation to “rebody yourself”.’39 This can be seen once 
again in the example of anorexia. Literary scholar Gillian Brown analyses anorexia as an 
extreme enactment of ‘liberal humanism’ with its focus on individual self-control. She 
argues that the anorectic’s struggle to ‘decrement’ the body is possible because the body 
is seen as something that can be mastered and directed from the head, as opposed to 
being recognised as inextricable part of being.40 Anorexia festers and grows in the gap 
between mind and body; in the ideal of mind over matter. Eventually, existence is driven 
only from within that ‘mind’. It is commonly reported that an anorexic ‘voice’ takes over 
in the head, commanding further self-starvation.41 Words are on the attack. Eventually, 
existence is driven only from within that restricted ‘mind’ of self-sabotage and embodied 
recovery becomes an elusive concept. 
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Haig’s account of depression suggests his own severance between thought and 
body. Depression causes him a profound sense of self-alienation and ‘derealisation’ 
(p.157); he writes that his ‘physical body seemed unreal and abstract and partly fictional’ 
(p.134). Even Haig’s own body becomes a sort of narrated ‘fictional’ abstract object. He 
describes this is like, ‘you are controlling your body from somewhere else’ and that ‘the 
centre that is you has gone’ (p.158). Reasons to Stay Alive suggests the stark result of the 
dualist split; ravaging thoughts overtake and the objectified and controlled ‘body’ is left 
hanging, it is a mere symptomatic vessel that is hardly involved in ‘being’ at all. While it 
may generally be the case that sensory experiences can be excavated with verbal or text 
based responses (even if those responses are not fully fledged narrative articulations), if a 
sensory understanding of the world has been suppressed by the disorder itself, then 
perhaps there is an inarticulacy because illness has effaced the corporeal.  
This idea draws to the surface further potential for narrative harm. In the 
experience of a 24/7 voice on loop in anorexia, or in rumination, which is said to be a 
feature of depression, or with the obsessive drilling of thoughts in OCD, there emerges 
the inescapability of overactive churning narrative and the constant battle with a headful 
of words. In this way, as Rimmon-Kenan argues, telling and writing ‘both may sometimes 
be entrapments in the chaos they tell’ and, in these forms of intense distress, may be 
viewed a sort of internal imprisonment ‘an issueless re-enactment of traumatic events, it 
narrates (or fails to narrate).’42 If this is the case, then, as Woods rightly questions, we 
need to interrogate whether narrative should ‘remain the privileged form for the 
interpretation or restitution of that self-experience.’43 Both Adam and Haig touch on the 
power and pain of worded thoughts. Adam’s text opens with a quote from an unknown 
source: 
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 Watch your thoughts, for they become words. 
Watch your words, for they become actions. 
 Watch your actions, for they become habits. 
 Watch your habits, for they become character. 
 Watch your character, for it becomes your destiny. 
 
This is a model of ‘mental’ dis/order that is very much top-down, from thought into 
language into action and into being. Adam’s text is immersed in addressing the depth 
and despair of his compulsive thoughts turned into potent and self-destructive language. 
Narrative struggles to access the body or embodied feeling in such a vertically ordered 
plane of existence.  
Body-Mind-Brain 
 
In Chapter One I considered how neuroscience has come to dominate understandings of 
mental health, with brain-based vocabularies widely disseminated into public 
consciousness. Mental health service users negotiate and move between these 
vocabularies, and those of psychology, to articulate their problems. When it comes to 
depression – for example – Deborah Flynn explains how ‘shifting ideas’, confound the 
experience, expression, and ultimately the treatment of depression’.44 Changing scientific 
paradigms concerning the cause and course of depression, as well as changing attitudes 
and beliefs both about depression and those experiencing depression, contribute to this 
lack of clarity. These conflicting models are pronounced in the texts by Adam and Haig. 
Haig’s memoir offers an insight into the problem of the language of ‘mental’ dis/order. 
His book takes his experience of depression and threads it through with the 
contemporary biomedical explanations for his illness. Throughout the text, Haig jostles 
with the competing physical and mental aspects of depression. He openly struggles with 
                                                          
44 Flynn, p. 37. 
109 
 
 
how to fit together what brain science owns and claims about depression and the 
corporeal feelings that often overpower him: the panic wherein his hands are shaking, 
his heart is ‘beating too fast’ and he struggles to speak – a feeling he likens to a ‘flood’ 
(p.24). The opening page sets up the neurobiological model. Haig explains that, at the 
beginning of his health issues, he felt an initial sort of ‘pulsing or intense flickering’, what 
he interprets as a ‘biological activity’ at the rear of his skull. He identifies this place as 
‘the cerebellum’ and continues, ‘I did not yet know of the strange physical effects 
depression and anxiety would create’ (p.9). Haig takes the biomedical brain disorder 
discourse and connects it up with his flickering sensation; this is not a subjective 
narrative set against objective facts, but interplay between the two.  
Throughout the text, Haig draws back to the corporeal symptoms including ‘a 
kind of near-aching, tingling sensation’ in various parts of his body (p.46) and ‘an inner 
trembling’ (p.47); he describes how his tears ‘came from [the] gut, [the] stomach’ (p.57). 
Time and again, Haig reaches to the incongruity of the ‘physical aspect’ of ‘mental’ 
dis/order. When he draws upon metaphors, it seems to be all about incommunicability, 
as the physical body is overcome and ‘trapped in a tunnel’ or heavy at ‘the bottom of the 
ocean’ or raging ‘on fire’ (p.125). This corporeality is not what is taught about ‘mental’ 
dis/order in a dualist culture, and the experience struggles to sit with the idea of an 
enclosed mind within the skull. In this perplexing terrain, Haig decides that the physical 
symptoms of his depression and anxiety must be an accompaniment or a side effect of 
his ‘mental’ ill health (p.78). For Haig, the mind still sits in the head, even if the 
problems do not all happen above the neck and are diffused throughout the person 
(p.156). 
Adam’s account is also an attempt to connect up those thoughts of his mind with 
the science around the brain. Adam feels that the Brain Disorder model is potentially 
too limiting and has focused too much on small parts of brain activity. Instead, he 
theorises that the elements of the brain work together as an ‘orchestra’ (p.274) and the 
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mind arises from this combination so that, ‘the sum is greater than the parts’ (p.172). The 
conclusion he draws, from all the academic, scientific and popular representations he 
discusses around the mind/brain conundrum, is that ‘it’s my mind, the brain’s lodger, 
which has the OCD’ (p.200). The mind, in Adam’s account, is clearly in the head. Adam 
brings together an updated model of William James’ ‘stream’ of thoughts with the 
‘electrical and chemical signals’ (p.171) channelled by the brain. The metaphors he uses 
for the mind are taken away from nature (with its streams, eddies and currents) and are 
much more mechanistic in tone, as he writes that ‘the mind is a thought factory’ where 
the ‘conveyor belt…always rolls’ (p.113). The tone perhaps reflects something of the 
ambivalence he feels about the power of these thoughts, which control him and vastly 
disrupt his life. Thoughts are his ‘enemy within’ (p.207) and Adam questions why ‘mind 
over matter’ is always couched in such positive self-determining ways.  
Adam’s account is interesting because it suggests the entrenchment of 
mind/body separation as is popularly conceived and understood. As Western dualist 
metaphysics dominates narrative shapes of mental and physical health, this feeds back 
into the way the world is actually experienced. The more that bodies are disconnected, 
alienated and objectified, and the more people live in their heads, and the more the idea 
of embodiment becomes difficult to explain or engage with. Adam’s memoir shows the 
intractability of the mind and body separation. The issue is implicit in the very structure 
of science and medicine – as I intimated at the start of Chapter One – separation and 
specialisation reinforce Cartesianism. Adam writes that ‘Neurologists work with brain 
tissue. Psychologists grapple with the functions of the mind. Psychiatrists have a foot in 
both camps; they diagnose problems of the mind and treat them as problems of the 
brain.’ (p.200) It is difficult, as a mental health service user, to negotiate this terrain, and 
it is unsurprising that an explanation for dis/order is found somewhere between the 
‘ephemeral’ mind and ‘material’ brain in this jumble of explanations and responses 
(p.201). I return here to an impasse, where the language of mental and physical health 
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obfuscates attempts to articulate symptomatology or support therapies that negate these 
medically defined spaces. 
 
Narrative Bodies: ‘All her body became that song’ 
Both Haig and Adam can articulate the intensity of the physicality of their ‘mental’ 
illness experience but it is within constricted forms. Narrative gets so far but is bounded 
by medical models and re-inserted into dominant frameworks. However, as Laura 
Salisbury articulates, there has perhaps been an incorrect assumption, in the 
construction of a ‘post-narrative’ position for the medical humanities, that language is 
the same as narrative. Salisbury stresses the difference between the propositional within 
narrative – where words are in context, modified by one another to ‘form a proposition’ – 
with other forms of language – the poetic, rhyme, idiom, for example. Salisbury’s 
argument moves towards a ‘critical questioning of the centrality of particular forms of 
language and narrative to medical humanities, without giving up on language’s resources 
or reframing illness as a state of exception beyond the linguistic’.45 Language is much 
more than its formation in structured, propositional, self-controlling narrative. She 
considers language that ‘cleaves to the embodiment of mind’ by burrowing into the 
‘resistant matter’ of language, away from contemporary versions of coherence and 
continuity, and towards modes that came to ‘scientific, philosophical and aesthetic 
visibility in modernity’.46  
Building on Salisbury’s re-visioning of language via modernism; I argue that 
modernism’s novel modes of narrative representation help provide much more of an 
embodied context for language. Modernist texts help to shift understanding about what 
narrative is and can do; it is not just the closed-down, confining structures that Woods 
warns against. These modes reveal how language can access the corporeality of distress 
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and disorder, without re-inscribing Cartesian assumptions about mind and matter. 
Modernist literary texts are useful precisely because they push and play with the notion 
of how the intending thought can be conveyed into words, as they investigate the very 
material nature of language. This is valuable for this thesis because, in ‘mental’ dis/order, 
where language is disruptive, unreliable, inaccessible or somehow unrepresentative of 
feeling, the notion of a coherent, self-controlled narrator starts to unravel. The 
modernist novels used as case studies in this chapter, both respond to and extend, the 
challenge of representing inner mental life. In their non-linear, experimental forms and 
with fragmented and unsettled prose, they evoke the sensory and bodily disturbance of 
life in breakdown. These texts are resistant to neat explanations and suggest the deep 
involvement of the corporeal in memory, experience and feeling. 
Virginia Woolf’s essay, On Being Ill, provides a useful starting point for this 
discussion. In an introduction to this text, biographer Hermione Lee writes that Woolf 
insists on the body in illness as she discusses how corporeality is often neglected by 
writers in favour of a focus on the turnings of the mind.47 As Salisbury describes, Woolf is 
critical of the way in which mind is emphasised as separable from the ‘stubborn 
materiality of the body’.48 Woolf posits the need for a new language that is, ‘more 
primitive, more sensual, more obscene’ than what is usually admitted by ‘intelligence 
[which] domineers’.49 Words are pieces of matter in themselves, and, as Salisbury 
articulates, this notion provides, ‘the possibility of taking language back to the affectively 
charged, embodied materiality of words’.50  
Woolf’s emphasis on the body in illness also turns towards form, as she suggests 
that there needs to be a break in the ‘long campaigns’ of the prose narrative line.51 She 
argues that it is necessary to smash existing structures and to deliver ‘something of the 
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51 Woolf, On Being Ill, p. 19. 
113 
 
 
exaltation of poetry, but much of the ordinariness of prose’ to convey the sensations that 
illness evokes.52 The punctuation, the cadence of words, or the rhythm of a passage can 
reach towards an energetically-charged language, dipped in the body’s currents. Woolf’s 
diary recounts her depression and echoes the rise and fall of the depressive wave in this 
way: 
 
Oh, its beginning is coming – the horror – physically like a painful wave swelling 
about the heart – tossing me up. I’m unhappy, unhappy! Down – God, I wish I 
were dead. Pause. But why am I feeling like this? Let me watch the wave rise. I 
watch. Failure. Yes; I detect that. Failure, failure (The wave rises.) Wave crashes. I 
wish I were dead! I’ve only a few years to live I hope. I can’t face this horror any 
more – (this is the wave spreading out over me).53 
 
The passage echoes the sensation of being tossed up and down in an uncontrollable 
surge. The parenthesis at the start marks the gasps and gaps as she wrestles with the 
weight of feeling. She stands back from it for a moment to ‘pause’ and question, only to 
feel it coming again. As the wave spreads out, she is obliterated, unable to feel that she 
can pass beyond it. The body is involved – this is not simply a line of propositional 
thoughts one by one occurring in a separate controlling head space. Language (especially 
with the poetic emphasis that Woolf discusses) is formed with sound and rhythm, which 
intimately connects with the body’s vibrations and pulse.  
To think in more detail about how modernist texts allow language about mental 
distress to invest in embodied sensation, I am now going to look more closely at two 
novels – Jean Rhys’ Good Morning, Midnight and The Shutter of Snow by Emily Holmes 
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Coleman.5455 These texts explore the notion of embodied language that stubbornly 
maintains a sense of the physicality of experience. These two examples cannot hope to 
illustrate anywhere near to all that modernist literature says about minds and bodies, 
but, they usefully reach to sensate experiences beyond language – sound, music, dance – 
to articulate dimensions of affective feeling. In doing so, they create a bridge between 
narrative and bodies, and this chapter with those that follow. This is writing which 
sounds and breathes, where the body of language is experienced in affective terms, not 
detached narrative order. Mind emerges from matter; it does not control and objectify it.  
These texts contribute to an understanding of the meaning of embodied mental 
health by beginning to gesture towards a model of the ‘being-body’ where distress and 
disorder implicate the whole person in material and energetic terms. I return once again 
here to Elizabeth Grosz, who theorises embodied subjectivity as the body in ‘three-
dimensional space’, conceived in its full materiality and including language.56 The 
modernist texts I analyse here bring these ideas to the fore.  
Both novels have something of an autobiographical context despite being written 
as fiction. Their fictional status draws them far apart from the memoirs of Haig and 
Adam, and this is not an attempt to make a comparison between very different forms, 
but to suggest ways in which these modernist texts articulate ‘madness’ with an open 
ended and experimental approach to narrative, that opens up the possibility for narrative 
to excavate (and not control) embodied expressions of distress. These two novels do not 
deal with diagnosed and labelled ‘mental’ dis/orders – and this again contrasts with 
contemporary memoirs led by dominant medical frameworks – but these texts do speak 
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to the experience of marginalised, ‘mad, bad and sad’ women experiencing different 
forms of despair.57  
In Emily Holmes Coleman’s The Shutter of Snow, the female protagonist, Marthe, 
is committed to an asylum after giving birth to her son. The book is based on Coleman’s 
own experiences of a ‘postpartum depression’ after her son’s birth in 1924 and was her 
only published novel.58 In a letter to her father, Coleman explained how the ‘extravagant 
imagery’ and ‘dream’ forms of the ‘Freud era’ provided opportunities for her writing of 
‘poetry and poetic prose’. This ‘poetic prose’, she felt, provided her with a unique 
‘imaginative’ approach to documenting life in an asylum. 59 Jean Rhys’ novel of 1939 deals 
with the alienated character of Sasha Jensen – alienated because of her gender, her class, 
and because she is sexually active.60 Rhys later talked about the autobiographical content 
of all her novels: ‘People have always been shadows to me. [...] I have never known other 
people. I have only ever written about myself’.61 Rhys’ narrative does something to 
collapse oppositions between past and present, memory and amnesia, inside and out, 
and the body and the world. To achieve this, it also collapses narrative into ellipsis. In a 
similar vein to Coleman’s novel, it is not always clear in the text where the narrative 
voice speaks from (both temporally and spatially). These off-beat narrative devices help 
evoke a sense of distorted perception and distressing experience, which is pushed to the 
margins. Marthe is an embodied trouble taken out of society and put into an asylum, and 
Sasha wanders the streets alone; a female body displaced, traumatised, alienated and 
dwindling towards death.  
                                                          
57 Lisa Appignanesi, Mad, Bad and Sad: A history of women and the mind doctors from 1800 to the present, 
(London: Virago Press, 2008). 
58 Sophie Blanch, ‘Writing Self/Delusion: Subjectivity and Scriptotherapy in Emily Holmes Coleman’s The 
Shutter of Snow’, in Depression and Narrative, ed. by Clark, pp. 213-27 (p.213). 
59 Coleman’s letter to John Milton Holmes (16 September 1929, F.1595), in Rough Draft: The Modernist Diaries 
of Emily Holmes Coleman, 1929-1937, ed. by Elizabeth Podnieks (Maryland: University of Delaware Press, 
2012), p.xxx. 
60 Judith Kegan Gardiner, ‘Good Morning, Midnight; Good Night, Modernism’, 11, 1/2, Boundary 2 (Autumn 
1982-Winter 1983), 233-51 (p.233). 
61 Harold Bloom, Caribbean Women Writers (Chelsea House Publishers, 1997), p.137. 
116 
 
 
The prose in Emily Holmes Coleman’s The Shutter of Snow is confused; it refuses 
to make coherent sense of Marthe’s sense of turbulence as metaphors collapse and time 
unravels. Indeed, Coleman achieves this is by ‘undercut[ting] the concept of metaphor 
(as connection maker) by unhooking the subject from the predicate in terms of logic and 
meaning’.62 Coleman produces a narrative shape but puts cracks in its containing 
structures. There is a sense of a story being told in the novel, but the voice is not 
reflective or controlled because Marthe’s experience is chaotic and unpredictable. 
Coleman does not provide a clear narrative – the events of the novel are hazy – instead, 
she offers an immersion in feeling and sensory, corporeal experience. There is a refusal in 
the text to allow propositional language to control the chaotic negotiation between inner 
and outer worlds. This is an experience that draws the shape of narrative to the fore – 
madness teases out questions of how to represent itself in words, and Coleman refuses 
an answer by making metaphors collapse and rejecting a clear temporal structure. 
Language in its embodied, sonic qualities is always present, bringing us closer to the 
body, not always pitched above or against it. 
Coleman stifles any sense of movement in the text; instead, a stilled iciness hangs 
over the asylum and snuffles out the outside world with ever-present snow. The novel 
appears to lack time-space as, from the outset, it launches into an unremitting 
description of women and their bodies, and the noise, screaming and singing, which 
infuses the air around them. These exposed and vulnerable women held in the asylum 
nestle against hard, permanent and fixed objects such as metal beds and cold, hard 
bathtubs. They are controlled by faceless nurses and doctors, while often deeply 
immersed in the imaginary spaces of their dreams and delusions. At the end of the text, 
dates appear and time is reinserted, and outside and inside meet as Marthe ‘presse[s] her 
face against the window’ (p.124) and prepares to leave the building. However, Coleman’s 
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story is not a linear progression, neither is it a tale of an ordered head overcoming the 
emotional body, nor is it a straightforward presentation of words and thoughts achieving 
a triumphant recovery over an irrational illness. Instead, Coleman’s text is a complex 
negotiation of bodies and world in flux. 
Coleman’s text helps to articulate the idea that language is not only about the 
signifier and signified or the propositional, but the vibration of sound emerging in 
speech and song. The novel’s evocative opening is laced with sound and voices. Madness 
is defined by the sounds the women make and their relative ‘goodness’ is defined by their 
level of noise (p.21). In the asylum, quietness is appropriate and internalised. Screams 
and shouts transmit; they vibrate and perturb others – the kind of affective relation that 
the asylum attempts to suppress. Sound comes from bodies; it touches other bodies, and 
madness lurches through the asylum. The text starts with sound in its opening line: 
 
There were two voices that were louder than the others. At night when the red 
light was out in the hall and there was someone sitting in a chair in front of the 
door clearing her throat at intervals there would be voices far down the hall 
mingling with sobs and shouts and the drones of those who were beginning to 
sleep. (p.3) 
 
These voices call out and sound-out distress, but they come from no specific location. 
Instead, random bodies make noises, and long asylum corridors transmit pain. When a 
loud voice on the other side of the wall to Marthe’s room stands out from the generic 
throb, it becomes ‘entangled in the blankets and whistled the ice prongs on the wind’ 
(p.3). This is noise, and it is physical, solidified and powerful. Despite the best efforts of 
the asylum staff, bodies cannot be separately and individually contained. ‘Madness’ is not 
simply a matter of something happening between the ears quietly taking place in 
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internal thought space. The charged energy of sound evidences bodies that are vibrating, 
energetic and affecting one another. 
Coleman’s text gestures towards the sensory depths of subjectivity, which do not 
always correspond to straight narrative propositions, as she foregrounds the corporeality 
of Marthe’s experience. Marthe struggles to keep her own voice held in and her body 
held back as the asylum demands she must. She takes a slipper and rocks it – as if it was 
her baby – and sings to it, as a lullaby earworm plays over and over in her head. Marthe 
is unsettling the other patients, so is told to stop. However, her whole being is involved 
and enmeshed in her distress and so she jumps from bed to bed, whispering into the ear 
of a sleeping woman. Sound shakes and moves a sleeping ward:  
 
The woman turned suddenly and screamed into the ceiling. All the beds began to 
tremble and all the voices began intermingling, stooping and rising. After the 
scream there was only the movement of the voices, like the waters of a lake when 
the wind has passed. (pp.61-62) 
 
Sound vibrates, channelling the body and its presence: ‘her deep voice pitched in 
trembling supplication. It shook her body and her head shook with her voice’ (p.85). 
Sound is vital, material, reconnecting word with body. The physicality of sound is 
intense as it shakes and moves the air, and the bodies within its resonating space feel the 
imprint. In the asylum, sound breaks into violence. The atmosphere is palpable as bodies 
become rooms, and rooms become bodies, and as energy surges and fights break out. 
Coleman writes, ‘The room was tottering on yellow spindle legs. There were a thousand 
white nurses […] the throbbing of her wrists and her hair’ (p.43). Sound is made by 
bodies, felt by bodies and moves bodies.  
In The Shutter of Snow, madness is not a quiet or bodiless act wrapped inside the 
narrating, thinking head. Marthe believes she is God, and with this strong conviction, 
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Coleman writes how ‘she tore from her tender skin the rough nightgown’ and ‘pounded’ 
the door (p.5). Marthe’s body is strong and she strikes and shakes off a nurse ‘like 
autumn leaves’. Resultantly, she is pinned down, put under a thick blanket and held fast. 
At this moment, her body is hidden – made immobile – because its motion and power 
are too difficult and too present for the asylum to deal with. Marthe’s body is under the 
asylum’s control. Coleman describes how ‘she was lying with her arms bound behind her 
back in the spiralled casket with the canvas sheet all over’ (p.25). In this setting, women 
must not be too strong, too loud or too bodily, because too much body signals the 
emergence of sound, voice, feeling and potential disruption.  
It is useful here to draw on Iris Marion Young’s feminist essay Throwing Like a 
Girl – which I will also return to in later chapters. Young writes how female movement is 
restricted and inhibited, not due to a natural property, but because of social conditioning 
and oppression, and the resultant expectations and limits imposed upon them. As such, 
a woman’s body is ‘a thing’; it is both ‘looked at and acted upon’.63 Holmes Coleman’s 
asylum space is a microcosm of this bodily context; bodies must not take up space, be 
active, over-exuberant or too powerful. Marthe represents an act of rebellion as she 
connects with embodied sensation through movement. As Marthe dances, the lines of 
her body appear to flow into space around her. Coleman writes that ‘she lifted her limbs 
to the lights over her head and bowed her body down to her feet. She was a fair white 
stream gushing down the ill-poised canyons of a dream.’ (p.51) In this sense of abandon 
and dangerous imagination, comes the freedom to move and enter her body fully. 
Marthe is the opposite of the quiet, silent and internalised restraint the asylum demands 
and she is ‘wild’ (p.52). Marthe’s physical and moving energy projects outwards and 
affects the other women on the ward who, ‘mumbled their lips together and chafed their 
hands’ – holding their ‘twitching’ and ‘murmuring’ bodies in, containing their natural 
                                                          
63 Iris Marion Young, ‘Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility and 
Spatiality’ Human Studies 3 (1980), 137-56, repr. in Throwing Like a Girl, ed. by Young, pp. 27-45 (p. 39 and 
p.42).  
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fluidity and energy as their voices rise and fall energetically and physically ‘like a wind on 
a roof’ (p.52). Self-expression is more than a simple narrative ordered line and bodies are 
not neatly contained but relational, affective and powerful.  
Music theorist Naomi Cumming – in questioning the inner-ness of identity 
located in Cartesianism – argues that gesture and music accompany language as ways of 
forming subjecthood, which is not located in some private ineffable space, but in social 
and interactive contexts. Following the work of other feminist music critics, Cumming 
discusses the relationship between her instrument – the violin – which is an extension of 
her body; the embodiment of her subjectivity. She asks, ‘Does the self form the sound, or 
the sound the self?’.64 In doing so, she questions the notion that a musician simply 
expresses their subjectivity in music, arguing for more of a relational aspect – how the 
musician takes on the character of the music. This idea resonates in The Shutter of Snow.  
For Marthe, the energy of music is a way of feeling the physicality and 
spaciousness of the whole being instead of the enclosed and trapping asylum space and 
music seems to become the woman, or woman becomes the music. When Marthe sings, 
there is release: lines and edges are blurred, her body enters the voice and, as she 
inhabits the music, it releases her from the confines of the body-object into an active, 
feeling freedom:  
 
It was a song, a perfect song, a note of clean and fixed control. It came to her in 
that moment, and in the drunkenness of sound she was in a trance of silver 
goblets and all her body became that song. (p.31) 
 
When Marthe plays the piano, Coleman writes how she ‘plunge[s]’ into the keys, 
‘lean[ing]’ her body into the instrument, feeling the ‘wide spaces between her fingers’; 
                                                          
64 Naomi Cumming, The Sonic Self: Musical Subjectivity and Signification (Bloomington IN: Indiana 
University Press, 2000), p. 7. 
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actively creating and bringing to life a ‘dream she had been keeping’ (p.73). Music 
appears to provide release and space as if the music reveals her defiant wholeness and 
unruly, sensual, physical being. As Cumming emphasises, music contributes to 
conceptions of selfhood, and language in its poetic and playful experimentalism is able to 
connect with this sensate, embodied feeling.  
I now turn to Jean Rhys’ Good Morning, Midnight, which like The Shutter of Snow, 
refuses a simple narrative arc with clear developed order. Rhys’ prose is fractured and 
splintered as she writes the story of Sasha Jansen, a woman who is saturated by memory 
and who wanders the streets of Paris from bar to bar in search of her next drink. In these 
narrated hours and days, Jansen meets strangers and potential lovers and encounters her 
own melancholic past and her ageing future as she recalls earlier footprints across the 
city. Rhys’ text plays with how to represent Jansen’s episodic experience and confused 
sense of reality. The narrative freely incorporates sound and songs, dreams, memories, 
flashbacks and present tense, all of which collide in Jansen’s distorted (and often painful) 
imagination. There is a sense of Jansen’s heightened inner mental chatter as voices shout 
at her: ‘when the absinthe went really to my head I thought I was shouting […] to shut 
up. I even heard my voice saying: “Shut up; I hate you”. But really I didn’t say anything.’ 
(p.102) While Jansen’s inner voice is shouting, aggressive and vociferous; there is a sense 
of the dissolve of embodiment. She is a ‘cerebrale’ whirring round in her own spinning 
head (p.136) while her physical body feels as though it contains ‘stagnant water […] the 
bitter peace that is very near to death, to hate’ (p.128).  
Rhys does not provide a coherent, self-directed narrative for Sasha to hold the 
text together. Sasha does not have access to a narrative of her life with a clear sequence 
of events, but this does not mean that language cannot articulate her feeling. She is 
unable to answer the question, ‘What’s your story?’ (p.76) because she is never sure 
which way she will go, what she will say, or who she will be at any moment. She is asked 
by the boss of a dress-house she works in, about her time as a model, but is left hollow, 
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as she thinks to herself, ‘How long ago was it? Now, everything is a blank in my head – 
years, days, hours, everything is a blank in my head.’ (p.18) Rhys ends Part One of the 
novel with Jansen in bed, covers pulled over her head, wishing to shut ‘the damned 
world out’ (p. 69) but Part Two opens with the sentence, ‘All the same, at three o’clock I 
am dressing to meet the Russian.’ (p.71) Rhys use of the opening words ‘all the same’ 
suggests Jansen’s passivity: things happen and one place just turns into another, one 
mood quickly melds into something very different. The experimental form of this novel 
defies the idea of a closed down narrative structure holding life in place with clear 
chapters, and linear, organised time. The idea that thoughts can be overcome by words 
or that thoughts define action comes undone. Jansen’s narrative suggests there is little 
personal control: ‘I never thought we should really get married. One day I’ll make a plan. 
I’ll know what to do…|Then I wake up and it’s my wedding day’ (p.96). Rhys’ use of 
ellipsis implies the tailing off of Jansen’s decision-making into passivity and 
formlessness. Rhys writes, ‘It’s not that these things happen or even that one survives 
them, but what makes life strange is that they are forgotten.’ (p.118) There is no master 
narrative, as sentences throughout the novel dwindle without closure. It seems to echo 
the sense of inevitability in the novel, that time is heading only one way and that a neat 
narrative explanation is a forgery. Jansen reflects that ‘it can be sad, the sun in the 
afternoon, can’t it? […] sad and frightening.’ (p.120) Towards the end of the novel, Jansen 
admits that ‘when I think “tomorrow” there is a gap in my head, a blank – as if I were 
falling through emptiness.’ (p.133) The text replicates this sense of falling; the narrative 
does not – and cannot – overpower these experiences of despair. 
Jansen lacks a grounded sense of her physical body and, thus, life appears entirely 
ephemeral and insubstantial; her body is an object defined by others – barely inhabited, 
it is looked at and gazed upon. As Young writes about this sort of female bodily 
objectification, ‘The source of […] objectified bodily existence is in the attitude of others 
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regarding her, but the woman herself often actively takes up her body as a mere thing’.65 
Objectification is not only a problem of misplaced value – being taken only for how one 
appears on the outside – but means a lack of proprioception and a lack of touch with the 
world. Jansen longs for invisibility because the objectification is too strong.  
Despite Rhys’ emphasis on the inner voice, cerebral thoughts and on the whirring 
machine of Jansen’s mind, Rhys seems to suggest that ultimately the body cannot be 
escaped, because it is not only the narrating thought stream that is involved in memory 
and feeling but the whole energetic being. Rhys writes of Jansen’s body memory: ‘my 
hands are shaking, my heart is thumping, my hands are cold. Fly, fly, run from these 
atrocious voices’ (p.22). Jansen’s body is unable to conceal her feelings; her hand ‘shakes 
so violently’ under the glare she perceives from those around her. She cannot hide her 
deep rooted and visceral fear: ‘can I help it if my heart beats, if my hands go cold?’ (p.46). 
Jansen’s memories, responses, thoughts and feelings are in her body, they pulse through 
it rhythmically, and her narrative line cannot conceal this deep-seated body memory, 
which underlines every utterance made. Returning to Naomi Cumming’s notions of 
embodied subjectivity, body language and body gestures are intricately linked to the 
story of the self.  
As in The Shutter of Snow, music seems essentially linked to the body and body 
memory in Good Morning, Midnight. Music is powerful; it sits deep in the body and holds 
Jansen close to past feeling and experience. The effect can be all-consuming as it raises 
those feelings back to the surface and appears to transplant a person back in time. Rhys 
writes how earworms possess Jansen, who senses that she needs to be distracted from 
‘trailing around aimlessly with cheap gramophone records starting up in your head’ 
(p.14). Even with a chink of resistance, she soon feels overtaken by the streets and bars 
she visited in the past as they bring back her memories, and are accompanied by a 
melody: ‘The gramophone record is going strong in my head: Here this happened, here 
                                                          
65 Young, ‘Throwing like a Girl’, p.44. 
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this happened.’ (p.14) As she walks to ‘the music of L’Arlesienne’ she remembers a coat 
she wore and is transplanted to a café, to a man and seemingly, to another time (p.73). 
As Jansen feels in her coat pocket, she is thrown, because the pocket she can feel is not 
the coat she remembered so vividly, nor the moment she thought she was in, but 
another time, years later, and she realises that she is another, older self (p.76). Music 
makes memories as much as narrative does, and its imprint is strong and sensual. 
Narrative goes part of the way, but music does something to articulate the past in a way 
that ordered versions of events constructed in narrative forms might neglect. 
Sound binds Rhys’ novel together; there is a rhythm and a pulse, which runs 
through it, and thatches the disjointed prose. Sound and music represent memory and 
feeling and they provide the current for Jansen’s experience of living between ‘fire and 
wings’ and ‘blackness’ in a way that the ordered words of the buzzing ‘mind’ fail to do. 
Rhys invokes a thick, sensory, palpable atmosphere in the text. A banjo player plays 
music that haunts Jansen – she is drawn to it and its evocative sound, and to the 
memories it brings to the surface. In this music is ‘all the music [she has] ever loved’ 
(p.155). Jansen wants to close down the memory of youth, happiness, dancing and 
making love, all of which the song powerfully evokes (p.155). Jansen wants to stop the 
voice in her head, which talks and narrates and tells her what to do and where to go, the 
inner voice that sings, what she calls that ‘damned voice’ (p.157). Narrative has the 
potential to deepen the imprint of distress. Jansen finds it hard to escape. 
Rhys’ text wrestles with the restricted and objectified female body and the need 
to find some sort of subjective identity and meaning for it. In undercutting a sewn-up, 
ordered narrative form with experimental, disintegrating and confused prose, Rhys 
questions the smoothing over of the female body’s submissive and docile position. In 
Jansen’s first experience of Paris, she spent time with her husband Enno. As a married 
woman, she is quickly told that ‘you mustn’t talk, you mustn’t think, you must stop 
thinking’ (p.98). As a result, Jansen starts to disappear. Rhys explains she is living ‘with 
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that expression in your eyes when you are very tired and everything is like a dream’ 
(p.102). Somehow, she is here, waiting – not talking, not doing, not living as an active 
subject – just being pulled and told what to do by Enno: ‘Peel me an orange, he tells her.’ 
(p.108) Somehow Jansen does what he says and she goes with it and goes with him 
because the experience is ‘much too strong – the room, the street, the thing in myself’ 
(p.108). This ‘thing’ in her allows her to be walked on and to be used. Jansen cannot fight, 
even though it is circulating in every pore. For a woman, in this time, there is no power; 
there is only the power of men with their money, their thoughts and their bodily 
objectification. Jansen dreams of writing a book in a flash of futurity but concedes that 
‘to be accepted as authentic, to carry any conviction, it would have to be written by a 
man’ (p.135). Women’s bodies are restricted, their worlds are reduced and their bodies 
ache to feel the world with space and fullness. It is no wonder that Jansen takes refuge in 
her head.  
Marthe in The Shutter of Snow feels a similar expectation to Jansen to be quiet 
and appropriate. Coleman writes that in the asylum ‘you must be quiet […] to show that 
you are better’ (p.58). While the body is treated as an object or cut off from the 
psychology of the head, a sense of release into deep feeling is restricted to fleeting 
moments: in the energy of music and the movement of dance. These are the times when 
the whole physical being feels and moves with the world. To prove that mind is in 
control of matter, the body must be docile, obedient and acquiescent. Its materiality and 
physicality must not surface, except in objectified ways. 
Modernist aesthetic experimentation is particularly useful in terms of its 
alternative narrative shapes, its questioning of the conscious and the unconscious and of 
inner and outer lines, and its interest in pushing the boundaries of form and language to 
access states of disorder and distress. In these two texts, ‘mental’ dis/order is silenced, 
either closed inside an asylum – its speech and sounds refused an audience (The Shutter 
of Snow) – or locked inside the inner churning of memory and mental chatter, 
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marginalised because of its femaleness and sexuality (Good Morning, Midnight). 
Modernist textures agitate formal narrative structures as words define, diagnose and 
treat, and as thoughts flow on an ever moving and rushing stream. Narrative modernism 
develops and represents this sense of inner mental life as the feeling, sensing and three-
dimensional body presses and pulses beneath the surface, aching for representation and 
defying constraining forms.  
 
Re-bodying the Self 
In this chapter, I have analysed how some modernist authors play with form and 
function, using rhythm, cadence, ellipsis and other devices to engage with a full palate of 
affecting, sensate experience. Returning to the aim set out at the start of this chapter, my 
focus has been on the ‘aesthetic and narrative strategies’ used to represent and model the 
affective experiences of madness and sadness. The texts that I have approached in this 
section offer sound, dance and music to explore non-dualist accounts of distress and 
breakdown. In doing so, I posit that words and language do not have to be set in 
opposition to the being-body, but can draw close to it; emanating from the body and 
with its breath, gesture and pulse, and that a focus on narrative as a direct expression of 
internal ‘thoughts’ and thereby ‘mental’ life is reductive. Modernist texts suggest the 
important differentiation between controlled narrative that is about fixing, overcoming 
and explaining, and language which resonates, draws from embodied experience, 
surfaces in shards and does not attempt to control the matter it describes. As Salisbury 
has also usefully articulated, there is a big difference between the limiting models of 
narrative pushed through the medical humanities models in the last decade (and the 
dominance of talking and narrating both in and out of the clinic) and the materiality and 
sensuality of language in these experimental forms. 
Personal narratives about ‘mental’ dis/orders are now regularly sharing a 
physicality of experience which struggles to sit with a vertical model of mind over 
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matter. In an example of this, in an article published in the Guardian newspaper, 
Australian author Anna Spargo-Ryan writes about her anxiety: 
 
I feel the fear not in my head but in my very self […] I feel it […] hissing there in 
the soles of my feet, shouting at me from the pain in my knees, from the 
weakness in my hands, from the tingling in my jaw. It lurches from my throat like 
a wave of black tar and I choke on it and the world caves in around me and I am 
drowning. 
 
This is anxiety felt in the ‘very self’ of the body; it is violent, noisy and physical and leads 
to a sense of suffocating enclosure and sensory shutdown. Spargo-Ryan continues, ‘I 
can’t breathe. My throat has closed. I’m going blind. Some days the fog is thick and it 
rolls in around us and we suffocate’. 66 The theory that anxiety filters down from thought 
in the head, capitulates to the sheer physical force of Spargo-Ryan’s description; anxiety 
(as the title of this chapter highlights) is in the ‘soles of [her] feet’. The body is not a 
meaningless weight below the neckline, or something that incorporates the brain and 
therefore reduces everything to itself. Anxiety can equally rise from the ground up.  
To understand how to feel the body and to experience that body, learning might 
need to come from the body itself. Indeed, what Matt Haig finds to ease his mental pain 
is not the offerings of brain chemical altering drugs or the thought-dissection of CBT, 
but ‘exercise […] yoga […] absorbing [himself] in something or someone[he] loves’ (p.77) 
and, in particular, ‘running’ (p.153) which, he writes, produced the kind of ‘wonderful 
feeling’ that made his depression and anxiety seem to ‘evaporate’ (p.154). Haig’s remedy 
begs the question of how to start to understand or make meaning from ‘mental’ 
                                                          
66 Anna Spargo-Ryan, ‘I Exist in a Fog. Some Days it Blows Away, but Some Days it's Heavy and Suffocating’, 
the Guardian, 2 March 2015 <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/03/i-exist-in-a-fog-
some-days-it-blows-away-but-some-days-its-heavy-and-suffocating?CMP=share_btn_tw> [accessed 18 July 
2017]. 
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dis/order with something other than narratives and language (without setting up further 
binaries).  
 
Conclusions 
 
‘It would seem timely to ask how we transform biomedicine back into a sensately 
fluent discipline’.67  
 
Medical Humanities scholar Jo Winning points to ways of approaching the human body 
which ‘folds in both rational thought and sensory information at the same time’. For 
Winning, the talking cure can be the meeting point of the psychic embedded in the 
somatic; having language listened to, she argues, can allow the body to heal. Indeed, 
Salisbury argues that language as representation ‘enables the subject’s intersections and 
interactions with the phenomenal world to become meaningful’.68 However, in some 
forms of ‘mental’ dis/order where embodied subjectivity is thwarted, a question might 
emerge about how linguistic representation can address embodiment, and how this can 
be meaningful if it is sheared from concepts of subjectivity. To begin to re-engage with 
embodied experience, a sort of physical attentiveness and cultivation might need to be 
developed that does not always start or end with layers of words; one that engages with 
and foregrounds – for example – the rhythm and pulse of experience or the body 
language; the creaks, hunches and stresses of the entire body and the context of the 
world that body moves within. This is especially the case in a contemporary culture 
where narrative is perceived – across media, literary and healthcare discourses – as a 
resolution or meaningful interpretation from the top down. Indeed, my sense is that we 
need to find other methods to engage and heal, rather than think that narrativisation 
                                                          
67 Winning, ‘Afterword’, p.333. 
68 Salisbury, p.454. 
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and talking are the main or only answers. In communicating and understanding, we may 
reach for words, we may hug or hold someone, we may breathe with them or we may 
look into their eyes. In the movement of the body in the flow of a body-based practice, or 
in communal spaces where bodies intersect and move together, or in the unspoken 
contact between a bodyworker and a client, there may be many readings and 
understandings and expressions of distress that do not require narrative ordering, and 
where the pressure or demand to narrate the experience, sometimes might not be 
appropriate or available. Indeed, by not forcing experience into narrative shapes the 
pressure of having to convert feeling into an illogical or irrational worded equivalent is 
removed. It is no longer about the story, the reason, about what happened; it is about 
finding a form for feeling. 
Tackling ‘mental’ dis/orders like depression or anorexia as experiences that 
always move from thought into word into action will not get to the core of this. 
Experiences are imprinted in the whole body (not only a set of thoughts in the head), 
and knowledge can be gained through physical experience (which does not have to be 
articulated into words to be useful or therapeutic). Ultimately, this may lead to words 
but is mediated first through a reconnection with physicality. One is unable to speak 
about the body if one is not able to feel it, if one is totally detached and acting only as a 
body disciplinarian. As important as it is that time and space is given to talk about 
mental illness,69 there may also need to be a renewed focus on the sensate body and its 
sense of the world. If (as some critics have argued) this is not possible because narratives 
are everywhere and always demanded to make cognitive sense and communicate, then it 
is worth considering what this implies about the dominant dualist structures in which 
lives are lived and bodies are objectified.70 
                                                          
69 Time to Change. ‘National Time to Talk Day’. 
70 McKechnie, p.123. 
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The practice of yoga, the movement of the runner, the shape of the dancer, the 
engagement with music, all can be involved in sense-making through sensation. In a 
paper, which explores how the guided practice of digital storytelling can explore the 
embodied experience of eating disorder recovery, social theorists Andrea LaMarre and 
Carla Rice discuss how such work ‘involves a rewriting of the embodied self, a remapping 
of its physical/mental surfaces and boundaries, a re-routing of its energies and flows.’ 
These practices, which foreground the embodied self, usefully start to ‘cultivate 
subjectivities’ that are not based on dualist structures. 71 In this chapter, modernist texts 
have helped me to show the energetic and flowing potential of sound and music, and the 
vibrational and physical nature of subjectivity, for excavating meaning from bodies. In 
the next chapter, I will go on to explore how a vibratory materialism developed in sound 
theory and feminist music criticism helps provide vocabularies and concepts which 
stretch beyond constrictive top-down narrative accounts of ‘mental’ dis/order. 
 
 
                                                          
71 Andrea LaMarre and Carla Rice, ‘Embodying Critical and Corporeal Methodology: Digital Storytelling With 
Young Women in Eating Disorder Recovery’, Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social 
Research 17, 2 (2016) <doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/fqs-17.2.2474> 
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Chapter Three: Haptic Sounds and Moving Music  
 
[Sound makes] corporeality explicit: guttural, abrasive, intimate, explosive, vocal 
and assertive, sound may amplify the inherent forces and drives of physical 
experience and what it means to be a body.1 
 
Chapter Aim and Summary 
The separation of body and mind in the dualist language of contemporary constructions 
of ‘mental’ dis/order can become mirrored by a sense of separation between bodies and 
the world. Mind over matter approaches divide individuals and their neurochemical, 
emotional or thought-based problems from the contexts in which they live, thus 
obscuring the role of environmental or sociocultural influences that affect and shape 
individuals. Recovery, in this individualised view, becomes a narrated, self-managed and 
enclosed act. I argue that this is ethically troubling – either blaming individuals for their 
disorders or over-identifying people with individual diagnoses, giving them no way out. 
Returning to the aims set out in the Introduction – and once again to my feminist 
materialist position – it feels essential to find ways of crossing those divides. This chapter 
thus speaks to the second aim of the thesis, to find appropriate analytic tools and 
concepts to re-infuse understanding of ‘mental’ health with the vibrating matter of 
physical life – ultimately signalling towards the assimilated being-body. 
In this chapter, I think about human life in terms of social and environmental 
contexts and the specific locations of individuals in material and energetic terms – as I 
aim to attend to human health beyond surfaces and sections. The modernist texts in 
Chapter Two explored how sensory experience (and, in particular, sound) captured the 
                                                          
1 Brandon LaBelle, Acoustic Territories: Sound Culture and Everyday Life (New York: Continuum International 
Publishing Group, 2010), p.104. 
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forces and drives of physical experience. I turn here to philosopher Michel Serres who 
writes how the senses are a configuration ‘whereby the body mingles with the world and 
with itself, overflows its borders’.2 This notion of the mingling senses usefully takes me 
towards the potential for sound, and its energetic and vibrational qualities, to articulate 
the idea of crossing boundaries between mind and matter. If being is a matter of 
vibration, it helps undo the idea of an intact, hearing-thinking-doing self, and leads to a 
renewed paradigm within which to consider the meaning of ‘mental’ health and 
dis/order.  
As I discussed briefly in the Introduction, there is no perfect term to do justice to 
a ‘holistic’ approach to understanding health and illness running through the whole 
person, but as I discuss in this chapter (and the next), cultivating knowledge through the 
whole body, means I that I need to foreground corporeality. Sara Ahmed generates the 
term a ‘sweaty concept’ to describe something that is difficult and which resists 
comprehension. She thinks of such concepts as ‘the worlds we are in’ rather than from 
the arguably exterior position of academia. Sweat, she writes, is bodily, and these kinds 
of concepts come from bodies, which do not feel at home in the world. ‘The task’, she 
says, is to ‘stay with the difficulty’.3 I develop the ‘being-body’ as a way of practically 
articulating the vibrational and material ways in which distress and discomfort implicate 
and involve the whole person, which is always moving, changing and becoming. The 
word ‘mental’ is laced with all sorts of implications from the models presented in 
Chapter One. The word ‘body’ of course, has its own problems and multiple definitions 
but enables me to think about conscious materiality, vibration and energy, and a kind of 
thinking and understanding which – via dualism – is normally associated with the 
immaterial mind, or brain only.  
                                                          
2 Steven Connor, ‘Introduction’ to Michel Serres, The Five Senses: A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies, trans. by 
Margaret Sankey and Peter Cowley (London and New York: Continuum International, 2008), pp. 1-16 (p.3).  
3 Ahmed, p.13. 
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With the term being-body, I turn towards how a person’s being and becoming is 
shaped by all the body’s systems and energies imbricated in the world. This moves us 
towards a radically different shape of knowledge – not directed from the head or from ‘a 
position of exteriority’, but implicated in the world around; just as Ahmed suggests, 
these concepts come up by ‘practical experience of coming up against a world or the 
practical experience of trying to transform a world’.4 Moving back to Karen Barad’s 
conception that ‘knowing and being’ are material practices, the being-body starts to 
articulate and tend to the sensory and the physical. This is not a body possessed, owned 
or objectified, or separately listened to, but one that is part of the self. Mind does not 
rule matter, but is an active part of matter, thus breaking through the divisive language.  
This chapter has two parts. First, it turns to sound theory and then to music; 
exploring some different facets of the question of how mental health might be embodied. 
An engagement with sound helps to dissolve inner and outer binaries, to consider the 
physical imprint of life events on bodies – and bodies on each other – and to reveal the 
interconnectedness of sound and touch. The concept of haptic sounds thus provides a 
way of thinking about sound beyond interiorised scapes of ears and heads and to the 
tingling and vibrational imprint on the skin and beyond. Sound helps to engage with the 
notion of vibratory materialism and – as the opening quotation of this chapter taken 
from sound theorist Brandon La Belle argues – it also demonstrates ‘what it means to be 
a body’, not just have a body. This contrasts with representation imposed on bodily 
sensation in the afterward of the narrative account, but it does not mean a dispensation 
with language altogether. I discuss, rather, how language and sound are in the body and 
affect the physical body. Language is embodied because breath and voice in their 
vibrating and physical qualities are at the source of the spoken. I argue that sound is 
connective, touching and relational, and how these aspects cut across dualistic lines of 
mind and body.  
                                                          
4 Ahmed, p.14. 
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I then turn to music (and, in particular, the theories of music and the emotions 
developed in feminist criticism) and how this helps address the importance of rhythm 
and of movement in space, and the connection between moving music and embodied 
subjectivities. I think of music through acts of performance and perception. I argue that 
music highlights the energetic body, once again connecting with feminist criticism to 
emphasise the indivisibility of matter and mind.  
Within this chapter, I consider the use of sound and music as therapeutic – as 
healing forces – and as already involved in some ways in medical practices. However, I 
recognise the limits here too – the cultural and social locations of music mean that there 
is never a universal or one human reaction to music and sound. While sound may be 
used in therapeutic contexts, and music may be couched in terms of a sort of universal 
language, it is important to emphasise how this language differs in different contexts and 
cultures. Indeed, as Ruth Barcan writes, music therapists tend to talk in much more 
‘culturally mediated terms’ about music.5 I take up this position here, to make sure that 
perception and vibration are not couched in insular terms but are understood as 
immersed in their social and environmental contexts.  
I remain wary of suggesting that sound and music are healing and positively 
affecting in all cases, as they can disturb and alienate, as much as they can bind and 
relate. As sound theorist Steve Goodman articulates in his book Sonic Warfare, sound 
influences and shapes crowds and it can damage the ears, affect the heart rate and blood 
pressure.6 There are examples of the potency of sound – its use in war torture, for 
example, and, on smaller levels, as sound theorists Marie Thompson and Ian Biddle 
testify, ‘ominous, out-of-place’ sounds can make the ‘heart race’.7 Sound asserts 
physicality and this can be deeply confronting and – at times – inescapable. Indeed, 
                                                          
5 Barcan, p. 119. 
6 Steve Goodman, Sonic Warfare: Sound, Affect and the Ecology of Fear (Cambridge, MA and London: The 
MIT press, 2010). 
7 Marie Thompson and Ian Biddle, Sound, Music and Affect: Theorising Sonic Experience (New York and 
London: Bloomsbury, 2013), p.11. 
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rhythm is a constant touchpoint for this chapter as I consider how bodies beat from 
within, and how the rhythm of bodily events affects breath, muscle and energy. 
Sonorous Beings 
In a book on sounds and perception, Casey O’Callaghan and Matthew Nudds explain 
that ‘traditionally sounds have been grouped with the colors, tastes or smells among 
secondary or sensible qualities’. In this grouping, the nature of sounds has been tied to 
the human experience of them. This led some twentieth-century philosophers to 
understand sounds as subjective and private mental experiences – providing ‘auditory 
perceptual access to the world’ – something that is registered inside the head.8 In this 
version of sound, a hermetically sealed notion of selfhood is approached. Sound remains 
an internalised property of the individual, rather than something that helps dismantle 
dualistic notions. Indeed, communications theorist Jonathan Sterne – in his book The 
Audible Past – argues that the differentiation between sound and sight (what he terms 
the ‘audio-visual litany’), emanates from ‘the role of hearing in salvation’.9 Such an 
interiorised understanding of sound suggests that it gives access to a personal and 
internal world, drawing lines around the individual. 
 Indeed, my first move towards sound came from the model of Immaterial 
Thoughts and the sense that ‘mental’ dis/order might have its own inner soundscape in 
the form of distorted inner speech. In accounts of ‘mental’ dis/order, and in research on 
inner speech, experiences of sound are pronounced as enlarged, distorted and warped. 
Perhaps sound could provide a way of understanding the inside experience of ‘mental’ 
disorder? However, sound understood in this interiorised way circles right back into 
mind and body dualism.  
                                                          
8 Matthew Nudds and Casey O’Callaghan, Sounds and Perception: New Philosophical Essays (Oxford: OUP, 
2009), p. 4 and p.5. 
9 Jonathan Sterne, The Audible Past: Cultural Origins of Sound Reproduction (Durham NC: Duke University 
Press, 2003), p.14. 
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Sound is a useful methodological tool is because it emphasises something else 
much more visceral; the vibration of bodies and the rhythm of bodies deeply connected 
and affected by the world around. Through this, it helps to demonstrate two things. 
First, borrowing from Simone Fullagar, the impossibility of an interiorised account of the 
‘mind’ or of ‘mental’ dis/order located ‘within the neurochemical self’’ and cut off from 
social forces.10 Second, it helps to ‘cultivate subjectivities’ beyond those of the narrative 
self, which controls and dominates selfhood in a top-down manner.11 Indeed, sound 
theory helps to reach towards an ontological position of being based in vibration. This is 
resonant for states of disease because, as Ruth Barcan argues, the body in pain has lost 
its rhythm; things are out of sync.12 Underpinning this ontology is the idea of energy – 
bodies and the world around are made up of fundamentally the same stuff. This is not 
materialism heavy and weighted with inert matter, or sectioned into separated 
anatomical parts, but one which is moving, sensate and boundary-dissolving. 
In my suggested term of the being-body, I argue that the ‘body’ is not the dustbin 
for ‘mental’ thoughts hanging below the head but needs to be re-evaluated in energetic 
terms, deeply related to the social and cultural environment; in constant contact with 
the world. Arguably, any account of sensory experience could help to unfold the 
experience of the being-body, but sound (and therefore music) has a particularly 
interesting place in this thesis: it links body and language, it is used in different ways in 
Western mainstream medical practice and in alternative medicine, and it sits at the heart 
of a rhythmic understanding of life as is expressed in physics and medicine.13 While a 
Body Systems model of ‘mental’ dis/order draws close to finding a way to express 
                                                          
10 Simone Fullager, ‘Diffracting mind-body relations: Feminist materialism and the entanglement of physical 
culture in women’s recovery from depression’, in Moving Body: Sporting Ecologies, Assemblages and New 
Materialisms, ed. by J. Newman, H. Thorpe and D. Andrews (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
forthcoming 2018) 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316488529_Fullagar_S_forthcoming_Diffracting_mind-
body_relations_Feminist_materialism_and_the_entanglement_of_physical_culture_in_women's_recovery_fr
om_depression> [accessed 19 July 2017]. 
11 La Marre and Rice, ‘Embodying Critical and Corporeal Methodology’. 
12 Barcan, p.119. 
13 Barcan, p.117. 
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physical and mental assimilation, it is still set within the language of physical and mental 
health. In this chapter, I more radically trace a model of the being-body that is 
embedded in vibratory and rhythmic subjectivities. Indeed, as Barcan usefully posits – 
also referring to the work of Elizabeth Grosz – conceptualising sound is ‘not just a 
question of the physiological effects of sound on the body, mind, or emotions; rather, 
sound is in a very crucial sense of the body itself. Living beings are vibratory’.14 Such a 
‘vibratory materialism’ – where sound resonates below the surface of sensorial 
perception – probes ‘deeper than the merely auditory’ (and what is heard) towards the 
‘primacy of the synesthetic’ where the whole being-body is engaged.15 I will now turn to 
explore these ideas in more detail. 
 
Vibrating Matter 
The problem with narrative linearity – in the sense in which one event follows another – 
is that it is often seen (certainly in terms of illness narratives used to document or share 
experience) as one thing causing the other. When memories come to be discussed and 
described they are lined up in sequential order, once again putting mind over matter; 
narrative structure overlaying fragments or layers of memory. A theory of sonic 
materialism shapes this rather differently; in focusing on the vibrating matter of all 
things, memories start to be seen as residing all the time and all at once – bouncing, 
shaking, vibrating in much more energetic terms. Sara Ahmed articulates her own body 
memory of violence in this way as she writes, ‘experiences like this: they seem to 
accumulate over time, gathering like things in a bag but the bag is your body.’16 In this 
account, Ahmed argues that the body collects, stores and lets sediment; changing the 
layers of feeling and sensation and experience of that body over time. 
                                                          
14 Barcan, p.119 citing Elizabeth Grosz, Chaos, Territory, Art: Deleuze and the Framing of the Earth, (New 
York: Columbia UP, 2008), p.33. 
15 Goodman, p.9. 
16 Ahmed, p.23. 
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The sensational body can be seen from the critical vantage point of the analogue 
wave; the imprinted vibration on the body and the world which refuses a mental and 
physical split, by emphasising the very physical structure of sound itself. Analogue 
recording stores sound in impressions made by an original sound wave. Philosopher 
Christoph Cox argues – via media theorist Fredrich Kittler – that the phonograph, in its 
analogue audio recording, registers the ‘messy, asignifying noise of the world’, which is 
the ‘perceptible plenitude of matter that obstinately resists the symbolic and imaginary 
orders’.17 Sonic materialism reacts to textual representation by reaffirming its physical 
imprint. In a world where eyes increasingly interface with a screen, and where mental life 
is constructed as life in the head, the physicality of sound on the body helps to redefine 
the value of the body in contact with the world. Life layers into the whole being-body. 
Indeed, taking this argument further, sound can make and imprint meaning, 
even if it is un-heard by the ear. In this manner, ‘mental’ dis/order can never be truly 
‘inner’ because the world does not happen in the bounded bits of the brain; the world is 
all around, affective, inside and outside all at once. Indeed, Musician Will Scrimshaw’s 
notion of ‘non-cochlear sound’ helps to remove sound from being singularly registered 
within the ear and transmitted to the brain – the inside ‘mental’ and subjective place – it 
is instead based on vibration and resonance.18 The notion of sound ‘un-heard’ is 
expressed further in sociologist Patricia Clough’s personal piece of writing about 
childhood memories where the 'affect' of sound is deeply felt. She writes of her mother’s 
scream, 
 
                                                          
17 Christoph Cox, ‘Beyond Representation and Signification: Toward a Sonic Materialism’, Journal of Visual 
Culture, 10, 2 (2011), 145-161 (p.154). 
18 Will Scrimshaw, ‘Non-Cochlear Sound: On Affect and Exteriority’, in Sound, Music, Affect, ed. by 
Thompson and Biddle, pp.27-44 (p.27). 
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Her screams penetrated my body unheard. 
more like a vibrating afterward 
 
In the violence of this scream, Clough’s ear-drum bursts and she explains how there was 
a burning feeling, the ‘blistering’ of this ‘noise’ without ‘voice’. 19 Sound is felt as a body 
and through the body. Sound does not need to be ‘heard’ because its ‘vibrating afterward’ 
is powerful, present and whole-bodied: ‘But the body cannot always refuse. Screams can 
enter unheard […] a shattering body of sound, shattering the child’s body’.20 The body of 
sound – formed from a body, and forming its own body – enters another, and attacks it. 
The experience of sound is not simply about waves meeting an ear drum; it resonates, 
circling the whole person, affecting and shaping as it does.  
Clough argues that ‘an ontology of vibrational force lets sound come to the 
rescue of thought rather than the other way around, forcing thought to vibrate, 
loosening up its organised or petrified body’.21 Indeed, sound theory helps expand upon – 
and further focus on – the entanglement of matter and meaning discussed in the 
feminist material in the Introduction. Whereas biology has often been critiqued by 
feminists for its reductionist understandings, sound suggests a much more malleable 
account of biology because it is moves and changes. Sound shakes up and breaks up a 
constricted, internalised thinking-doing ontology with energy. The self is not bounded 
but hugely connected to the world around it; it cannot seal off against the soci0-cultural 
or environmental forces. Indeed, as Ahmed implores, feminism is ‘sensational’; bodily 
sensation communicates and forces awareness of a sense of dis-ease with the way it is 
represented and treated by the world around.22 The whole ‘being-body’ feels and reacts 
and the body is itself energetic; it holds energy and is moved by energy. This account 
                                                          
19 Patricia Clough, ‘My Mother’s Scream’, in Sound, Music, Affect, ed. by Thompson and Biddle, pp.65-72 
(p.65). 
20 Clough, p.67. 
21 Clough, p.69. 
22 Ahmed, p.22. 
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disrupts the idea of a closed-down or contained individual subjective self. Bodies in 
contact with the world experience life through vibrations that move, shake, energise and 
transform them. They similarly can imprint and transform and alter the world.  
Indeed, a ‘medial’ account of sound immerses the hearer and the object in the 
medium; this is how sound waves are understood.23 Sound is created by the ‘pattern of 
disturbance caused by the movement of energy traveling through a medium’.24 This idea 
that sound is immersive and energetic offers a connective account that starts to 
dismantle the idea of the fixed body and instead offers a suggestion of evolving bodies. 
Sound acts as a connective tissue as it binds bodies to the world in a way that emphasises 
relationality. Sound does not just happen between the ears because it refuses the 
distinction between inside and outside and between mental and physical.  
 
Affecting Energy 
The relational aspect of sound brings me towards affect theory, which I want to touch on 
here because it ties so closely into the material on sound, and because it finds synergy 
with notions of the energetic body. However, I also want to emphasise its limits, and why 
the language used often does not go far enough to move beyond dualistic terms. As 
humanities scholar, Ruth Leys writes, in her analysis of the ‘affective turn’ in the early 
twenty-first century, the affective frame sought to put the body back at the centre of 
experience, which rises from the body and from the world in which that body is 
situated.25 As such, and as is emphasised by philosopher Teresa Brennan, affect is 
material with an ‘energetic dimension’; it travels and transmits.26 The movement – or 
‘transmission of affect’ – starts to undo the idea of a bounded individual separate from 
                                                          
23 Roberto Casati and Jerome Dokic, ‘Sounds’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. 
Zalta <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/sounds/> [accessed 17 July 2017]. 
24 Margaret Rouse, ‘Sound Wave’, WhatIs.com, September 2005, 
<http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/sound-wave > [accessed 17 July 2017]. 
25 Leys, ‘The Turn to Affect’. 
26 Teresa Brennan, The Transmission of Affect (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 6. 
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the world in which she/he moves because it expands beyond and between individuals. 
Importantly, Brennan argues that the ‘social’ is not just a theory or concept of world 
dynamics – a ‘non-real’ thing, split from the ‘real’ thing of the physical or biological. The 
social is embodied – ‘it actually gets into the flesh’.27 
Affect might be thought of as an ‘in-between’ in terms of the extra or excess of its 
transmitted energy. In this way, it is not possible to seal against the world because the 
world and body are all energy. As Thompson and Biddle explain, affect is about ‘divesting 
the body of something, making “autonomous” what the body imagines as its own’. 
Resultantly, it is ‘something that is connected […] to the bodily’ and yet also ‘allow[s] for 
nodes of connectivity that sometimes (often) omit or bypass […] bodies’. 28 This notion 
opens up a space between phenomenological perception – where the individual body is 
centralised – and those ‘nodes of connectivity’ which travel beyond or in excess of 
individuals. As Thompson articulates – a person can be ‘overwhelmed or traversed by 
affect […] it spills over what we consciously know, or feel, or experience of it’.29 This can 
be demonstrated by thinking about affect in a room full of anxious people: the palpable 
tension, the heat in the air, the shuffle of bodies tapping and shifting and the texture of 
the space. In the rhythm of interaction, anxiety transmits within the air, through the 
ground and between and beneath perception.  
This idea of spill-over – or of excess – begins to dismantle the cognitive position 
of controlled thought or feeling – where a person simply reframes or rejects unhelpful or 
irrational thoughts in an enclosed act of individual transformation – because inner and 
outer worlds are interwoven and inextricable. Human life is never wholly self-contained 
within the outline of the flesh. Anxiety is not a property of a person, but a tangible, 
visceral and physical energy, and can be created and sustained between people. This 
                                                          
27 Brennan, p.25. 
28 Marie Thompson and Ian Biddle, ‘Somewhere Between the Signifying and the Sublime’ in, Sound, Music 
and Affect ed. by Thompson and Biddle, pp.1-24 (p.13). 
29 Marie Thompson, ‘Three Screams’, in Sound, Music and Affect, ed. by Thompson and Biddle, pp.147-162 
(p.160). 
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view matters in terms of mental health because a person with a Brain Disorder model 
neurochemical problem or an internalised issue with Immaterial Thoughts, which are 
supposedly fixed by thinking or managing better, can never actually be separated from 
the context of their lives.  
While these theories around affect, both enhance and support a vibrational and 
sensory account of human embodiment, some affect theorists have injected a split 
between conscious thoughts (and their accompaniment in words) and visceral matter. 
This can be seen in the work of social theorist Brian Massumi, who argues that affect 
cannot be fully realised in language because it exists ‘prior’ to and/or outside 
consciousness. For Massumi, there is a time lapse between body and word because the 
body is pre-conscious; ‘the skin’, he argues, ‘is faster than the word’.30 In Massumi’s 
account, the body is foregrounded, and affect is positioned as a precognitive and visceral 
force that can influence thinking and judgements, but it is essentially separate from 
these. A line is drawn between bodily responses to an event – to the shake of a traumatic 
incident, for example – and the cognised, interpreted or reimagined version of that 
visceral bodily force. The corporeal is split apart from the cognitive. Goodman’s affective 
account of sound takes up a similar theme; the body reacts to sound and to its vibration 
and movement before conscious ‘minded’ perception of the event. Sound is made 
equivalent to the body and is listened to with ‘every pore’ of that body. The body once 
again precedes the word where ‘the gut reaction is pre-empting consciousness’.31 
In this dialectic, the body senses anxiety before the ‘mind’ reacts. This appears to 
be directly opposite to an understanding of ‘mental’ dis/order where the mind leads the 
body – where ‘unhelpful’ thoughts cause the body to react – impelling a tight chest or a 
tingling arm in response, and where the subsequent treatment is to deal with the 
person’s thoughts and see the bodily reaction as somehow secondary. This inversion also 
                                                          
30 Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 2002), p.25. 
31 Goodman, p.48.  
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raises a question: even if the body is put first, does it come first? And if it does come first, 
then what does that mean for re-inscribing a sense of duality, rather than overcoming it? 
In giving the visceral body its place back at the centre of experience, and in destabilising 
the prominence of the rational, cognitive mind, some affect theorists seemingly reinforce 
the mind/body split. As Ruth Leys discusses, just because we might be familiar with a 
‘wrong, disembodied model of the mind’, it does not mean that the alternative model of 
viscerality and affect is non-conscious or devoid of meaning and sense.32  
 
Sound and Language 
There is something about sound’s impact and relationship to affect, which begins to 
explode into broader concepts of how sound traverses being-bodies but also exists in 
excess of them. From the point of view of understanding embodied mental health, this 
idea of sound that stretches beyond a mentalist, enclosed and interiorised perspective, 
helps to emphasise the very physical and material ways in which people connect and 
engage with the world. A vibrating energetic force might be small and unheard, but it 
demonstrates how affect impacts beyond – or in excess of – worded representation. 
Therefore, it is not the case that the word follows or trails the bodily response, but rather 
that not all thought is worded or needs to be represented in narrative terms. This is a big 
leap to make when thought and language are so intimately connected in the Cartesian 
model but it is important to recognise – as Karin Eli and Rosie Kay write in their medical 
humanities focused work researching a dance project for women with eating disorders – 
that the sensory nature of illness can become somewhat lost or overwritten by a focus 
only on narrative explanation and verbal sense-making.33  
                                                          
32 Leys, p.458. 
33 Karen Eli and Rosie Kay, ‘Choreographing lived experience: dance, feelings and the storytelling body’, 
Medical Humanities, 41(2015), 63-68. 
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For Marie Thompson, the scream actively exemplifies the notion of experience 
that transcends linguistic representation.34 Its energy is not one of a neatly structured 
signifying form, but of a shaking, embodied noise. This is a noise with feeling and 
vibration; this is a noise that can haunt and hurt. Indeed, as Clough explains, she writes 
in the role of ‘an ontologist of vibrational force’ in describing her childhood rather than 
someone telling her ‘autobiography’.35 Her account is one of physical memory inscribed 
through sound, not simply one word following another word. In conveying the personal 
account of the ‘affect’ of her mother’s scream, she seeks something other than the 
‘technical remove’ of a linear narrative which seeks to ‘story the self’. In retelling (or re-
feeling) her childhood memories, she wants instead to ‘translate statistical populations of 
radicalised lives’ in the neighbourhood in which she grew up, ‘into vibrations, coming up 
from the street, affecting me bodily, resonating with the slow painful beating in my 
stomach and the fast irregular beating of my heart’.36 The visceral and physical nature of 
Clough’s slow painful stomach-beating and ‘fast irregular’ heartbeat permeates her 
writing. This physicality and vibrational force are put into words, but words are not 
containers – the gut and organs push through words; they pulse and beat from within 
them. The body in the world is implicated in everything; thoughts or feelings packaged 
into words can provide only a part of human experience. The matter of her body, the 
matter of the sound wave, and the matter of her experience all have meaning. Both these 
authors suggest that the thought-word correlation might fall short in conveying the 
sensational and vibrational texture of experience.  
The aim of this chapter is not to disconnect language from the body, more to 
trouble the dominance of the former in describing the latter. Indeed, sound can helpfully 
connect word and body, rather than divide them. To do this, I return once again to the 
concept of embodiment developed by Grosz where she conceives of embodiment as 
                                                          
34 Thompson, ‘Three Screams’, pp.147-162. 
35 Clough, p.69. 
36 Clough, p. 67. 
145 
 
 
understood as ‘fully material’ and inclusive of language.37 To illustrate this in practical 
terms, I draw upon the example of the yogic mantra or vibration ‘Om’. In this chanted 
word, the materiality of sound is inseparable from its meaning. As Barcan articulates, it is 
‘simultaneously physical and metaphysical’. It means something and it does something. 
It is not a separate worded or narrative representation of a bodily experience; it creates 
bodily experience. Indeed, as Barcan explains, ‘mantras are not just symbols’ but are a 
form of ‘energy encased in [a] vibrational structure’.38 In practical terms, what this means 
is that different body parts are activated in the vibration of making different sounds. The 
tongue makes different sounds affecting different parts of the body as it moves. Matter 
and meaning and intimately connected. Indeed, when sound is used in healing – for 
example with chanting or toning or with the use of Tibetan singing bowls or Chinese 
meditation gongs – this is not only about an ethereal, detached and floating energy; it is 
a vibrating, physical energy to which there is a non-divisible response. 39 
 
The Touch of Sound 
In a whole being-body account, where vibration and energy underscore experience, the 
senses are interrelated. Clough develops a theory of what she calls the ‘transsensorial’ as 
she remembers watching the night-time patterns on the bedroom wall of the cramped 
apartment in which she grew up: 
 
      unhearable sounds, vibrating, jumping on to my skin and pushing in. 
      Once I was made to swallow the pattern whole. 
      Choking I could not control 
                                                          
37 Grosz, Volatile Bodies. 
38 Barcan, p.133. 
39 Jeffrey D. Thompson, ‘The Clinical Use of Sound, The Center for Neuroacoustic Research, 
<https://www.scientificsounds.com/index.php/center-for-nueroacoustic-research/articles/the-clinical-use-
of-sound.html> [accessed 17 July 2017]. 
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      the screaming now inside me echoing silently.40 
 
The sounds are sensed through the organ of the skin, rather than directly listened to by 
the ear. The sounds ‘push in’; they are given a sense of physicality by Clough and there is 
a feeling that they are deeply imprinting on her body. The senses are not neatly defined 
and marked out; they cross over throughout the whole person.  
In his book Sinister Resonance, composer and musician David Toop emphasises 
this connection between sound and touch, in particular. His examples give a perceptible 
feeling to the experience of the touch of sound. He writes,  
 
Lying down, I experience sound as physical sensations […] I feel sounds (loud or 
soft, familiar or uncanny) as a shock or surprise; shivers, a sudden prickling 
sensation, shudders, small waves of hearing that are haptic more than aural, as if 
a hand has brushed across my scalp, as if a quick jolt of electricity has been shot 
into my back.41 
 
Sound is felt. It touches and moves the skin and it connects the body to the world; 
energy against energy and vibration against vibration. Sound helps articulate a model of 
embodied subjectivity, which is deeply embedded and involved in its social and 
environmental context; one where the idea of inner sounds and interiorised individuality 
is difficult to support. 
Toop’s mention of waves of hearing that are ‘more haptic than aural’ leads me to 
unpack the meaning of haptic and its possible relationship to sound. While the Greek 
roots of haptic align it with the ‘sense of touch’ or ‘tactile sensations’,42 I am working 
                                                          
40 Clough, p.68. 
41 David Toop, Sinister Resonance: The Mediumship of the Listener (New York and London: Continuum 
International Publishing Group, 2010), p.56. 
42 "haptic, adj. (and n.)." OED Online (Oxford University Press, June 2016) [accessed 17 July 2017]. 
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with a definition that connects with concepts of embodiment. Haptic expands the reach 
of touch from the ‘cutaneous surface’ towards the more ‘inwardly-orientated senses’ of 
proprioception and kinesthesia. 43 These senses inform perceptions of ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’ and of inner and outer space as they help locate the body in the world. Rather 
than being discrete and separate, these senses act together. If sound is also haptic – 
involving a feeling and impression on the skin and a physical, vibrational energy – then 
sound also provides a sense of connection to what it means to inhabit a body. A 
conceptualisation of haptic sounds adds depth to both touch and sound; it is part of a 
being-body’s world relationship and something that is much more than a thought-
constricted experience, it is deeply layered and deeply felt.  
Different paradigms offer touch as a form of body listening and body knowledge, 
from acupuncture to massage-based bodywork. The relationship between listening to, 
and feeling for, knowledge about the body is interestingly explored within medical 
practice too, in a way that counters a segmented and siloed anatomical view of human 
bodies. Anthropologist of medical practices, Anna Harris, discusses how doctors percuss 
bodies and how this process involves the ‘feeling of the vibration’ – suggesting a tactile 
resonance to doctors’ work. Percussion is a key tenet of the basic clinical examination 
taught to medics in training. It is ‘a method of tapping body parts with fingers, hands, or 
small instruments as part of a physical examination’ to assess ‘the size, consistency, and 
borders of body organs’ or the ‘presence or absence of fluid in body areas’.44 Importantly, 
as Harris articulates, it is a form of ‘listening touch’. For medics, the practice of feeling 
and listening is very much ‘integrated’. Textbooks tell them to simultaneously ‘listen and 
feel for the nature and symmetry of the sound’.45 Sound here is given a tangible depth 
and structure. The blend of these two sets of understandings – moving from 
                                                          
43 Mark Paterson, The Senses of Touch: Haptics, Affects and Technologies (Oxford: Berg, 2007), p.4. 
44 Linda J. Vorvick, ‘Percussion’, Medline Plus, 31 January 2015 
<https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/002281.htm> [accessed 19 July 2017]. 
45 Anna Harris, ‘Listening-touch, Affect and the Crafting of Medical Bodies through Percussion’, Body and 
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‘physiological anatomy’ to ‘subtle anatomy’ usefully taps into a transdisciplinary space 
that medical practice often struggles to connect with or articulate in its evidence-based 
spaces of knowledge. In terms of my research question, this is also useful for dissolving 
mind and body binaries, providing a body modelling that does not separate out matter 
from the immaterial. 
 
Matter with Meaning 
David Toop articulates how the physicality described in a vibrational-material account of 
sound has to sit against ‘the aerial (or ariel) nature of sound [...] which always implies 
some degree of insubstantiality and uncertainty’.46 This duality does not engender a 
separation but is a way of conceptualising two parts of the same thing. A material or 
corporeal approach to understanding subjectivity does not cement that subjectivity in 
fixed cells and blunt ends; instead, it reveals how the body is energetic, fluid and 
malleable. The argument runs further; it is not a case of body against mind because 
mental life is a part of the body. Steven Connor writes that sound can be ‘imagined in the 
same two-sided way as skin: both as that which touches and which is touched’.47 This 
concept of the two-sidedness of sound feels resonant in thinking about how it 
complicates or agitates different states. It is akin to a dismantling of dualism; inner and 
outer, body and world, touching and touched, the pairs cannot be separated.  
Sound has a physical presence and is assimilated by the being-body; it suggests a 
space of connection and crossover to work through the mental and physical binary in 
both the invisible fibres of vibration and the larger connective tissue of bodies as a part 
of the world around them. Sound helps detach thought from the head alone; it shows the 
thinking being-body alive, vibrating, energetic, and immersed in a world beating along 
with it. This immersive picture points to the value of context not universality; to the 
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sensation of the body, to the feeling on the skin, to the way in which the world accepts or 
challenges that body, and how the body is then shaped in return. As Ahmed writes, when 
the context is violence – for example – the body begins to expect it, and the body 
becomes differently inhabited, differently moved in anticipation.48 This is the process of 
becoming. It is a process of being in the world, and learning from that world; a body 
defined and redefined in relation to the energy it creates, anticipates and experiences, 
and in relation to space it is offered or refused. I will now turn towards music to deepen 
the understanding of embodied subjectivity – understood through the moving, 
performing or perceiving being. 
 
Moving Music 
 
As a performer, I act on and with what we ordinarily call music with my body; as 
a musicologist I have been formed to act on (and with?) what we ordinarily call 
music with my mind, and only with my mind. Thus, my musicological habitus 
inclines me to think about music's fixed, textlike qualities, an inclination that is 
perpetually at odds with the way my performing self inclines to think about and 
respond to music.49 
 
In this quotation, feminist musician and critic, Suzanne Cusick argues that musical 
theory has become dislocated from the bodies that are so involved and essential to the 
very practice it seeks to describe. In this way, music criticism struggles with a mind/body 
binary as much as medicine does. In this section of the chapter, I look at music theory, 
and specifically criticism around music and the emotions, to help further foreground an 
account of mental life that is vitally embodied. To develop this position, I consider how 
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feminist criticism has focused on the emotional and embodied experience of music, to 
help unthread it from the dualist underpinning inherent in cognitive, rationalist models. 
Music is relevant and resonant for the question of embodied mental health because, as 
Barcan usefully conveys, its therapeutic use (in medical settings and in alternative 
practices) bridges scientific and humanistic discourse. Music therapists refer to both the 
physiological and to the affective and energetic without division.50 This bridging is vital 
because it provides a space from which to think through difficult questions and those 
‘sweaty concepts’ around ‘mental’ dis/order in a transdisciplinary way. However, I couch 
this discussion once again within limits; music is not a singular thing, and there is no 
universal human reaction to music, but many cultural and social influences that shape 
responses. Despite these limits, music has the potential power to cross mind and body 
divides and to demonstrate an indivisible, sensation-based response that clarifies the 
idea of moving energy and embodied existence. 
 In twentieth-century Western musical discourse, music has often been conceived 
in cognitive or rational terms, which seems to miss out a whole spectrum of emotional, 
imaginative and bodily resonance. As with discourse around sound, the philosophy of 
music and the emotions has been largely led by a model of mental life enclosed in 
Immaterial Thoughts model and underlain by dualist beliefs. Philosopher Paul 
Boghossian, in a long line of philosophers discussing music and the emotions, argues 
that, because a ‘brute physiological explanation’ would not be satisfactory in an 
understanding of how and why music relates to emotions, we must, therefore, look to 
explain ‘the rationality of our emotional response’. He wonders, ‘How is it possible for 
mere sound, lacking speaker intention, or any of the other resources which make 
linguistic meaning possible, to express meanings?’51 In this quotation, Boghossian 
inscribes several assumptions that I seek to counter in this chapter. First, that a 
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materialist position would necessarily be ‘brute’ in its bodily context; second, that such a 
response would not involve ‘rational’ thought and, by the same token, that there is a split 
between rational and bodily responses; third, that the elevated, rational view is to be 
admired and that the ‘right’ response is a matter of intellectual appraisal; fourth – the 
overarching position that this chapter seeks to undo – that language makes all meaning 
and that ‘mere’ sound cannot be meaningful. 
 
Formalism and Intellectual Music 
In order to move past a cognitive, detached and theoretical appraisal of music, and 
towards an embodied account, it is necessary to journey across some of the most 
influential evidence within the philosophy of music and the emotions. This is a richly 
developed field, and I cannot account for every perspective within it, but it is my aim 
here to consider how these accounts take music away from the body in dualistic and 
mind over matter terms. These accounts cling to individualist models of enclosed minds, 
unaffected by the matter of the body and sensation, in ways that, I argue, irresponsibly 
neglect and negate the context in which music is made, listened to and felt.  
The most cognitive and rationally focused model of music takes a formalist 
approach. In this understanding of music, any meaning in the music is intellectual. 
Therefore, the study, appreciation or understanding of that music comes in its ‘pure 
form without any extra musical content’.52 Such an approach is non-referential; the 
music does not have to refer to the world outside because its meaning is internal. This 
position is taken up by philosopher Nick Zangwill who argues – in an often-cited account 
taking this perspective – that music should not be understood in terms of emotion at all 
– that music does not have to ‘possess emotions, arouse emotions, express emotions or 
represent emotions’.53 For the formalist, meaning is in the context of the work itself – in 
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the very sound structure of which it is composed. A formalist model is unhelpful and 
uneasy against theories of embodiment and it gapes with holes in terms of how music is 
created by embodied beings, moves bodies, connects bodies and is played by bodies, all 
of which it takes no interest in.  
A differently-angled formalist approach is that of expressionism wherein it is felt 
that music communicates or expresses emotion. In expressionist accounts, it is thought 
that the emotions expressed in music are a cathartic release or a presentation of the 
composer’s own emotions. Other varieties of this theory focus on the way in which music 
might express the kinds of emotion that the composer understands, even if he or she 
does not personally feel them at the time of composition. However, these theories fail to 
explain how the music holds or transmits those emotions, or how or why others might 
have an emotional response to them, only that it expresses them. Furthermore, such 
accounts are not particularly interested in the seat of those emotions, or in an embodied 
understanding of emotional life. 
The formalist model bends a little further for some critics who argue that music 
can be expressive of emotion. In these accounts, emotion exists within the structure of a 
piece of music itself. Listeners understand the emotions created in the piece within a sort 
of shared code of musical and emotional meaning. The emotion is within the music – its 
dynamics and form – and the ‘knowledgeable’ listener will experience music’s 
expressiveness in this cognitive appreciation.54 There are specific versions of resemblance 
theories that describe the ‘shared code’. The work of Peter Kivy suggests that music is 
expressive of feeling because ‘it has the same “contour” as expressive human behaviour of 
some kind’.55 Philosopher Stephen Davies’ theory of ‘appearance emotionalism’ argues 
that people recognise sadness in a piece of music because it is reminiscent of other 
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expressions of sadness. He articulates how we come to see emotion by ‘appearances’. 
Davies’ account is based on the idea that there is a shared understanding of, for example, 
sadness as ‘slow and quiet downward movement’. 56  
Kivy and Davies start to put the body into view because there is some reflection 
or representation of the body in music. However, the body does not actually take part in 
that process of identification: it is not involved in feeling it, embodying it and reliving it 
while listening to music. If identification with music only exists in ‘perceive[d] 
resemblance’57 or cognitive memory about how an emotion is typically felt or 
experienced, this arguably implies the negation of body-memory itself, which feels 
particularly problematic in a musical context. Furthermore, these critics make some 
assumptions about types of experience and feeling and the sensations attached to them, 
which are problematically universalising in tone. 
Susanne Langer’s chapter ‘On Significance in Music’ in her book Philosophy in a 
New Key argues that the relationship between music and the emotions is one of 
symbolism. Langer argues that, if music has emotional content, then it ‘“has” it in the 
same sense that language “has” its conceptual content – symbolically’. 58 Langer’s 
emphasis is on the structure and complexities of feeling and the abstracted and imagined 
quality of experience. In her view, music can only express certain qualities of emotion, 
rather than the emotion itself. Langer’s work is important in moving music from the 
static and textual towards motion. She suggests that music’s fluidity reflects the 
‘morphology’ of feeling, as music’s ‘[dynamic] patterns of motion and rest, of tension and 
release, of agreement and disagreement, preparation, fulfilment, excitation, sudden 
change’ suggest, or figuratively represent, a sense of human inner life.59 The structure of 
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music symbolises the scope of the body of emotions and the tension and resolution of 
these feelings. However, this (and other) symbolism accounts remain referential and 
metaphorical. The symbolism approach keeps music’s reception in an emphatically 
disembodied space. At this point in the curve of critical perspectives, the story of the 
expressiveness of music tips into something more than a conventionalist or 
representational theory can hold together. The gap between the idea that music is 
expressive of emotion because it resembles the motion of emotional bodies, and the 
notion that those bodies might remember and feel that emotion when listening to music, 
begins to feel so small as to be untenable.  
Indeed, even where formalist accounts make room for the emotional reaction or 
response of the listener, it is within limits. Davies, for example, admits that a ‘listener can 
be moved to feel the emotion that the music expresses’ but the metaphors he leans on to 
exemplify this include contagion, transmission, communication, and osmosis.60 The 
body is tangibly reacting to the emotion but what is missing from this theory is any sense 
of meaning for the person in their reaction, which is purely automatic. This is a bodily 
response, but not an embodied one.  
Moving beyond formalist accounts, an ‘arousal theory’ claims that emotion is in 
the perception and the person perceiving, and so music is sad because it arouses sadness 
in the listener. Jenefer Robinson’s paper in this area, The Expression and Arousal of 
Emotion, takes up this view, but once again inscribes a split between body-physiology 
and cognition.61 Robinson argues that at the more ‘primitive’ end of the scale are 
emotions such as ‘tension, relaxation, surprise’ and at the other end there is the more 
elevated and cognised ‘unrequited passion’. In the case of those basic or ‘primitive’ 
emotions, they are aroused by the music and then translate into something else more 
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complex via the imagination. In this way, a simple sensory emotion such as surprise jolts 
the body and the imagination then works on this feeling to translate it, reimagine it and 
rearticulate it. Robinson’s account sees an emotional response to music at the ‘simple’ 
level as more operational and mechanical than meaningful. Indeed, it is hard to find a 
position for the emotions when, one on hand, they are related to judgement, appraisal 
and cognitive, brain-based calculations and, on the other hand, where it is said that the 
body has a significant role but the argument collapses into sensation without meaning. 
The body and mind split still overshadows the interpretation, and the dualistic language 
remains ingrained.  
 
Embodied Music 
In this section, I aim to consider how the body is immersed in music, moved by music 
and, ultimately, how music acts to dissolve the binaries presented in the above formalist 
and referential accounts. Indeed, embodied musical accounts foreground the feeling of 
music making, or the experience of listening to music, as they are interested directly in 
the impact on a person.62 Leaning back towards the words of Suzanne Cusick, the 
practice of music is always an embodied discipline so why should musicology seek to 
defy this? Cusick describes the problem of the dominant theories of musical criticism as 
wrapped up in a ‘mind-mind’ relation wherein, ‘the composer has come to be understood 
to be the mind that creates patterns of sound to which other minds assign meaning’. 
There is no room for an embodied response to this because the music is identified as 
being a product of ‘mind’ and only to be deciphered and interpreted by mind. As Cusick 
identifies, ‘we end up by ignoring the fact that these practices of the mind are 
nonpractices without the bodily practices they call for about which it has become 
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unthinkable to think’.63 Music is not only a score, nor the production of the score into 
sound, but to embody and to become body in the act of playing, as well as in the act of 
listening/perceiving. 
A feminist modelling of musical criticism understands the mainstream 
philosophical discourse of music and the emotions as a gendered one. Susan McClary 
writes that music has been effectively disembodied and rationalised in an attempt by 
male musicians to define music as the ‘most ideal (that is the least physical) of the arts 
by insisting emphatically on its “rational” dimensions’. Historically, she asserts, 
musicology attempted to ‘remasculinise’ music away from any sense of feminine or 
affective influences. 64 For Cusick, this means that interpretations of music that find an 
embodied response or a body story are denied. This interpretation of music and emotion 
feeds into a wider cultural tendency to see emotions as weak and bodily. Sara Ahmed 
develops this point to explain how emotions have been narrated as ‘a sign of how the 
primitive exists in the present’. As Ahmed explains (reminiscent of Robinson’s 
interpretation), emotions have become stratified, with some emotions ‘elevated as signs 
of cultivation’ and others cast down and away, seen as weakness and very often couched 
in soft or negative feminine terms.65 Music criticism and analysis suffer the same 
hierarchicalism. 
The disembodiment of music criticism is linked to a wider notion that the body 
in its weighty or physical materiality only surfaces when things are wrong.66 From this 
perspective, in day-to-day life, a person should be unencumbered by the physical body, 
which is – at most – able to react or respond in visceral, autonomic ways. However, the 
performance of music raises very a different view of bodies, which ascend in physicality 
and where the player is an active and engaged subject. The physical body is valuable, 
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present and productive; it moves from the position of object to subject. This is of 
particular importance within feminist discourse as critic Lauren Steyn writes: 
 
Women are viewed as passive flesh and therefore the potential object of another 
subject’s intentions and manipulations, rather than as a living manifestation of 
action and intention […] For the body to be effective, it must not be seen as an 
object, but rather as a subject (i.e. active).67 
 
McClary’s work puts musical discourse back into subjective bodies. The body is not the 
opposite of ideal and pure abstract intellect but is necessarily bound up with subjectivity. 
When music is understood in this way – pushing aside mind and body binaries – it is a 
productive source of embodied understanding. Indeed, McClary puts it this way, ‘Music 
has an uncanny ability to make us experience our bodies in accordance with its gestures 
and rhythms’.68 When bodies have been so far objectified by a cultural emphasis on mind 
over matter, and when women’s bodies have been asked not to take up too much space, 
or have inhibited their movement due to repeated violence or objectification, or when 
‘mentally’ ill bodies have been stigmatised and ostracised, an embodied conception of 
music is a valuable way of renewing and actively demonstrating embodied subjectivity.   
Rhythm, in particular, cements the connection between bodies and music. Music 
communicates with its rhythm without the need for an accompanying or representative 
narrative. Musicologist Carolyn Abbate in her book Unsung Voices provides an example 
of a piece of opera music where a female vocalist ‘transforms herself into a kind of 
musical instrument, a sonorous line without words and unsupported by any orchestral 
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sound’.69 She explains that this expression is about ‘sonority’ rather than ‘story’ and that 
the musical voice, ‘exists in present time, as a physical and sensual force, something 
beating upon us’.70 This focus on the physical beat and energetic force of rhythm 
provides meaning without linguistic representation. Rhythm transmits and it recreates; 
it is felt and received and imprinted. This is not just an abstracted or a metaphorical 
experience but an intensely physical one. The rhythms of music are implicated and 
imbricated in the body’s own rhythm; led by its own internal metronome – the heart. 
This ongoing beat inside the chest, affected and moved by the external music, starts to 
unsettle the boundaries of the body. The work of music goes inside and underneath the 
skin, or, to take this even further, the body makes its own beats and the internal and 
external separation is undone.  
In theorising the body’s response as important in listening to music, and the 
body’s essential role in producing music, it is essential to think about how knowledge 
can also come through embodied experience, as opposed to a subsequent working 
through with words. Indeed, musicologist Gascia Ouzounian’s piece in Contemporary 
Music Review, helps frame this idea, as she argues that we need to move the ‘listening 
point from the ears to the tissues of the body – a tangle of information, memories and 
physical and psychic relationships’ – and that this then, ‘requires a new model of aural 
reception and analysis’.71 An embodied listening challenges the formalist, neutral or 
disembodied stance and, in doing so, it ‘reveals the body’s biases, tendencies and aims – 
its history’.72 As Ouzounian listens from a space of embodiment, she explains how, ‘all 
parts of my body act like antennas, turned on and receiving sound, changing my psychic 
image of myself’.73 Bodies are not only text-objects, to be discussed or held at a distance; 
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they are not simply there to observe or analyse. An embodied mode of listening uncovers 
meaning in the whole being-body and brings sensation to the fore, rather than at a 
representational arms-length. 
There is something within the ‘tissues of the body’ and body memory that feels 
essential to both connect and to tease apart the experience of playing music from the 
experience of listening to it. While I have sought to question musicology, which negates 
the body, because the body is absolutely at the heart of musical practice, this is not the 
same as saying that playing and listening are identical processes.74 Could it be that when 
the body is engaged in creating music by pressing itself against a string or a key, or when 
lip meets mouthpiece or when hand pounds a stick – when body memory is involved and 
implicated – that the imprint is stronger or deeper, that it is embedded in muscle and 
being-body? Roland Barthes considers this notion of embodied music-making in the 
essay Musica Practica. Barthes writes that ‘the music one plays is a muscular music […] 
as though the body were hearing […] the body as inscriber’.75 The body does not ‘inscribe’ 
or play ‘muscular music’ without the whole person being drawn into the playing of it. 
The body is involved in music-making whether that be through the grain and texture of 
the human voice, or the imprint of different body parts against wood or nylon or steel, or 
through hearing and feeling the crawl of bass over the skin. This centring of the body 
within music sees it as collusion with sound, not an intellectual response to a detached 
and separated score.  
Music reveals the imprint on the body, of what the body experiences, and what it 
learns from those experiences. Music, of course, will not always evoke deep reactions 
(some music may wash over, or may produce no discernible effect) and different types of 
music will evoke different reactions in different people. This is not an argument for 
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universality, but one for context, and one for the impression and immersion of bodies in 
the world as opposed to enclosed and internalised brain-based or psychological mental 
states, for which only individuals have responsibility or can be held to account. An 
embodied account of music is one in which the whole being-body can be deeply affected 
and shaped in listening or involved in complex and non-dualistic thinking in playing. As 
musical scholar Chris Stover writes in an article about ‘Musical Bodies’, in this way, 
musical scholarship has something to learn from feminist scholarship as ‘emergent 
musical subjectivity’ is inscribed through both ‘performance and perception’.76 
Performance and perception help unfold patterns of embodied subjectivity. From here, I 
want to look in more detail at the relationship between music, movement and space, and 
how this is revelatory of a being-body always moving, beating and becoming. 
 
Musical Movement and Space 
The idea of static music with fixed properties, which are then interpreted or analysed by 
the critic, is undone by the relationship between music and listener – between the 
rhythm conveyed by the musician and the rhythm received or beating down on the 
listener, who takes part in that rhythm with their own body and often moves to it. Music 
is not only representative or symbolic of human movement, but it actively brings out 
those movements in the listener. The idea of reciprocity in musical exchange is 
exemplified by composer Antonia Barnett-McIntosh in a piece entitled Quintet, which 
explores the way in which music emerges with and from movement. Quintet is an 
interesting example because it inverts the idea of the musician composing and playing 
music and subsequently bodies listening, responding and dancing to the composition. In 
Barnett-McIntosh’s piece, dance and music start on an equal footing so that ‘dancers 
contributed to the sound world and musicians to moving in the space’.77 Rather than 
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dance forming in reaction to sound and music – evolving from the bass or rhythm – 
Barnett-McIntosh’s piece sees music being created with bodies and from dance. There is 
no simple response to a thing; it is a musical co-production.  
Indeed, music is moving, but it is not only in that physical sense because it moves 
in an emotional sense too. Music moves or ‘affects with emotion’; the word emotion 
stems from ‘a movement of the soul’ and from the Latin root motio meaning 
movement.78 This etymological root provides a useful way of connecting the motion of 
music with the emotion of its experience and with a tangible sense of what the embodied 
mind might mean. Being-bodies are moved inside and out, or to further this notion, 
those inner and outer positions are dissolved away. 
Music does not need to make movement happen perceptibly or externally to 
involve motion and emotion within the body. A person does not have to be dancing 
wildly to be moved by music. Indeed, if we take the idea of motion away from that 
explicit external bodily movement and towards a sense of motion such as an internal 
sense of a drop in sadness or despair, or the stomach-flutter of excitement – movement is 
understood as an integral part of emotion, not only an outwardly projected sign. Stilling 
the body is, in fact, a difficult process and involves a concerted effort, what Eldrich Priest 
defines as ‘choreography of non-acts or counter movements’.79 Music draws body 
responses and body concepts to the surface. The body is not an unthinking ‘physical’ 
object but part of the thinking and feeling being. When it is said that music is moving, 
that movement is not a detached, cognitive, head-controlled response to an object, but 
the reaction of the whole person, whose being is breathing through a body that 
remembers, feels and beats with and through the music.  
Perhaps the most useful model of music to help rethink the divides between 
mind and body (and thereby the extension of mental life through the body) is one where 
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music is understood as an act of release or a space of dissolve. As philosopher Don Idhe 
attests, ‘music – can overwhelm inner presence’ and provide a ‘temporary sense of the 
“dissolution” of self-presence’.80 Music dissolves the idea of a bounded self, impenetrable 
to the outside, or somehow individually able to overcome with the power of mind over 
matter. Chris Stover agrees that music helps us see the always-becoming of the body; 
and we cannot know what this ‘is’ at any point, as the ‘porous thresholds’ that music 
reveals help to problematise ‘where one body stops and the next begins’.81 Drawing back 
to the questions of this thesis – centred in providing a social and physical context for 
‘mental’ dis/order – such ideas of boundary dissolving, or of bodies constantly affected 
and affecting, and moving and interacting, which are offered up by embodied music 
criticism, help to provide a tangible realisation of these theories.  
Taking this idea further, the psychoanalytic music critic David Schwarz is 
interested in why music can cause goose bumps, and why these bumps on the surface of 
the skin (as the visible edge of a body) might be significant. He writes that listening is an 
‘all around’ pleasure, and that through music the boundary separating the body from the 
external world seems dissolved or crossed in some way. Schwarz argues that music is an 
‘oceanic’ fantasy comparable with ‘sleeping, swimming, having sex, being absorbed by a 
movie, by a religious experience or a landscape’.82 These experiences overwhelm and 
overtake. Such oceanic fantasies are compared with the ‘sonorous envelope’ – the 
surrounding of the foetus with the maternal voice – which Schwarz argues is the first 
model of auditory pleasure.83 Music then finds its roots in nostalgia for this ‘sonorous 
womb, a murmuring house’.84 Music is not the thing itself, but the fantasy of the thing – 
it is visceral but it is also imaginative. Schwarz argues that whether music represents the 
                                                          
80  Don Idhe, ‘Auditory Imagination’ in The Auditory Culture Reader ed. by Michael Bull and Les Back 
(Oxford and New York: Berg Publishers, 2003), pp.61-66 (p.61). 
81 Stover, ‘Musical Bodies’. 
82 David Schwarz, Listening Subjects: Music, Psychoanalysis, Culture (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
1997), p.7 
83 Schwarz, p. 8. 
84 Schwarz, p. 7 cites Guy Rosolato, ‘La Voix: entre corps et langage’, Revue Francaise de Psychanalyse, 37 
(1974), pp. 75-94. 
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‘sonorous envelope’ in terms of either being structured as this ‘fantasy thing’ or as it 
articulates the ‘sonorous fantasy space’, it represents the crossing of thresholds.85 
In the accounts by Schwarz and Idhe, the body is touched by music in a very 
visceral and physical sense, as well as connecting to its imaginative power (which is not 
separate but connected and integrated with that physicality). If music represents this 
sense of space – yearned for and recalled through certain moments or movements that 
seem to cross back to that sonorous womb – then when that ‘fantasy space’ is entered 
into, a boundary is crossed, and goose bumps appear with the memory of feeling 
reimagined. Body memory is foregrounded; memory that is created even before linguistic 
signification is learnt or constructed. In this understanding, music is an enabling force 
for understanding subjectivity through embodiment. In a culture of habituated 
disembodiment, where models of the mind and body are split, and where the head and 
brain are viewed as dominant, music articulates the possibility for something else – a 
different model of being a sensible body. The ‘affect’ of music – of movement and of 
being moved – is visceral and embodied and meaning is deeply embedded within this. 
Music provides a sense of spaciousness and it actively articulates the constancy of 
the thinking body in motion. Musician, Jo Hamilton, demonstrates the whole body 
immersed in a dance-like choreography with an instrument called the ‘Airpiano’; an 
instrument which is played without being touched. As her hands and arms move above a 
slab, sensors detect those movements in 3D space.86 Watching her hands lift, release, 
wave, open and close, there is a real sense of how music is created through space and 
through the movement of the body within that space. The moving, opening and soothing 
that music can enable, provides a pathway through the problematic head-body 
verticality which is culturally dominant and leads our current perspectives on ‘mental’ 
                                                          
85 Schwarz, p.8. 
86 Tom Lamont, ‘Jo Hamilton: “Playing an AirPiano is Almost Dance-like”’, the Guardian, 10 July 2011 
<http://www.theguardian.com/music/2011/jul/10/jo-hamilton-airpiano-air-piano> [accessed 19 July 2017]. 
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dis/order and the solutions psychiatry and psychology offer to address them. 
 
Conclusions 
In carving out a conceptualisation of mental life as running through the being-body, I 
needed to find a tool with which to practically grasp and to articulate this notion. In this 
chapter, I have discussed how the notion of haptic sounds brought forth the body and its 
presence; where sound as physical energy imprints, moves and vibrates the skin and self. 
I then worked with theories of music and emotion to suggest that music moves in ways 
that grant space to the body to move beyond habit and to feel an embodiment often 
denied in an individualist, head dominant culture. I argued that a detached, separated 
and abstracted notion of musical experience rests on the belief that mind rules matter. 
Conversely, I suggested that music is both produced and felt by bodies, which both 
shape music and are shaped by music, thus helping to dissolve boundaries between 
object and subject, and self and other. With these arguments in place, the bubble where 
thought is held inside words – and where ‘mental’ dis/order is a problem of this specific, 
compartmentalised aspect of human life – starts to explode into something physical and 
amorphous, potentially testing and transcending the boundaries of narrative form. This 
chapter has taken the thesis from the re-hashed spaces of narratives circling around the 
problematic dividers of ‘mental’ and ‘physical’ health to push towards the material, 
practical feeling of being a body. I have foregrounded how ‘emergent musical 
subjectivity’ in both performance and perception/reception of music surfaces aspects of 
bodily-being that reach beyond the confines of narrative selfhood presented as essential 
in some dominant spaces in medical humanities scholarship. Indeed, in the next chapter, 
I move to think about body practices that focus on the experiential; where meaning and 
knowledge is located within being-bodies rather than in subsequent and separate 
interpretation or representation. I suggest that these practices are important in helping 
to wrestle with the difficult work of addressing the language of ‘mental’ dis/order, and 
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that a radical reconsideration of what this means needs to draw from practices and 
understandings that start to enquire about ‘mental’ health and life from embodied roots, 
rather than as an afterthought or unthinking relation. 
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Chapter Four: Knowing Bodies 
 
Chapter Aim and Summary 
In order to further explore some of the methods and structures of embodiment as they 
relate to health, I turn in this chapter to models of working with the body grounded in 
non-dualist principles, to move beyond the consistent binaries engrained in medical 
knowledge and practice. I work through a number of paradigms of understanding the 
body, not only in terms of organs, bones, muscles and nerves – the anatomical maps of 
western medicine – but with an energetic and vibrational understanding, and how these 
aspects help to inform and develop an account unhindered by ‘mental’ and ‘physical’ 
divisions. This chapter thus builds and develops the work of Chapter Three, where I 
argued that sound and music agitate neatly contained notions of static bodies and 
beings, with individually contained mental lives. I once again here situate the argument 
in a line of new materialist feminism, which – as Simone Fullager suggests – is useful 
because it ‘reorients questions about what bodies “do” and how matter “acts”’ as opposed 
to seeking to define and confine what a body must be. I thus build on the work of 
Chapter Three where musical subjectivities helped to reveal the fluidity of moving 
bodies. Indeed, I argue that there is more to bodies than the enclosed thinking-narrating 
model of selfhood allows, as I seek to understand – as Simone Fullager frames it – 
‘how embodied matter contributes to ways of knowing.’ 1  
In the Introduction, I articulated that I would build upon recent calls for the 
medical humanities to challenge and act as a corrective to biomedicine’s evidence 
hierarchies. In this chapter, I put the notion of what constitutes evidence and experience 
at the centre of my argument. I argue that there may be forms of knowledge about 
distress – the prickling sensation in a state of anxiety, or the heavy depths of depression, 
or the pump of fear in an eating disorder – that are not about the narrating, talking self. 
                                                          
1 Simone Fullager,‘Diffracting mind-body relations’.  
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Indeed, distress may be about relationships with the world that cannot be solved or 
disentangled. In this chapter, I am interested in how these things may (or may not) be 
relieved in dropping into a feeling of the physical and energetic body rather than 
objectifying or exiting from it. In this way, this chapter broadly advances some of the 
issues discussed as part of the wider corporeal turn. As philosopher and choreographer 
Maxine Sheets-Johnstone puts it in her book The Primacy of Movement, this ‘calls upon 
us to attend to something long taken for granted […] to be mindful of movement […] to 
be silent, and, in our silence, to witness the phenomenon of movement […] of self […] 
and world’.2 
In this chapter, I attend to the ‘silence’ and the meaning of movement by 
analysing a range of body models that re-vision or re-shape both ways of thinking about 
bodies, as well as knowledge and experience of those bodies. However, I do this within 
some critical parameters. I do not suggest (in the way that complementary and 
alternative medicine often does) that these alternative models simply provide the 
answers to distress. Furthermore, when mental health is linked to physicality and body 
movement in government policy or public health spaces (and in the accounts of 
individuals replaying and reconstructing these discourses) this tends to focus on 
promoting the benefits of exercise. While exercise has proven and growing benefits for 
‘mental’ disorder, in such constructions the ‘body’ is still attended to in objectified, 
anatomical ways. I thus examine these ideas critically – considering how they propagate 
more internalised self-management solutions to socially and environmentally related 
issues. Indeed, I assess how these body-based techniques may (and have) become 
instruments of promoting more internalised and further individualised responsibility for 
mental health – in similar ways to the cognitive behavioural strategies discussed in 
Chapter One.  
                                                          
2 Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, The Primacy of Movement, (Amsterdam, Netherlands; Philadelphia PA: John 
Benjamins Publishing Company, 1998), p xviii. 
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I, therefore, keep to the critical through line of this thesis to think in depth about 
the neoliberal structures supporting certain prioritised notions of how health and 
recovery can be accessed. Fullager provides a useful context here in an analysis of 
physical activity and women’s recovery from depression. She discusses how physical 
culture – often used as a message of empowerment for women (for example in the This 
Girl Can campaign) – is not a ‘neutral’ or ‘inherently good or bad for emotional 
wellbeing’ but is based on ideas of individuals finding or summoning up the willpower 
and energy needed to engage in exercise, which is often countered by the languid, 
painful body experienced in depression.3 In response to this point, I draw a line between 
the relational, worldly and deeply-felt sense of embodiment and ‘physical activity’ or 
‘exercise’ that is involved in ‘doing to’ or moving the object body in functional ways. My 
emphasis in this chapter is how knowledge is formed about ‘mental’ dis/order and how 
‘mental’ dis/order is experienced, and how these things should not be directed in a 
model of head-down, mind over matter understanding, where narrative – aligned with 
thought in the head – is the only form of knowledge. I propose that embodied mental 
health is not about bodies doing physical things to feel better, (although for some people 
this might be part of their process of becoming well), rather I argue that embodied 
mental health reveals bodies imbricated and involved in their social worlds. I have 
already troubled the idea of neatly contained and boundaried bodies in Chapter Three, 
and I have touched upon concepts of embodiment, which are not wholly based on 
individual sensations, or in individual methods of self-improvement, but are instead 
understood as affective and vibrational. In this chapter, I develop this further by drawing 
on disciplines where embodied knowledge is foregrounded. 
Finally, this is not an attempt to provide a comprehensive view of several body-
based practices spanning vast fields with huge integral differences, but to find useful 
connections in order to provide meaningful models of embodiment. I return once again 
                                                          
3 Fullager, ‘Diffracting mind-body relations’. 
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to the notion of the transdisciplinary and to drawing out the intersections, overlaps and 
unity of knowledge in an affirmative reading of distinctive areas of work. My aim in this 
chapter is to consider how these models are both non-dualistic and offer useful ways of 
reconceptualising and understanding ‘mental’ health. It is also an appeal to different 
knowledge forms, beyond the textual and the verbal in the narrative-led medical 
humanities. 
Somatics: A ‘Generative Concept’ 
There are numerous ways of cutting the fields of bodywork therapeutics, which might 
include those of anatomically-based physical therapies, the tradition of embodied 
psychotherapy, or subtle body models in a more ‘spiritual’ tradition such as the chakras 
in yoga or acupuncture meridians from Chinese medicine.4 However, in 1976, Thomas 
Hanna (1928-1990), who was a movement practitioner and philosopher, identified a 
collection of embodied disciplines sharing an approach to first person practice through 
sensory awareness and named the field Somatics.5 In Hanna’s definition, Somatics is 
differentiated from general studies of the body by its first-person perspective; it is the 
body proprioceptively as perceived from within.6 As Hanna explains in an instructional 
film, in which he relays his methods, from the interior of a body there is a perceptive 
ability that no one can have from looking at or being outside of that body.7 Hanna argues 
that the somatic viewpoint is engaged with the idea that ‘everything we experience in 
our lives is a bodily experience’. 8 9 This even applies to language, which is not denied or 
set in opposition to this body-sensation but comes from both the body and the breath. 
Following the lead of philosopher Don Hanlon Johnson (in his edited collection of 
                                                          
4 Barcan, p.151. 
5 Don Hanlon Johnson, Bone, Breath and Gesture, Practices of Embodiment (Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic 
Books, 1995), p. xv. 
6 Thomas Hanna, Somatics, 1 (Spring/Summer 1986), pp.4-8 (p.4). 
7 Thomas Hanna, ‘Unlocking Your Body (excerpt)’, Online video, YouTube, 21 August 2010 
<https://youtu.be/_cWnoZqJZ8g> [accessed 20 July 2017]. 
8 Association for Hanna Somatic Education Inc. <http://hannaSomatics.com/> [accessed 20 July 2017]. 
9 Thomas Hanna, Somatics: Reawakening the Mind's Control of Movement, Flexibility, and Health, 
(Cambridge: MA, De Capo Press, 2004), p.xii. 
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Somatics’ essays, Bone, Breath & Gesture), in this chapter, I use this term, which groups 
different bodywork practices and practitioners, as a ‘generative concept’ that creates the 
opportunity for collaboration and augmentation of once conflicting or disparate 
traditions.10  
The roots of Somatics body-based practice are often attributed to the work of 
François Delsarte (1811-71). Delsarte lost his singing voice ‘through poor instruction’ and 
so turned to a focused enquiry on movement and breath to help him.11 His work – the 
Science of Applied Aesthetics – examined ‘voice, breath, movement dynamics, line and 
form’ with the body seen as an ‘expressive agent of the human impulses, mind, spirit, 
and vital instinct’. Delsarte’s work is the acknowledged root source of inspiration for the 
first generations of modern dancers. 12 It was also studied by dancer, choreographer and 
movement theoretician Rudolph von Laban (1879-1958) and taught by actor F. Matthias 
Alexander (1869-1955) before they each developed their own practices. Furthermore, one 
of his students – Steele MacKaye – established the first professional acting school in 
America.13 Subsequent bodywork practitioners grew out of these foundations and their 
mutual influence and connection have been well-documented. As Don Johnson affirms, 
like Delsarte, many of these body practitioners were inspired by their own illness or 
diseases that were not solved by conventional medical approaches. Other practitioners 
were motivated to bring out the clarity and self-awareness they found in bodywork to 
fields of more mechanical methods of exercise.14 This bodywork was not simply about 
moving, toning, honing or refining the body below the neck via stilted exercises, it was 
                                                          
10  Don Hanlon Johnson, ‘Somatics’, <http://www.donhanlonjohnson.com/Somatics.html> [accessed 13 July 
2017]. 
11 Carola Speads, ‘Ways to Better Breathing’, in Bone Breath and Gesture, ed. by Johnson, pp. 36-49 (p. 39). 
12 Joe Williams, ‘A Brief History of Delsarte: The Delsarte System of Expression’, The Delsarte Project 
<http://www.delsarteproject.com/?A_Brief_History_of_Delsarte> [accessed 20 July 2017]. 
13 Stacy Marsella, Sharon Marie Carnicke, Jonathan Gratch and others, ‘An Exploration of Delsarte’s 
Structural Acting System’ in J. Gratch, M. Young, R. Aylett and others, (eds) Intelligent Virtual Agent, IVA 
2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4133 (Berlin: Springer, 2006) 
14 Johnson, Bone, Breath, Gesture, p. xi. 
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centred on developing something much deeper, that challenged the split, or that was 
used in a healing capacity. 
Somatics practices including the Feldenkrais technique, Mind-Body Centring or 
the Alexander Technique are understood to be methods of self-improvement based on 
attending to, and becoming aware of, the skills and movements of the body in everyday 
life. Within these practices, the work is on activating knowledge through observing the 
body in action. Learning to develop this mode of attention comes through practice and it 
is garnered through physical engagement. As I think about Somatics as a ‘generative 
concept’, I draw on practices and dance methods with their roots in this lineage of 
bodywork, but I also think (in broad terms) about Eastern influences on Western body 
practices (with the examples of yoga and martial arts). While there are clear differences 
between dance geared towards performance and bodywork conducted in classes – as well 
as between the complex historical lineages of yoga and modern bodywork – I suggest 
that the work connects around a communal vocabulary and understanding of the value 
of cultivation and practice. 
While the contexts for different bodywork including manual and movement 
therapies may be diverse, I focus on three specific points of connection that contribute to 
understanding what embodied knowledge means and enlarge the concept of embodied 
mental health. The first part of the chapter turns towards notions of moving (and 
changing) bodies and how movement in space relates to embodied knowledge. The 
second looks at the way in which the mass or matter of the body absorbs experience and, 
in particular, how trauma and memory affects or alters that matter, which is not dull, flat 
and inert but energetically driven. Finally, I suggest in the third part of this chapter, that 
ethically committed bodywork foregrounds how individual understanding and embodied 
knowledge confirms the ways in which beings are affected and affecting. This is a much 
more rounded and complex account of how distress is created, perpetuated and 
sustained in social and cultural contexts, and how the mind is not an internalised zone 
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between the ears. I consider how embodiment can be thought of in more critical terms 
related to surrounding contexts and social worlds. Before I come to think about these 
three areas, I turn first to the issue of knowledge, and the limits of evidence-based 
medicine; limits that reinforce mind over matter and dualistic models of understanding 
concepts of health and illness. 
 
Embodied Knowledge; Embodied Research 
 
The tenacious split between mind and body infects even those who vigorously 
criticize it. One of its most widespread manifestations is in an institutional split 
between theory and practice.15 
 
The above quotation is taken from Johnson’s compilation of a range of perspectives from 
leading bodywork practitioners. This quote usefully wrestles with the issue of how a 
mind and body split affects the division between theory (which is constructed by minds) 
and practices (fulfilled by bodies) – this is very clear in the context of medical practices 
where physical and mental health are treated in separate departments and institutions. 
In this section, I consider the importance of recognising ways of knowing beyond such 
dualistic and reductionist categories of thought. A medical model based on evidence-
based medicine – centred on objective and distanced third person research, struggles to 
incorporate embodied, sensate and subjective ways of knowing in its understanding of 
health and illness. Experiential evidence is downgraded in terms of its quality and value 
versus empirical and expert evidence in terms of evidence hierarchies in healthcare.16 
However, I argue that embodied knowledge is vital, in terms of coming to know and 
understand ‘mental’ dis/order, which is far more complex than the reductionist medical 
                                                          
15 Johnson, p. xii. 
16 See, for example, the GRADE criteria: BMJ Clinical Evidence, ‘What is GRADE?’ 
<http://clinicalevidence.bmj.com/x/set/static/ebm/learn/665072.html> [accessed 13 July 2017]. 
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models can describe or account for. This chapter is thus also about methodologies and 
ways of knowing about the body or embodied sensations. I argue once again here, that 
language should not be severed from the body, but that it might be necessary (as medical 
humanities researchers thinking about ways of knowing about ‘mental’ dis/order) to 
approach that which has been ignored and disconnected first. I will now turn to discuss 
what the meanings (plural) of embodied research might constitute. I turn first to Eli and 
Kay’s research project looking at dance as an embodied practice specifically for anorexia 
as a practical example. They write: 
 
We aimed to design a study which foregrounded the body, and where sensory 
experience and the memories thereof would be expressed first through the body, 
rather than forced into immediate verbal translation in interview.17  
 
In this dance work, Eli and Kay describe how participants in their project choreographed, 
danced and watched others perform solos about their eating disorders. The 
communication here was one of ‘visceral empathy’ and it was through the practice of 
dance that participants could ‘identify and address’ their embodied feelings. Kay and Eli 
articulate how the practice of dance led participants to begin to describe their 
experiences in words. Arguably, through engaging directly with the physical movement 
of the body – the ‘shaping and expressing of each dancer’s habitus’ – a sense of embodied 
feeling may occur, which enables a language connected with that experience to begin to 
articulate that which has been severed and split. If you want to come back to the body, 
you must come to the body first, and then to words. Indeed, Eli and Kay articulate this 
point, explaining how one participant’s dance in their study focused on ‘a feeling-centred 
                                                          
17 Eli and Kay, ‘Choreographing Lived Experience’, p.63. 
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body of knowledge on her eating-disordered experience’, and how this was about 
‘embodied, rather than discursive sense-making’.18   
Eli and Kay’s paper, which speaks to insights about the importance of valuing the 
sensory or physical, might be applicable to the methodologies that researchers use. 
Gender studies theorist Rachelle Chadwick considers this very point as she surveys a 
range of what she calls ‘embodied methodologies’. 19 Chadwick convenes a range of 
methodologies including ‘embodied reflexivity’ wherein the researcher makes clear their 
own embodied position or state; body-centred methodologies including work focused on 
the depth sensation of memory; sensory prompts in interviews including tactile objects, 
and body-anchored interviewing that concentrates on opening up the body sensations in 
participants’ accounts. Chadwick concludes that most of these techniques end up 
coming back to ‘talk about the body’.20 This leads me to the important point emphasised 
throughout the thesis, that language does not have to be divided from embodied 
knowledge, when the energy of the body is understood not as static, flat matter but as 
energetic and rhythmic; that which moves and powers words.  
Somatics practices provide ways of actively working through the trouble of what 
Sheets-Johnstone terms ‘languaging experience’.21 In such practices, sensory experiences 
provide knowledge, and language taps into this to connect with this body knowing. 
Resultantly, Somatics practices undo something of the dominance of the overruling 
thinking subject in Cartesian frameworks. Indeed, in speaking to this point, Johnson 
writes that Somatics practitioners have an element of ‘feistiness’; viewing their history as 
resistant to dominant notions of the cognitive, thinking self that overrules the 
knowledge of the body. Somatics practitioners attend to the silence of body 
                                                          
18 Eli and Kay, p.65. 
19 Rachelle Chadwick, ‘Embodied methodologies: challenges, reflections and strategies’, Qualitative Research,  
17, 1 (2016), 54–74. 
20 Chadwick, p.57. 
21 Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, The Corporeal Turn: An Interdisciplinary Reader (Charlottesville VA and Exeter: 
Imprint Academic, 2009), Chapter XV. 
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communication against ‘rational verbosity’ by working with ‘the quieter intelligence of 
the flesh’.22 These ideas take me to the broader question about the kind of epistemology 
that underpins Western understanding of mental health, where intelligence and 
thinking are largely separated out from body systems – even in those models that come 
close to describing an integrated understanding of bodies and minds.  
 In his book, The Body: Toward an Eastern Mind-Body Theory, Yuasa Yasuo 
considers (largely through Japanese thinkers, as well as other Eastern philosophy) 
Eastern body-mind relations contrasted with Western concepts, as well as their 
methodological differences. Although there is no such thing as one Eastern view, Yuasa 
asks in broadest terms what might be a distinguishing feature of how knowledge and 
wisdom is conceived in methodological terms. He argues that although Western 
philosophers – including phenomenologists – have taken up the question of how to 
overcome dualism, they approach this in a ‘strictly conceptual that is, mental fashion’.23 
Yuasa suggests that whereas Western thought has maintained a difference between 
philosophy and empirical sciences (or between theory and practice), in Eastern terms 
philosophy is not only a theoretical speculation but a practical, applied and lived 
experience. Yuasa explains that the ‘wisdom of satori [metaphysical insight or 
enlightenment] is empirically verified in a process of cultivation’.24 The theoretical 
position one reaches is based on this lived experience; this is experiential verification of 
felt and embodied knowledge.  
This cultivation is not the same as Western notions of ‘praxis’, which is generally 
opposed to theory and is focused on the application of knowledge. Instead, in Eastern 
conceptualisations, knowledge is attained through this ‘practical process’. Indeed, 
                                                          
22 Johnson, p.xiii. 
23 Thomas P. Kasulis, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, to Yuasa Yasuo, The Body: Toward an Eastern Mind-Body Theory, 
ed. by T. P. Kasulis, trans. by Nagatoma Shigenori and T.P. Kasulis (New York: State University of New York 
Press, 1987), p. 6.  
24 Yuasa, p.27. 
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‘theoretical cognition of the truth is possible only through practice’ [my emphasis].25 To 
illustrate this, Yuasa quotes the medieval poet Shenga who explained that ‘no matter 
how much one is exposed to sacred teachings and books, attainment is not his unless he 
knows for himself what is cold to be cold, what is hot to be hot’.26 Cultivation can only be 
understood ‘by personally experiencing the whole body-mind’, as opposed to an 
intellectual comprehension through a detached analysis. Resultantly, knowledge is not a 
cognitive, empirical object obtained through distance; embodied knowledge might need 
to be worked upon, practised and developed.  
These very broad insights are useful to work towards ways in which embodied 
sensation and embodied practice might inform knowledge and understanding about 
mental health, which does not have to be directed from the head down or objectified or 
conceptualised from the detached perspective of theory. Indeed, it is useful here to 
contemplate the ways in which medicine is, in itself, a ‘practice’. Drawing back to the 
work of Anna Harris and the use of percussion by medics to use their bodies to listen 
through touch, Harris confirms that:  
 
perception is not, or not always, a registration of some world out there by means 
of separated sensory organs, but rather an intricate engagement in which knower 
and known are crafted together, through sensing in movement.27  
 
Knowledge through practice, rather than practice demonstrating knowledge, is at the 
centre of this paper and is an inversion of the contemporary conceptualisation of what 
medical practice is about. Davis’ interest is in how doctors’ own bodies develop and 
evolve through the process and practice of percussion. This is a fully embodied 
knowledge in the context of medical practice and reveals a diffractive space in which it 
                                                          
25 Yuasa, p.85-86. 
26 Yuasa, p.103. 
27 Harris, ‘Listening Touch’, p.50. 
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connects with Eastern spiritual practices and bodywork. However, this investment in 
doctors’ ‘sensory acumen’, which is ‘a way of knowing of, and through, the resource 
always at hand; one’s own living breathing body’, is largely overruled by the idea that 
knowledge and research are verified through the objective, rational mind. 28  
 
 
Moving Bodies  
 
Unsticking ourselves from our physical location can help dislodge our unhappy 
mental state. Movement is the antidote to fixedness, after all.29 
 
In the above quotation from Matt Haig, whose memoir of depression was discussed in 
Chapter Two, he suggests that moving the body might be a way of operating against a 
negative ‘mental state’. In this way, he parallels ideas about exercise and movement 
suggested at the start of the chapter – of the body (in its separate physical sphere) 
moving to relieve or disperse negative mental thoughts. However, in this section of the 
chapter, I argue for something much more integrated, by suggesting that movement may 
be a way in which a person can attend to, observe and drop into the sensations of their 
physical form. As Fullager explains in her account of women’s experiences of exercise 
with depression, movement is not only about building motivation, or helping people to 
feel empowered, or about causing chemical changes in the body, but is much more 
about, ‘affective possibilities in new and forgotten embodied pleasures – relaxation, 
immersion in movement, doing “unimportant” things.’30 Movement might provide a 
different way of being a body; an inversion of the top-down control of mind over matter.  
                                                          
28 Harris, ‘Listening Touch’, p.31. 
29 Haig, p.144. 
30 Fullager, ‘Diffracting mind-body relations’. 
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I consider how the movement of bodies also relates to the limits and spaces 
afforded to them. Indeed, as Fullager writes, the ‘new corporeal therapeutics’ that 
promotes physical exercise to overcome mental health difficulties, might in some cases 
cut out the ‘conditions under which distress materialises’ as well as becoming ‘another 
practice in the line of moral and gendered imperatives to manage one’s health’. 31 Indeed, 
as this chapter discusses, embodied mental health is not so simply dealt with by 
prescribing people a few weeks of exercise classes, but is much more about staying with 
the difficulty; the messiness of the problems, which aren’t so swiftly detached from social 
contexts.32 The ways in which bodies are allowed or enabled to exercise and move, and 
the ways in which they may be prevented or excluded from this (in particular how female 
bodies might be denied space or have their movements inhibited, or disabled or ill 
bodies might be restricted or disempowered) suggests that the relation between 
movement and embodiment is not straightforward. Finally, I suggest that we need to 
reconceptualise what is meant by ‘exercise’, by borrowing from Somatics practitioners; to 
think in terms of movement dynamics and in terms of practice and cultivation – about 
the possibility of dropping in to connect with embodied knowledge. 
In a countenance to the notion that words are the primary way of 
communicating thought, theorists of movement, such as Maxine Sheets-Johnstone have 
put forward the primacy of movement, explaining that we are not ‘stillborn’ but come 
into the world moving. The acquisition of language, she explains, is ‘post-kinetic’. Sheets-
Johnstone argues that movement is ‘our mother tongue’; it is the way in which we come 
to know our own bodies and the way we related to the spaces around us. Movement is 
formative as an infant; the contact of a hand grasping and reaching for objects around it 
                                                          
31 Fullager, ‘Diffracting mind-body relations’. 
32 The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) recommends that people with mild to 
moderate depression take part in about three (exercise) sessions a week, lasting about 45 minutes to one 
hour, over 10 to 14 weeks <http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/stress-anxiety-depression/pages/exercise-for-
depression.aspx> [accessed 13 July 2017]. 
179 
 
 
and the way it comes in contact with the world and comes to think about the world.33 
The idea that movement might, in itself, be a form of thinking and knowing (and have 
meaning in and of itself), counteracts those disciplines that seek to decipher or draw out 
the meaning from such experiences. If the meaning is in the bodily event and is not 
external to it, or after the fact, it may not need to be narrated into any kind of coherent 
linear structure. We cannot demand or command narrative out of movement, it may well 
speak for itself. 
For Somatics practitioners, movement involves physical awareness; developing 
and honing the kinaesthetic sense. Once physical opening through movement starts to 
occur, and the experience is attended to, felt and practised, then a whole-self shift can 
take place. There are many examples of this approach in both Somatics work and in 
bodywork influenced or shaped by Eastern philosophies, but I seek here to focus on a 
couple of cases that speak to this point. As American dance and movement therapist, 
Mary Starks Whitehouse (1911 – 1979) writes, ‘Movement is the great law of life. 
Everything moves’.34 Whitehouse, like Sheets-Johnstone, argues that an engagement 
with the dynamics of movement and a self-awareness of the kinaesthetic sense is not 
valued and is also underused. With the cultural axiom of mind over matter, paying 
attention to physical sensation and feeling is not considered to be a way of self-
examination, and, if it is, then the relation is commonly conceived as being 
metaphorical. As Whitehouse continues, ‘the more [the body] becomes an appearance’, 
the more it ‘moves from anything to do with one’s self’.35 Whitehouse trained as a 
psychotherapist and went on to pioneer ‘Authentic Movement’ – improvised free 
movement with closed eyes, following the impulses from within and responding 
kinaesthetically to develop value and awareness of the intuitive moving self.  
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34 Mary Whitehouse, ‘The Tao of the Body’, in Bone, Breath and Gesture, ed. by Johnson, pp.239-252 (p.244-
45), p.239. 
35 Whitehouse, p. 245. 
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The freedom and fullness developed in Whitehouse’s work, echoes Fullager’s 
rounded account of how movement can create complexes of feeling beyond 
contemporary reductionist accounts of muscle building or calorie burning found in the 
exercise and physical activity guidelines of public health literature. However, as martial 
arts and movement guru, Peter Ralston argues, in contemporary Western society people 
often forget how to feel with their bodies, or move without inhibition, because, after 
basic physical education is given to children there is ‘no opportunity to investigate the 
basics of sensation, movement and interaction for their own sakes’. 36 In cultures bound 
to models of Cartesian separation and intellectual development situated in the brain, the 
body is reduced to a brain carrier and physical exercise is often contained to repetitive 
exercises based on moving muscles in certain ways. With the type of conscious 
movement Ralston advocates (or in the improvised impulsive movement of 
Whitehouse’s Authentic Movement) a different feeling of the body emerges, one which 
Ralston argues that ‘makes us more conscious of every aspect of being a body’.37  
A leading Somatics practitioner who influenced others in the field – and who 
noticed this gap between movement focused on form and movement that developed self-
awareness and feeling – was German therapist Elsa Gindler (1885-1961). Gindler explained 
that ‘Gymnastik’ (bodywork that began in Germany in around 1900), ‘are a means by 
which we attempt to increase intelligence’.38 Gindler’s aim was not to get people to 
achieve a perfect movement, as in other Gymnastik teaching (which had this emphasis 
on form at its centre), but to change what they felt was wrong so that learning and self-
knowledge come about through motion. Charlotte Selver (1901-2003) (a pioneer of the 
Sensory Awareness method) explains how she learnt through studying with Gindler, that 
there was a difference between performing an ordinary exercise – as one would in a 
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37 Ralston, p.32. 
38 Elsa Gindler, ‘Gymnastik for People whose Lives Are Full of Activity’, Somatics (August/Winter 1986-87), 
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physical Gymnastik practice – compared to the questions that Gindler asked her about 
her movement. These questions included: ‘Do you feel that you are going through 
space?’ ‘Do you feel the air around you?’ ‘Do you really want to jump?’39 The movement 
asks its own questions about where the body is, how it feels and where it is going. This 
sort of Somatics work is not just about exercising the objectified body but living in it. As 
Gindler explained, her work was not about fixed exercises but an exploration of how 
movement works and where the connections lie. 
Movement cuts through the idea that learning must always be top down. 
Learning comes from personal experience, as Gindler articulates: ‘Breathing, relaxation 
and tension […]. As long as they remain just words, they create mischief; as soon as they 
are imbued with experience they become great mediators of life’.40 To tell someone to 
relax, or to explain why they feel tense in words, is very different from asking someone to 
move their body and feel where the tension exists, then to breathe deeply into that 
tension and create a sense of bodily space. Gindler felt by bringing awareness to a 
problem that a person becomes already ‘equal to the situation’.41 However, this is not just 
a process of ‘thinking about it, alone’, a person must instead ‘open [the] senses to these 
phenomena’ because the work cannot come from without.42  
Somatics and forms of movement influenced by Eastern spiritual traditions are 
further connected by a specific awareness of the breath and their development of 
different non-vertical shapes for human subjectivity. Eastern forms of meditation always 
begin with training respiration with ‘control of (Yama) the life-force (the prana, the Ki)’; 
attentiveness to the breath is essential in deepening a felt sense of connectivity.43 
Somatics breathwork practitioner Ilse Middendorf (1910-2009) describes her breath work 
technique as growing ‘spatiality’; as the breath offers a sense of the body opening up to 
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41 Gindler, p. 9. 
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the world. She argues that her work can be approached from any side – it’s not like a 
ladder directed to one place, instead, it is like a ‘sphere’.44 A vertical model of selfhood, 
which is directed from the head down, is altered by the way in which breath inflates and 
expands the felt sense of the body.  
This notion of space becomes vitally important as I think about the possible 
limits of an account of movement as productive for an embodied understanding of 
‘mental’ health. Returning once again to the work of Merleau-Ponty and to questions of 
being and becoming, he writes that, it is this ‘spatiality’ of the body, which is ‘the 
deployment of its being as a body’, because the body is not just ‘in’ space, but it actively, 
‘inhabits’ space. This can be most clearly seen when ‘the body is in motion’ because 
‘movement is not content with passively undergoing space and time, it actively assumes 
them’.45 While breath provides more internal space, or a different shape of conceiving of 
body-mind relationships, the space in which bodies are ‘deployed’ and ‘assume’ 
movement is not equal or universal. Indeed, it is perhaps too easy to eulogise about 
movement, or to think uncritically about it in a moralistic healthcare climate demonising 
obesity and sedentary behaviour. Normalising or universalising movement as a healthy 
state, or a way to connect with the self, is a potentially sizeable issue when the freedom 
or ability to move is not possible. I will turn now to think some more about these 
possible limitations and to practitioners whose own limited personal movement ability 
helps to rethink this connection as well as reconceptualising movement in energetic 
terms. 
Iris Marion Young in her work on the roles and limits ascribed to female bodies 
argues that the subject/object dichotomy – wherein bodies are objectified and 
disconnected from self-concept – comes from ‘a lack of practice in using the body and 
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performing tasks’.46 Young analyses what it is like to learn to ‘throw like a girl’, which, 
she contests is not an inherent factor of gender but a socially shaped reaction and 
movement. To throw in a limiting way is not a personal or internal failure, but a 
response and reaction to the ways in which bodies are taught by society that they can 
operate. Drawing back to Ahmed’s analysis of female bodies, when those bodies shrink 
away from violence, they try to take up less space; they move nervously, hesitantly or 
cautiously, or they rule out movement altogether. This can be seen in the work of two 
writers who describe the massive bodily reaction they endured after being raped. Roxane 
Gay, in a memoir about her relationship with food and her body, writes how after she 
was raped as a young girl, ‘I remember eating and eating and eating so I could forget, so 
my body could become so big it would never be broken again.’ Her response to the 
trauma was to make her body into a ‘cage’ – it was, she describes, ‘a cage of my own 
making’. But this was an act to ‘keep men away’; her eating was an act of self-defence 
against the violence she had faced. This was a body shaped by trauma, pushed to re-
define itself as a result of a violent world.47 Poet Rupi Kaur also discusses this idea in a 
TED talk about her experience of rape. She describes how she encountered, after the 
event, a feeling of homelessness in her body; and so, she refused it – she showered in the 
darkness, she craved physical pain and vandalised her skin through self-harm.48 These 
brief examples suggest how distress and trauma are entrenched in the folds of the body 
and how this is not an internalised or self-created act, but part of the world’s entangled 
imprint. 
Young and Ahmed’s analysis raises the question: when the physical body is 
compromised by the social world, and the natural development of a felt sense or 
                                                          
46 Young, ‘Throwing Like a Girl’, p.35. 
47 Roxane Gay: ‘My body is a cage of my own making’, the Guardian, 1 July 2017 
<https://www.theguardian.com/books/2017/jul/01/roxane-gay-my-body-is-a-cage-of-my-own-making> 
[accessed 13 July 2017]. 
48 Rupi Kaur, ‘I'm Taking My Body Back’, TEDxKC, online video recording, YouTube, 20 July 2017 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RlToQQfSlLA> [accessed 13 July 2017]. 
184 
 
 
kinaesthetic awareness is troubled, how can a sense of embodied knowledge develop? 
The idea that exercise is always helpful – when sensations have been cut off, or when 
bodies have been refused movement, or when fear has frozen bodies into stillness or 
sealed them off with layers of fat – needs to be interrogated. Moving a body is not simply 
an action but a reaction and – as Fullager describes – one which is an affective relation. 
To bring this back once again to the questions raised by this thesis, ‘mental’ dis/order 
can’t be universally solved by helping people to discover embodied movement, or to gain 
a better kinaesthetic connection; policy also needs to be committed to making social 
changes that improve inequality and that recognise the social determinants of distress 
and disorder. 
These questions are pushed even further – and in a different direction – when the 
body can’t feel because of degeneration or paralysis. I turn here to two examples of re-
defining embodiment, to tend to a much more energetic conception of embodiment, one 
which isn’t wholly defined by moving the object of the flesh, bone and muscle. In my 
first example, the educator and writer Bruce Kramer (who suffered from the degenerative 
condition ALS – motor neurone disease) made the connection with his energetic body, 
rather than his weakening muscular frame, through yoga, which he started to practice 
after his diagnosis:  
 
The first yoga class that I was in, I suddenly realized it was music […] And I 
realized that there was a depth to this mind/body relationship that they were 
trying to teach us that is very similar to the mind/body relationship that one has, 
especially as a singer. So, for example, when I would work with the choir, I would 
ask them to ground their feet, to be very present. And as you breathe, breathe 
into your toes, and as you exhale into this tone, let this tone go out the top of 
your head […] so there I am, and I'm thinking, ‘Oh, my God, I'm practising music 
again. […] I am a musician again’.  
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This energetic understanding of the being-body draws back to music (and the work of 
Chapter Three). Kramer discusses the cellist Jaqueline Du Pre, as he makes sense of his 
experiences. He explains that, in Du Pre’s performance, you can see ‘the spine and the 
body and the sound coming up out of the body and you see this connection you are not 
aware of unless you are practising [yoga] that connection is almost super human […] and 
it allowed me as the physical challenges of ALS have become greater and greater to 
remain engaged’. In his yoga practice, Kramer describes something of the sense of inside 
space opened up to him, even though his external movement is restricted and 
minimised: 
 
There's the concept of peeling an onion […] the idea that as you are physically 
engaging and mindfully engaging that physicality, as you are recognizing the 
energy that flows through you, out of you, into others, and others' energy flowing 
into you, that there's more to it than coming to a moment of bliss. […] I was 
overwhelmed by this centre that I could perceive that I had delved into 
something I didn’t even know was there.49 
 
Kramer’s metaphor of the onion – of the energetic core, which is an internal presence 
and the centre of the being-body – is felt in this yoga practice. Furthermore, the body is 
not one thing; it has multiple levels or dimensions, and connects in relational and 
affective ways with the energy of other bodies. Indeed, in yoga, beneath the gross body 
(the physical body) lies the subtle (or astral) body consisting of energy channels or 
nadis.50 Yoga has several meanings but is largely defined from the Sanskrit word yuj 
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meaning ‘to yoke or bind’ and is often interpreted as a ‘union or a method of discipline’.51 
At the heart of yoga is the focus on bringing together parts of the self that are often 
understood as mind and body. Part of this connection (or union) is about the vital 
energy that comes with the integration and fusing of movement with breath. 
Connectivity can be ruptured or unsettled in distress and illness and so practical, 
physicalised movement with connected respiration (like yoga practice) can start to 
enable a differently defined embodiment on an energetic, rather than a muscular or bony 
plane.  
This idea of different bodily levels and the notion of energetic movements within 
a deeper seated bodily system might begin to provide a conceptualisation of human life, 
which is neither the physiological body nor the mind. Like Ilse Middendorf’s spherical 
and spatial way of thinking about embodiment, yoga practice undoes the notion of the 
thinking mind (on top) with the body (below). Kramer’s onion metaphor helps to think 
about a sort of ‘depth’ mental body and how movement and breath explore that process 
of opening. In such a depth, multiple and shifting reading of the energetic body, the 
concept of mind over matter is challenged. 
While Kramer’s energetic and musical connection with his degenerating body 
helped him to invest in feeling and sensing his body in a new way, in my second example 
author Matthew Sanford’s work suggests that embodied knowledge is far greater than 
can be accounted for by even ‘feeling’ the body. In his memoir, Waking, Sanford writes 
about his chest-down paralysis following a car accident as a teenager.52 Later in life, he 
became a yoga teacher and author and went on to work in the field of mind-body 
integration. In his memoir, he documents years of his own felt mind/body split following 
the crash. In the paralysis, he began to feel like a ‘floating head’ and after immense and 
chronic pain; he explains how he began to try to hold himself ‘thinner and thinner, 
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making less of [him] for them to break’.53 Doctors, who saw his physical body as 
unfeeling and broken, advised him to ignore it. His mother suggested that he abandon 
his body and concentrate on ‘developing [his] mind’ in his studies. Sanford explains that 
he felt he’d been given permission to leave his ‘body behind’.54  
It was a yoga teacher who helped Sanford, ‘through his body’, to release the 
trauma of the accident and to come to experience a sense of his body energetically. 
While the medical community suggested that feeling his lower limbs was impossible, 
Sanford explains how his internal sense of his own body might be different to someone 
who is not paralysed, but there is a definite sense of what he terms its ‘energetic 
presence’. Sanford feels this presence and taps into it, as he comes to an awareness of the 
present-ness in his body.55 He describes this experience of his paralysed limbs as a feeling 
of heaviness and of consciousness; this is a quiet feeling that comes about ‘when we learn 
to soften the organs of perception’. As Sanford explains, even for someone who cannot 
feel every part of their body, ‘The spaces you don’t feel are not loss or absence, they are 
part of your strength.’ He provides the metaphor of wood, in which it is ‘not just the 
grains of wood but spaces in between that make it strong’.56 Sanford works through 
subtle sensations that those without an injury (of any sort) might not easily find. The 
sensation – a change in gravity – may be different but it is real and acutely felt.57 
 The implications of these alternative versions of movement, space and feeling in 
both world-engaged and energetic terms, suggest a much richer and thicker account of 
embodied ‘mental’ health, one which is necessarily situated in its environmental and 
social context, and one which moves, breathes and is affected energetically. Movement is 
not just about shaking out negative ‘mental’ thoughts, or releasing mood-boosting 
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chemicals or empowering individuals to take control of their lives, nor is it a given 
ability, or a free expression for all people in the same way. A deeper and more critical 
exploration of movement (even externally imperceptible energetic movement in breath 
or in subtle sensations) starts to trouble the concept of mind over matter, as it gestures 
to knowledge and feeling in much more complex dynamics, where bodies are fluid, 
moving, responding and in constant, chaotic change.  
 
Body Matter; Bodies Matter 
In this part of the chapter, I build on the energetic understanding of bodies, focusing on 
how body matter absorbs and deals with everything it experiences. I think, in particular, 
about the impact of trauma, where there has arguably been the loudest volume of 
research activity about the physical body in this area of ‘mental’ health. One illustrative 
example of this connection in research is within a study by the French National Institute 
of Health and Medical Research (Inserm) that looked at the impact on children whose 
fathers were killed or badly injured during World War I. The study, of more than 4,000 
people born between 1914 and 1916, found that the lives of those children who 
experienced such loss or trauma were shortened by a year on average, thereby suggesting 
the possible long-lasting ‘physical’ impact of what are termed ‘early life adversities’ 
(ELAs).58 These children were not connected by ‘physical’ illness or injury but by ‘mental’ 
trauma. This new evidenced connection for medical research underlines what Somatics 
practitioners have intuitively felt and new materialist scholars have critically articulated 
– body matter, matters.  
Trauma is usually an area where medicine likes to insert a mind/body split: a 
physical trauma to the body is an injury (the impact of a knife wound, for example) and a 
psychological trauma is defined as affecting mental or emotional dimensions (an 
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overwhelming event or something that threatens the integrity of the self, whether 
through a single incident or repeated ‘blows’).59 However, in this section, I argue that a 
trauma – whether the blade of a knife or the blow of losing a parent in war – affects the 
whole. Matthew Sanford’s work does something very important to advance this 
indivisibility. He articulates in Waking how, in the aftermath of the car crash, his body 
‘continue[d] to become an object.’ He adds: 
 
I judge it rather than connect to it. I leave it rather than feel it. This only deepens 
my sense of separation. It also gives me better access to anger and disgust. Both 
are effective ways ‘out’ of a body. Ask an anorexic.60  
 
Sanford’s bold move from paralysis to anorexia disobeys conventional illness models of 
the mental versus the physical. However, for Sanford, the connection is obvious and the 
issue is one of the traumatic gap that forcibly balloons itself between ideas of mind and 
body (whatever the illness or disability). 
Bodywork practices are useful to draw upon to cement this point because of the 
way in which whole bodies are understood to hold onto memories. There are several 
different expressions and accounts of this idea, and rather than give a synoptic overview, 
I focus here again on a couple of examples that speak to the issue of the imprint of 
trauma. The Rosen Method – developed by Marion Rosen (1914-2012) – is hands-on work 
that stems from the belief that emotional and social pressures ‘become structured in the 
body, and […] require muscular tension to maintain’.61 The trauma settles into the 
structure of the being-body and it is the job of physical and practical manipulation to 
unlock it by listening to it, rather than just by plying the tissues. In this method, the 
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practitioner observes the changes in the muscle and breath, releasing built-up, stored 
tension.62 Within a similar framework of sensory understanding, somatic trauma 
therapist Peter Levine takes the specific view that a person who has experienced a 
traumatic event ‘locks down’ the energy and stores it within their body. Painful 
symptoms that might emerge in later years are, therefore, the re-emergence of 
‘fragments of sensory body memory’.63 Trauma embeds into physical tissue structures 
which are not separate from ‘mental’ or ‘emotional’ structures.  
The impact of trauma is not only locked into tight muscles, but Somatics breath-
based practitioners also point to the effect of trauma on breathing. Carola Speads, (1900-
1999) who studied and taught with Elsa Gindler, discusses the way in which breath is 
affected by events and that ‘we often cling to the changed ways of breathing even after 
the events that brought on the disturbance have passed’.64 While it may be widely 
acknowledged that a traumatic incident such as a car crash would cause the heart to race 
and the breath to become erratic and uncontrolled, the idea that this pattern might be 
altered after the event, or that breathing can subsequently be habituated into restrictive, 
shallow spaces, is a further stretch, and one which is not often explored in the main 
models and medical discourses around trauma and ‘mental’ dis/order. 
The impact of life events on bodies and breathing also extends to memories, 
which are not simply contained in immaterial thoughts and metaphysical mental 
landscapes but are dug into the fibres of the ever-changing state of the being-body. 
Dance is aptly able to think through this idea, as a practice that comes to life through the 
body and one that is memorised in muscle and movement. As a connecting example, 
(and in the spirit of working with a broad generative concept of bodywork), I consider a 
dance performance by theatre director and performance theorist Anna Furse and dancer-
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turned-artist Esther Linley’s When We Were Birds. Furse and Linley were both students 
at the Royal Ballet in the 1960s and, in 2012, revisited the space where they once danced 
and performed. As the two dancers listened to the music and began to move, they 
started to remember choreography they once learnt and performed. Furse and Linley 
recalled themselves as performing bodies on stage, remembering as they started to 
dance, the ‘complex patterns’ that the ‘the body goes into’ as well as something of the 
emotional resonance of their past experiences. When We Were Birds, therefore, became a 
duet about the body ‘as memory’ to think about, ‘how when we re-embody past learnt 
movement the mind opens up to forgotten events of the past’. The piece ‘overlaps 
personal memory with historical memory to explore, via the dancing body and its 
memory, how our sense of self is deeply tied into our embodied experience of the 
world’.65 Furse and Linley’s piece explores how the repeated structure of body practice 
creates and builds embodied knowledge and how memory can be explored in three-
dimensional spaces. 
It may seem like a great conceptual leap from the notion of the body in 
performance practice to dealing with ‘psychological’ trauma (or the specific ‘mental’ 
dis/order of PTSD as defined in psychiatric terms), however, psychiatrist and author 
Bessel van der Kolk who runs a trauma centre in America, and has authored a bestselling 
text The Body Keeps the Score: Mind, Brain and Body in the Transformation of Trauma 
makes a very similar move. He argues that the physical and practical movements of 
actors and dancers may have something to ‘teach psychiatrists about healing from 
trauma’.66 Kolk explains that the practice of the movement of the body can inform 
clinical practice. In an article in The New York Times looking at van der Kolk’s work, 
journalist Jeneen Interlandi documents how she attended a ‘psychomotor therapy’ 
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session for patients with PTSD. The approach, she explains, was developed by Albert 
Pesso, a dancer who studied with contemporary dancer Martha Graham (whose work 
also links back to the teaching of Delsarte within the Somatics field). In the psychomotor 
therapy session, a group of people with various issues relating to trauma come together 
in the room and take up roles in character to act out a traumatic memory of one of the 
participants. Interlandi gives the example of a veteran of the Iraq war, Eugene, and his 
killing of an Iraqi man: 
 
Eugene would recreate the trauma that haunted him most by calling on people in 
the room to play certain roles. He would confront those people – with his anger, 
sorrow, remorse and confusion – and they would respond in character, 
apologizing, forgiving or validating his feelings as needed. By projecting his ‘inner 
world’ into three-dimensional space, Eugene would be able to rewrite his 
troubled history more thoroughly than other forms of role-play therapy might 
allow. 
 
Embodied trauma here re-inhabits the body in space; it is replayed as the affect and 
energy between people, rather than confined to an unseen void – an ‘inner world’ – 
between the ears. However, putting the body into motion in space, and in a room with 
other bodies, is something that is largely ignored in cognitive approaches to trauma. Van 
der Kolk argues that cognitive therapy is ‘benign’ when it simply asks patients to ‘alter 
behaviour through a kind of Socratic dialogue’ [and] ‘recognise the maladaptive 
connections between their thoughts and their emotions’. He protests that, in fact, 
‘trauma has nothing whatsoever to do with cognition’ but it is to do with a ‘reset[ting] of 
the body’.67 For van der Kolk, at the heart of trauma is a problem with narrative itself. In 
traumatic experience, the story cannot fully integrate and cannot, therefore, account for, 
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explain or solve the layers of experience embedded within the body. Trauma, he argues, 
is not about being reasonable or verbal or articulate. The response of talk therapy is 
largely inadequate because it ignores bodily and spatial elements of experience.68 Mind 
needs to come back to matter. 
Contrary to Western medicine’s dividing definitions, all ‘psychological’ traumas 
have a ‘physical’ impact. Where bodies are violated, shattered, thwarted or fail in the 
moment of trauma, it is those same bodies that react to the world and shudder, cower or 
shake as the trauma resurfaces. In psychomotor sessions, and in other similar 
approaches that involve ‘paying careful attention to patients’ physiological states’, the 
therapy attempts to reconnect traumatised patients with their own mass and to help 
them to tolerate their own ‘physical sensations’, which they have been forced to stifle.69 
Van der Kolk’s work starts to approach the question of how paying attention to physical 
sensations might lead to first being able to tolerate, and then being able to understand or 
articulate, what those sensations feel like or where they come from.  
Matthew Sanford’s experiences led him to set up an organisation ‘Mind Body 
Solutions’ with a mission to: ‘transform trauma, loss and disability into hope and 
potential by awakening the connection between mind and body’.70 His organisation has 
worked with a range of clients, from people with eating disorders to those injured in 
accidents, to war veterans experiencing paralysis or disability in different forms. A part of 
the therapy he has developed involves placing comforting weights on to bodies to help 
people sink into their own flesh. Sanford describes this as ‘feeling your substance’. This is 
a novel concept for anorexia, which tends to shift the sufferer out of the corporeal body 
(that it tries to efface and reduce) and into a whirring head of thoughts. Asking anorexics 
to relax into the still, weighted body is a very different kind of approach than battling 
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their thoughts with more thoughts and words in talking therapies. Sanford suggests the 
same sense of ‘calming compression’ provided by the weights can be explored in yoga 
poses, which can provide a sense of release into the body structures, helping clients to 
feel the ground and the pull of gravity and weight.71 He compares the energetic sensation 
of yoga to the ‘feeling of getting into a warm bath – the relief, the feeling of nourishment, 
the calm and quieting’.72 Sanford writes how the feeling of dropping into the body 
creates a sense of ‘landing’.73 This physical feeling of containment might also be 
experienced in the release into someone else’s weight in the process of being hugged or 
held, or it might be felt as the body sinks into bed. These feelings are not about objective 
body movement but about a deep drop into the energetic and sensate body – an internal 
feeling of being not having a body. 
To get back to an embodied feeling might take practice, especially if the weight 
and matter have either been forcibly suppressed (as in anorexia) or savagely taken away 
in the trauma of a car accident or in conflict in a war zone. The idea that a person’s sense 
of embodied mass and physicality is important, and that something is skewed with this 
relationship in the traumatic body, feels resonant in someone suffering from an eating 
disorder who can’t bear his or her sense of weight and who wants to get rid of the fleshy, 
physical object hanging below their head. It also feels pertinent for a person having a 
panic attack, who misreads or is confused by a racing heart and chest pains and is unsure 
of how their body should feel, or for a woman scarred by rape and feeling homeless in 
her own flesh. 
As Sanford explains, in Western culture, the drop, release or surrender into the 
energetic, feeling and depth body does not fit with vaunted models of heroism and of 
overcoming. It does not align with the fighting ideal of mind over matter; of trying to 
undo the irrational thoughts of a panic attack or the illogical food-phobia of an eating 
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disorder. Sanford comments that he also ‘duly followed the traditional approach to 
rehabilitation’ and explains, ‘I learned to make my upper torso really strong to overcome 
my body. That’s a metaphor for everything, because you can’t overcome your body’.74 If 
bodies can’t be overcome with theory, cognition or narrative and if matter matters in all 
the above ways, then the question for this section of the chapter starts to move towards 
what happens to the treatment of ‘mental’ dis/order when notions of whole person 
‘mental’ health are re-magnetised back to the body; to the corporeal and the sensate, not 
only the verbal and textual. The question of treatments for embodied distress cannot 
escape or avoid physical connection when the body ‘keeps the score’.75 While the Body 
Systems model of mental (ill) health provides us with a gesture towards a space beyond 
dualism, the techniques and epistemologies of biomedicine remain largely detached 
from seeing either touch or body movement in therapeutic terms. As Barcan identifies, 
touch in Western medicine is largely objectifying, analytical or information-gathering 
(measuring, weighing, palpating) or comes through the distant or virtual touch of 
technology.76 Movement is about exercise, which tends to be researched in terms of 
improved functionality or objective measures to add to the evidence base. Body based 
practices define something other; the possibility of communicating through the flesh and 
through energy, as they uncover the indivisibility of the feelings involved in embodied 
distress. 
 
Social Beings 
As I argued at the start of this chapter, bodywork practice may be thought of as deeply 
individualistic and connected to internalised self-management prescriptions for recovery 
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<http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2011/sep/26/wheelchair-yoga> [accessed 20 July 2017]. 
75 Bessel van der Kolk, The Body Keeps the Score: Brain, Mind, and Body in the Healing of Trauma (Penguin, 
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from ‘mental’ dis/order. However, in many cases, the explorations of Somatics 
practitioners have focused on intentionally externalising objectives, which help to move 
beyond what might otherwise be just further attempts to divide being-bodies from 
contexts and social worlds. I turn here, therefore, to the idea of bodies without limits; to 
consider bodies as social beings rather than individual agents, and to suggest that a truly 
embodied model of mental health is one that takes the energetic and moving matter as 
deeply embedded and interacting with nature-culture. It is useful to once again draw 
back to the work of new materialist feminist scholars who talk in terms of the relational. 
Fullager usefully positions this work in terms of how it contributes to re-thinking 
subjectivity ‘beyond liberal assumptions of a voluntaristic, (ir)rational self by positioning 
agency as distributed and profoundly complicated in relational ontologies, multiple 
forces and complex affects.’77 If agency is affective and affected, the being-body is not 
static or enclosed, but open, moving and shifting, and embodied distress is not only 
about the connection between body, breath and self-awareness, but the air that body 
breathes, and the social climate in which that body is moulded.   
Embodied self-knowledge is connected in Somatics practices with doing ethical 
work. In one example of this, Barcan cites the writing of fascial therapist Thomas W. 
Myers who, in his book, Anatomy Trains, explores the necessity of new modes of 
perception, and of kinaesthetic awareness; what he terms the ‘felt sense’. Myers argues 
that, in order to engage with the wider world and to respond to the social and 
environmental issues of the current century, an attentiveness and embodied knowledge 
is necessary.78 The attentiveness or consciousness of movement is a theme that runs 
through a range of Somatics practices. The underlying philosophy is that it is impossible 
to be flexible or agentic in the world if one is narrowed by physical habituations. The 
link, endorsed by a range of somatic practitioners and performance theorists is one that 
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connects body self-knowledge, self-awareness and undoing the habitual, with making a 
positive socially directed change.  
It is useful here to once again reflect on van der Kolk’s offering of the knowledge 
and practice of performers whose connection with embodied sensation and the depth 
and meaning of movement helps to explore the idea of working through habituated body 
patterns. In order to perform as dancers and actors, a form of knowledge is developed 
that requires conscious attentiveness and learning through the body. Dancers and actors 
who work with their bodies in performance must refine their kinaesthetic sense – their 
coordination with movement.79 In his book Games for Actors and Non-Actors, Brazilian 
theatre director Augusto Boal focuses on how actors can improve their body knowledge 
through exercises to help expand and develop that sense. The rigour and discipline of 
performers’ bodywork deepen the imprint of their practice. Boal argues that the body is 
the most important element of theatre. It is not possible to separate out the body 
because a human being ‘is a unity, an indivisible whole’.80 Furthermore, for Boal, 
bodywork is not simply an internalised tool for professional actors, but all bodies (on 
stage and within the audience) can help affect social and political change. Boal founded 
the Theatre of the Oppressed, with the belief that the impetus for change could come 
from the ‘spect-actors’, who acted simultaneously as participants and audience 
members.81 Boal’s book of exercises or ‘games’ aims to de-habituate bodies that, he 
argues, may become ‘hardened by habit’. He writes that by ‘always carrying out the same 
movements, each person mechanises their body to execute these movements as 
efficiently as possible, thus denying themselves the possibility of original action every 
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time the opportunity arises’.82 Habits need to be de-tuned so that emotion and sensation 
can be tapped into or recognised anew.  
Somatics practitioners similarly focus on the importance of breaking down 
habits. As Thomas Hanna writes, human physicality can become so habitual that it gets 
locked in a form of ‘sensory-motor amnesia’.83 It is a theme approached in the writing of 
Deane Juhan, who, like Thomas Hanna, studied the practical methods of embodiment. 
Juhan also became a leading teacher of the Trager Method, which is a partly hands-on 
and touch-led method of movement.84 Juhan explains that bodywork has an effect, in 
general terms, because of its ability to help people ‘understand their bodies and their 
own sensations from a fresh perspective’.85 The touching involved in some bodywork – 
the physical manipulation or adjustment work – aims to penetrate the reciprocal 
relationship between ‘our habitual behaviour and the chronic conditions of our tissues’.86 
As new movements are made, and new pressures are applied, the idea is that the person 
can see themselves apart from the ingrained habit. 
Ideas around ingrained habits are important for understanding notions of 
embodied mental health because they actively demonstrates how bodies hold on to and 
can be released from certain practices, as well as how new patterns can be accessed. In a 
practical example of this relation, I move here to the Alexander Technique, which 
highlights the interconnections within the whole person and provides a valuable 
practical articulation of what is meant by the health of the whole being-body. F. M. 
Alexander writes in his book, The Use of the Self, about how he came to try to resolve the 
voice-hoarseness he developed when reciting lines in his work as an actor.87 He came to 
understand that ‘the wrong use of the self’ led to ‘muscular tension’ through unconscious 
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habits of ‘mis-use’.88 Alexander argues that this habitual doing and action might 
intuitively ‘feel right’ because it is what a person feels comfortable with, and is used to 
doing, but it actually needs to be ‘consciously inhibited’ to allow the body to move 
dynamically.89 The Alexander Technique suggests that changes can be made to improve 
overall movement and, importantly, that through this improved movement there will 
also be improvements in overall health. The process starts with stopping the habits, 
which are ingrained in the body, and which affect and influence the whole person. 
Understanding habit is important because it shows the integrity of the body and how 
one part of the system affects another. Indeed, Alexander found through ‘practical 
experimentation’ that it was ‘impossible to separate the “mental” and “physical” 
processes in any form of human activity’ and he, therefore, needed a technique to ‘deal 
with the body as a total entity’.90 In one example that develops this idea, Alexander 
writes that when working with people who have a stutter, ‘every stutterer stuttered with 
many other parts of his body, besides his tongue and lips’. The stutter does not begin in 
the mouth, but is connected to a series of habitual movements that sediment throughout 
the body and it is therefore ‘associated with other symptoms of wrong use and 
functioning in other parts of his organism’.91  
The habitual movements and connections of interconnected body parts speak to 
a wider issue of the importance of recognising that humans are interconnected beings in 
their social worlds. When a human ‘organism’ is understood to be a part of the world 
that she/he exists in; pressed upon by the brackets and expectations of gender, race, 
sexuality, or the air that the organism breathes in, or the conditions in which the person 
is housed or works, the idea that ‘mental’ dis/order is an inherent part of the flawed 
individual feels reductive and problematic. Indeed, in this chapter, I have emphasised 
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that understanding what is meant by embodied mental health is not as simple as 
associating physical exercise with individual overcoming of distress. Instead, I have 
orientated to a model based on meaningful movement or depth forms of touch engaging 
with meaningful matter; recognising both the possibilities and limits of embodied 
knowledge and connection. Embodied mental health is about embodied lives; lived and 
deeply imbricated in the world around them.  
 
Conclusions  
At the start of this chapter, I cited the philosopher-dancer Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, 
who, in discussing the corporeal turn suggests the need to attend to movement, which 
may evoke silence. This silence might turn attention to aspects of the world and self that 
are largely ignored in a focus on the masterful ‘mind’ and the narrative self. Van der Kolk 
articulates some similar issues when discussing movement for trauma. He suggests that: 
 
in order to recover, people need to feel free to explore and learn new ways to 
move […] only then can nervous systems reorganise themselves and new patterns 
be found. This can only be done by investigating new ways of moving, breathing 
and engaging, and cannot be accomplished by prescribing specific actions geared 
at fixing. 92  
 
The notion that new forms of movement might be a therapy for trauma (or indeed other 
forms of mental health issues) appears to be at a tangent to the fixing programme of 
cognitive therapy that focuses on identifying and resolving ‘dysfunctional beliefs and 
cognitive errors’.93 Embodied therapy addresses habitual and learnt physical fears, 
anxieties and stresses through touch and movement and breath, and most likely will not 
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be involved in developing or discussing what is rational or irrational, functional or 
‘dysfunctional’, truth or ‘error’. 
It is useful to reflect here again on Alexander’s model, which stretches beyond an 
understanding of the importance of body awareness or connectivity in and for itself, but 
to the way in which illness is diagnosed and treated. There is not a clear dividing line 
between what is a ‘physical’ ailment and what is a ‘mental’ issue because, in Alexander’s 
view, ‘the harmful use of the “psycho-physical mechanisms”’ is present in a range of 
conditions from ‘constipation’ to ‘so-called nervous and mental troubles’. For Alexander, 
all illness has a psycho-physical aspect and indeed when there are not ‘organic’ causes or 
explanations it is usually related to ‘undesirable conditions of use of the self’.94 This is 
not a model of psycho-somatic illness (where psyche causes symptoms in the soma) but 
a whole person view. When it comes to an illness considered as being ‘mental’ in form, 
like anxiety, Alexander uses the same rationale that he would if presented with a 
‘physical’ problem like a hoarse voice. For Alexander, the point is that the person is 
‘unable to make a change within themselves, which they have reasoned out would be a 
desirable change’ and, therefore, the question of whether the approach is applicable to a 
‘mental’ or ‘physical’ aspect is redundant.95 With this view, pointing out that something 
is ‘mental’ and related only to ‘thoughts’ is unhelpful because such a neat box does not 
exist, nor can it be extrapolated from the whole. 
Alexander concludes that all human illness cannot be divided and classified as 
either physical or mental and that the focus in ameliorating or educating needs to be on 
the unity of the human entity. Alexander uses the example of the processes involved in, 
‘lifting an arm, or of walking, talking, going to sleep, starting to learn something, 
thinking out a problem, making a decision’ and argues that these can never be isolated as 
either physical or mental acts.96 This has implications for medical practice, because, as 
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Alexander explains, diagnosis needs to account for this unity, rather than emphasise 
compartmentalisation.  
The aim of this chapter has been to move away from the body as object and body 
as text, to the feeling, lived, active experience of the being-body. The development or 
cultivation of this relationship can only come through a first-person experience of the 
body, as opposed to third person objectification of it. As Carola Speads explains, ‘The 
heart of [the] work [is] the experience of it’.97 However, embodiment is not an 
internalised state that is always controllable by the intending self. Somatics and CAM 
more broadly have been rounded upon by social and cultural theorists for not being 
critical about their approaches, and for using terminologies that can oversimplify the 
accessibility of therapies, ignore the privileges of participation and negate social or 
environmental contexts. Further, ideas about embodiment in Somatics, understood as a 
felt – or kinaesthetic – sense, appear to map and construct internal body spaces and 
feelings, as opposed to broader concerns about how bodies are affected and embodied in 
the world. However, returning to the words of Volker Scheid in his medical humanities 
chapter on Chinese medicine, my aim here has not been to analyse these practices ‘as 
objects of enquiry’ nor to claim that they fully explicate the complexities of mental 
illness, but to use them as ‘resources for thinking critically’ [my emphasis] about ways to 
blur the lines of mind and body and articulate non-dualist ideas 98  
As Alexander reportedly said, ‘any word I use has got barnacles on it […] I really 
need to invent a new language; but if I had, nobody would have understood a word we 
said’.99 The fact that it is difficult to communicate the sense of embodiment, or that 
people may not realise they are living in a ‘disembodied’ way, perhaps points to a wider 
lived sense of bodily possession rather than bodily being (exacerbated by social and 
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cultural emphases on mind over matter) touched upon in the preceding chapters. The 
models of mental life articulated in Chapter One reveal how the body (as the physical 
form of bones, muscle and flesh below the neck) is controlled by the head and brain. The 
structures of contemporary narratives discussed in Chapter Two show how the body is 
kept in this model – words represent and sometimes struggle to connect with the 
intensely physical sensations of ‘mental’ dis/order. The dominating language and 
categories of psychiatry get in the way. If – and when – physical health is linked to 
improved mental health, the overriding message is that it would be a positive thing to 
engage the body in some kind of physical activity because of the close links between 
physical activity and improved mental wellbeing on a series of objective measures 
defined by medical and social science researchers.  
Embodiment has become a paradigm of interest for cognitive science but this 
conversation remains limited by the framework of ‘mental’ health. This can be seen by 
briefly turning back to the paper on psychopathology and disturbances of embodiment, 
where psychiatrists Fuchs and Schlimme suggest that specific types of embodiment 
issues might be present in different diagnoses of ‘mental’ dis/order. They argue that 
schizophrenia and depression affect the integrity of the subject body, whereas anorexia 
or body dysmorphic disorder disturbs body image and awareness.100 Fuchs and Schlimme 
provide an interesting rereading of psychiatric disorders but, ultimately, it is reductive to 
try to fit different problems of embodiment into already defined models of disorders of 
the mind. This is especially troubling when those diagnostic categories are so unstable in 
the first place.  
If the body always remains an object – something to be worked on or overcome – 
a dualist mental health conceptualisation remains inevitable. However, in this chapter, 
the lineages of Somatics and performance, as well as the influence of some forms of 
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Eastern spiritual practices, have shaped alternative understandings of bodies. These 
bodies are not defined by the anatomical dividers of biomedicine, nor are they objects to 
be researched only through the lens of objective third-person approaches. This chapter 
has drawn on a few case examples of practices that connect with the energy of 
movement, which is not a meaningless act, but an expression of the space bodies are 
given, and the memories they carry. Further, I have analysed some therapies for trauma 
working directly with physical matter rather than streams of thoughts carried in 
narrative form. Finally, I have kept to the critical medical humanities’ perspective of this 
thesis, in augmenting the accounts of Fullager and Barcan who have respectively 
approached the worlds of exercise science and complementary and alternative medicine 
with a critical engagement. This chapter thus develops an account of embodied mental 
health invested in the feeling and knowing sense of bodies in the contexts in which they 
develop and live. The chapter has thus directly suggested, and shown ways of 
conceptualising, mental life as deeply imbricated in physical life. On this note, I 
conclude this chapter with the words of Matthew Sanford discussing the work of Mind 
Body Solutions: 
 
I have a very, very simple premise. If I leave the healthcare system, more 
connected to my body rather than less – we can talk for a long time about what 
that means – I’m going to take care of it better over time. That’s what’s going to 
occur. And if I take care of it better over time, I am going to end up back in less 
often, and it’s going to save money for somebody […] one of the things that drives 
the work of my non-profit Mind Body Solutions is how do you teach mind-body 
awareness to me the end user? What does a healthcare system look like that 
makes that one of the things that’s happening?101 
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Sanford’s questions lead me towards the concluding chapter and the implications for 
research and practice in a new model of embodied mental health. 
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Conclusion 
 
Chapter Aim and Summary 
 
If mental health is in our heads, then we had better put our ‘heads together’; so speaks a 
campaign launched in 2016 by the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge and Prince Harry 
aimed at tackling the stigma around mental illness.1 In this thesis, I have asked what is 
meant by the ‘mental’ of ‘mental’ dis/order and whether a focus on heads and brains has 
come at the expense of more physical and socially embodied models. I have considered 
different models, from those centred in an understanding of mental illness in brain 
chemistry and function, to others which conceive of ‘mental’ dis/order as linked to 
metaphysical thoughts, through to concepts of mental health integrated with physical 
health. I have also asked how the evidence that points to the role of whole bodily 
systems in mental wellbeing fits with divided clinical areas of physical and mental 
health. I have unpacked what is at stake in this confusing terrain because how ‘mental’ 
dis/order is ‘languaged’ – and by whom – affects how it is understood, and how it is 
understood informs how it is treated: if it is in the brain, treatment might be via drugs, 
but if it is in inner speech, then targeted talking therapy might be deemed more 
appropriate. However, if it is in the whole person – from head to toe and linked to that 
person’s social and environmental context – then a different vocabulary, understanding 
and clinical approach might be needed.  
In this thesis, I have begun to shape a space for mental health beyond the head; 
developed and sustained in the whole being-body. Indeed, I have argued that by putting 
‘heads together’, a dualist framework and vocabulary remains; one which puts theory and 
thinking in front of practice. In the preceding chapters, I have argued that models that 
split apart mental health in the head, from bodies in the world, are not only confusing 
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but that they undermine – or cut out – both the social and environmental aspects of 
people’s lives, as well as the physical and sensory. In this way, my research is an original 
contribution to knowledge through its critical analysis of the language used in medical 
and policy discourses and personal narratives about ‘mental’ dis/order, as well as its 
development of an embodied model of mental health that breaks out of heads and into 
shifting, affective bodies in constant contact with the world. 
This Conclusion will revisit the warrant for this research and the problems I have 
sought to answer. It will reassess the questions that were posed and the methods used to 
address them. I will consider how the chapters addressed the perceived gaps in research 
and understanding, briefly revisiting how each chapter contributed to the analysis of 
dualistic ‘mental’ health discourses, and some of the alternatives I posed in return. I will 
then move on to consider the meaning and implications of this work, as well as 
addressing the limitations. I will end this Conclusion by returning to the embodied 
model of mental health that I argue is so essential in being able to dispense with dualism 
and take people’s experiences of distress out of narrow, internalised, narrated containers, 
into being-bodies in the world. 
 
Critical Questions 
In this section, I consider why it was important to address the meanings of ‘mental’ 
dis/order and the overall questions that the thesis sought to answer. 
With the oft-cited statistic that one in four people has a mental health problem 
at some time in their lives, and with stark evidence pointing to the growth of these 
issues, particularly in young people, 2 3 there is a sense of critical urgency around mental 
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health. Political and biomedical responses to the problem are growing – in terms of 
promises of increased funding, clinical trials and public awareness campaigns. Mental 
and physical health are increasingly known to impact one another and the issue is 
highlighted in charity lobbying,4 policy initiatives5 and personal testimonies6. However, 
the clinical structure of the NHS – divided into physical and mental areas since its 
conception in 1948 – and the language that supports the divide – continually re-inscribes 
a dualist understanding of divided minds and bodies. Indeed, while there are moves 
towards integrated healthcare and growing developments and focus on systems 
medicine, it is the language and diagnostic tools of psychiatry that shape and give 
meaning to public understanding of ‘mental’ dis/orders. A failure to problematise this 
language means the continual fall back into mind over matter assumptions. These 
expand from an individual level of the mind in the head (as superior or controlling the 
physical, object, unthinking body below), to wider notions of self-contained individuals, 
separated from their social and environmental contexts and implicitly responsible for 
their own internal problems.  
From the outset, this thesis thus posed the questions: How can we offer solutions 
to ‘mental’ dis/order if the meanings and understandings are tangled and torn between 
constantly moving and competing accounts? Where is the room for embodied accounts 
in a psychiatric diagnostic culture, which splits out and categorises through narrative 
means, potentially thereby missing affective, sensate, physical experiences that can’t 
easily be translated into preferred modes of storytelling and rational explanation? As 
articulated in the Introduction, the aims of this thesis were two-fold. First, to conduct a 
general discursive disentangling of the language and narratives of mental health in 
policy, public spaces, and medical and psychiatric literature and, second, to find 
                                                          
4 Mental Health Foundation, ‘Physical Health and Mental Health’, <https://www.mentalhealth.org.uk/a-to-
z/p/physical-health-and-mental-health> [accessed 14 July 2017]. 
5 Strathdee, ‘Integrated Care: 3 Years of Progress and “Jugular” Actions Needed’. 
6 In Reasons to Stay Alive, for example, Matt Haig states that the term ‘mental illness’ is misleading because 
‘it implies all the problems that happen, happen above the neck’ (p.156). 
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appropriate tools and models with which to conceptualise non-dualist ontologies and to 
gesture towards an embodied model of mental (ill) health by breaking down the ‘familiar 
and repeated’ impasse of language.7 
 
A Critical Medical Humanities Framework  
In this section – and drawing back to the Introduction – I discuss how a critical medical 
humanities approach helped me to answer the aims of the study, and how I drew upon 
notions of the transdisciplinary to gather and analyse material from traditionally 
boundaried disciplinary spaces. The concept of the ‘critical’ medical humanities has been 
discussed and interpreted by scholars working in the field in very different ways, but for 
the purposes of this thesis, it had some very specific meanings and has provided some 
clear points of engagement.  
First, I have argued for a critical imperative that the language of ‘mental’ 
dis/order and mind over matter is unpicked and that an embodied account is 
foregrounded. I have continually drawn on evidence showing the size and scale of the 
problem in the UK – often couched in the language of ‘epidemic’,8 the confusing terrain 
of competing accounts and explanations, and the limitations within biomedicine and 
psychiatry to deal with embedded dualist language. 
Second, psychiatry has oft been critiqued, and the areas of critical mental health 
studies and anti-psychiatry, in particular, have emerged to resist the hegemony of 
psychiatric power and the labelling and expanding of disorders – particularly from one 
culture into another, or the wiping out of social problems into personal ones. Indeed, I 
have argued that dominant medical discourses lead public understanding and that the 
scripts that are disseminated about ‘mental’ dis/order shape how experience is 
                                                          
7 Ahmed, Feminist Life, p.9.  
8 Mark Rice-Oxley, ‘Drugs alone won't cure the epidemic of depression. We need strategy’, the Guardian, 3 
July 2017 <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jul/03/drugs-alone-wont-cure-epidemic-
depression-we-need-strategy?CMP=fb_gu> [accessed 14 July 2017]. 
210 
 
 
understood and felt. Medical humanities scholars have drawn on the concept of 
‘biopower’ to show how dominant discourses are ‘crystallised’ in popular media – and 
thus ideas about minds and bodies are built, sustained and reproduced.9 These dominant 
discourses focus on individual overcoming, self-management and personal responsibility 
and inflect public health messaging in the UK. These messages are focused on 
accountability; getting people to manage themselves and ask for help less, so as not to 
drain the publicly-funded health service, and are supported more widely by a neoliberal 
climate, where the body is an object to be done to, with body solutions to be bought for 
improvement or self-betterment. However, these messages put incredible pressures on 
individuals, ‘ghosting’ the powerful social and cultural effects on being-bodies.10 
Third, a critical medical humanities framework has helped towards the insertion 
of the ‘critical’ as a gesture towards policy, and the theorisation of mental health 
underpinning policy. In a debate about mental illness run at the University of Oxford in 
2016 by Mark Brown (editor of One in Four, a national mental health magazine) the 
promotional material for the meeting contended that ‘mental health and mental illness 
are higher on the policy agenda than they have ever been yet, to date, the area has not 
seen the levels of innovation and disruption present in approaches to other social 
challenges’.11 I have returned throughout the thesis to notions of breaking down walls, to 
feminist models of disruption and challenge, to the way in which feminist criticism 
models how academic work can engage with notions of social change beyond the 
academy. Feminism has provided a model of disruptive thinking (especially around the 
value and meaning of bodies in contact with the world), that I have returned to 
throughout, with the aim of disrupting the idea of separated out ‘mental’ health. In this 
                                                          
9 Rail and LaFrance, ‘Confessions of the flesh and biopedagogies’.  
10 Fullager, ‘Diffracting mind-body relations’. 
11 Mark Brown, ‘New Mental Health Mini-hack’, Oxford, 14 April 2016 
<https://marmalade.attending.io/events/new-mental-health-mini-hack> [accessed 20 July 2017]. 
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way, I began the thesis locating my own body and biography for this work, and will 
return to the possible limits of this position later in this Conclusion. 
Finally, being critical in the context of this thesis has also been defined in relation 
to how evidence is conceived and hierarchized. I have suggested that embodied 
methodologies in broad terms might be useful to tap into the felt quality of ‘mental’ 
dis/order when narrative strategies fail, are unhelpful, or – in some cases – toxic. I have 
suggested that there are alternative ways of knowing that are not conceived in terms of 
thinking mind over unruly matter. While I have carried out a narrative analysis within 
this thesis – looking at a range of narratives from newspaper articles, policy and charity 
documents, and memoirs and fictional representations of ‘mental’ dis/order – I have also 
attended to the limits of narrative itself and suggested how it can close down or confine 
experience. I will come back to this when I consider both the limitations of this thesis, as 
well as the possibilities for future research. 
I have positioned my entry into the critical medical humanities as 
transdisciplinary. I have turned to the transdisciplinary and the notion of the trans- 
rather than inter- or multi- disciplinary to break down walls by not focusing on 
either/or: mental or physical, science or humanities, subjects or objects, mind or matter. 
Building on Nicolescu’s notion that transdisciplinarity offers new knowledge that arises 
from the ‘between, across and beyond’ disciplines, I have used this to gather together 
alternative body-mind models from a range of spaces – dance, bodywork, music and 
sound theory, literary texts – trying to read and analyse (in Barad’s term) ‘diffractively’ 
about the possibilities for non-dualist readings of embodied distress.12 I will now turn to 
the work of the individual chapters of this thesis, and how they have started to address 
the questions I set out to explore. 
 
                                                          
12 McGregor, ‘The Nicolescuian and Zurich approaches to transdisciplinarity’. 
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Chapter Contributions 
In Chapter One I mapped different discourses about mental health to perform a 
discursive disentangling of how ‘mental’ dis/order is positioned, understood and 
conceptualised in medical, psychiatric, policy and public health spaces. I drew 
(somewhat fluid) lines around four models of ‘mental’ dis/order that emanated from 
these spaces and considered the implications of these models for individuals looking for 
expert opinion and answers to their distress. In this way, I revealed the multiple and 
often confusing models of ‘mental’ dis/order and how they manipulate everyday 
understanding. I presented in this chapter somewhat of a hierarchy of models – each 
taking more interest (in very different ways) in physical life, and eventually gesturing to 
a systems model playing with the language of embodiment. However, I argued that this 
did not go far enough to dismantle underlying dualism. 
The first model of Immaterial Thoughts places ‘mental’ dis/order in the head, 
closely linked to language and distorted inner speech. Understood in this way, treatment 
– like CBT or mindfulness – targets the conscious mind and the worded thoughts of that 
mind. However, this internalised, thought-into-word model leaves a whole tranche of 
the experience unchartered. The trajectory of the model of ‘mental’ dis/order confined to 
internalised thoughts, whirring heads, problematic inner speech and narration, largely 
disregards the body. It raised an important question about how this dualistic model 
might actually provoke unhealthy behaviours towards that objectified body – barely 
registered as involved in this conceptualisation of subjectivity.  
The second model I explored – the Brain Disorder model - puts psychiatry in 
(much firmer) biological territory. The model also does apparent favours for those with 
diagnosed mental illness. It detaches a person from the responsibility of – or vagaries of – 
having an illness of the mind, and pins the illness to the brain instead. The model has 
obvious advantages: it reduces the slipperiness of the term dis/order (which is removed 
from issues of social flux) and it does not mind too much about the word ‘mental’, which 
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it thinks of as an old-fashioned synonym for the brain. The body is relevant in this model 
because the brain is part of the body, so there is a sense of a real physical ground for 
‘mental’ dis/order. The problem with this model arises when ‘mental’ dis/order is 
equated with internalised brain chemistry alone and physical life is the brain. 
Furthermore, this model sits on some shaky evidential ground. Indeed, the rest of the 
body is merely the receptacle of the brain’s orders, and the concept of embodiment (in 
terms beyond the brain) is often swept aside. 
In this chapter, I explored a third model of Interacting mind and body. I 
analysed how this model was fuelled by linked outcomes between physical and mental 
illness. Herein, the body is understood to express the mental anxiety, depression or 
stress in physical ways – a racing heart, problems sleeping, a sense of heaviness and 
languidness. This model certainly recognises the physical implications of ‘mental’ 
dis/order. Furthermore, it posits the need to better integrate mental and physical health, 
as it accepts that one might affect the other and that people who have poor mental 
health have poor physical health outcomes. The startling statistics that depression is ‘a 
risk factor for mortality […] comparable in strength to smoking’13 and that it is 
‘independently associated with increased cardiovascular morbidity and mortality’14 firmly 
support the adage that there is ‘no health without mental health’.15 However, this model 
does not push hard enough to understand why these links are so powerful or to explore 
why they remain separately described and articulated. The model remains vertically 
shaped. Recovery remains a heroic overcoming and ‘biopedagogies’ about how to live 
                                                          
13 A. Mykletun and others, ‘Levels of Anxiety and Depression as Predictors of Mortality: The HUNT Study’ 
British Journal of Psychiatry 195, 2 (2009) 118-125.  
14 Judith H. Lichtman, ‘Depression and Coronary Heart Disease: Recommendations for Screening, Referral, 
and Treatment: A Science Advisory From the American Heart Association Prevention Committee of the 
Council on Cardiovascular Nursing, Council on Clinical Cardiology, Council on Epidemiology and 
Prevention, and Interdisciplinary Council on Quality of Care and Outcomes Research: Endorsed by the 
American Psychiatric Association’, Circulation, 118, 17 (October 2008) 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1161/CIRCULATIONAHA.108.190769>. 
15 HM Government, ‘No Health Without Mental Health: A Cross-government Mental Health Outcomes 
Strategy for People of all Ages’ (2 Feb 2011) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/138253/dh_124058.pdf> 
[accessed 20 July 2017].  
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well are inserted into public health narratives. This model is also found in some areas of 
complementary, alternative and psychosomatic medicine, where minds affect bodies, 
thought causes illness, and where body symptoms express the contents of the mind 
metaphorically or symbolically. The splits and binaries persist and the internalisation of 
‘mental’ dis/order continues. 
The final model of the chapter – Body Systems – suggests somewhat of a 
progressive move towards the importance of embodiment in human distress. It tends 
towards a more sophisticated and nuanced account of minds and bodies, gesturing 
towards a hierarchical shift away from mind over matter. A range of disciplinary 
perspectives speak to this model, and the transdisciplinary nature of this study emerged 
as valuable in being able to place the (not unproblematic) holism of CAM next to 
cognitive science and theorists of the embodied mind such as Damasio and Varela, and 
biological work into the ‘gut-brain’. These are complex and very different areas, with 
radically different understandings and conflicting interpretations. However, the focus on 
body systems provides an interesting synergy and one that widens the understanding of 
mental life beyond the brain. In the final part of Chapter One, I considered the 
implications of these models, which, on the whole, focus on floating heads above an 
objectified body. I suggested that none of these models focus on what it might mean to 
be a body, rather than possess a body.  
While Chapter One argued that narratives of ‘mental’ dis/order are powerful in 
naming, clustering and segmenting issues of mental (ill) health, in Chapter Two I 
discussed how scholars in the medical humanities have viewed narrative as an essential 
form of communication, as the reclamation of subjective experience against biomedical 
dominance, and as able to clarify, order, control and overcome chaotic experiences. 
Furthermore, that the focus on talking therapies in the clinic has extended into the 
morality of everyday life wherein talking is associated with breaking the mental illness 
stigma. As a result of this important focus on narrative, a question has arisen among 
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medical humanities scholars: what else if not narrative, to communicate the experience 
of mental illness? In this chapter, I troubled this relation, suggesting that personal 
narratives can be subsumed back into master models and discourses, reinforce 
particularised ‘get well’ scripts of illness overcoming, and underline the idea that mind 
can solve unruly matter. Indeed, I also argued that narratives can be damaging in some 
cases, or feel inescapable. However, rather than concede to a totally post- or anti-
narrative position, I felt I needed to consider narrative more carefully, rather than simply 
agreeing that its linear, confining models would be unfit to represent embodied 
subjectivity. Words, after all, come from bodies. As I worked with modernist case studies 
– texts that push the limits and edges of narrative form – I showed the malleability of 
narrative structures and the ability of words to convey the experience of the being-body 
in distress and disorder. Emily Holmes Coleman and Jean Rhys’ novels explored how to 
access a sense of the unruly, marginalised, failing, affective body in words. A close 
reading of these texts showed how sound and music acted as enablers to convey the 
embodied residues of pain and breakdown. Narrative was not so stringent and 
constricting that it foreclosed the expression of the body’s materiality, but a reliance on 
narrative as the only way to access feeling, or to communicate, needed to be challenged. 
Chapter Three turned to sound and music, and to the second aim of the thesis, 
to work with subjectivities that are not based on dualism. I began the chapter thinking 
about how the senses ‘mingle’ with the world, and how sound as vibration helps to cross 
the divide between mind and matter. In order to break down the language of ‘mental’ 
dis/order, I argued that the effect on bodies needs to be foregrounded and, hence, I put 
forward the ‘being-body’ while recognising the difficulty of developing terms that define 
subjective states. I argued that sound is useful because it reveals sensation and 
experience beyond the narrative self through its moving, vibrating energy. Sound theory 
helped to define what it is to ‘be’ a body, rather than subsequent representation. 
However, I reiterated the integrity of language, which is embodied, both in the physical 
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terms of sound and breath, but also (beyond the spoken), what can and cannot be said is 
shaped by the context of the body in the world. I drew back to feminism, and to the idea 
– offered by Sara Ahmed – that feminism starts with bodies made to feel uneasy. The 
sensation of a body in contact with the world shapes that body. This is the process of 
becoming; through the energy it anticipates, and spaces it is offered or refused. I 
developed this idea to reflect how vibrating matter helps to reveal how bodies store 
memories. I drew synergies between sound and affect theory to undo the idea of a 
bounded individual able to contain and manage their ‘mental’ health. Sound foregrounds 
the inarticulate and sensory, which might be hidden by a focus only on verbal and 
textual representation. When sound is understood as energy that imprints, the division 
between mind and matter is closed.  
As I moved on to consider music, the literature revealed just how much the 
intellectual and cognitive academic traditions based on mind/body divides also impacted 
theories of the emotions in music. At every turn, dualistic discourse seemed to confirm 
and collaborate with mind and body divisions. However, voices from within feminist 
criticism, and those engaged with concepts of embodiment, helped me to articulate that 
music is always an embodied discipline – both in playing and listening. A body engaged 
in playing music also tells us something about body memory, which does not start top 
down. Music is useful in supporting the concept of the being-body, as it dissolves 
thresholds and reveals the always becoming of the body – we cannot know what that ‘is’ 
at any moment because it is always changing, unfolding, absorbing, and moving. This 
chapter thus drove forward the thesis by developing the idea that whole being-bodies 
feel, absorb, react, and are involved in knowing; they are immersed in their social and 
environmental contexts, thus outstripping the confining models of ‘mental’ dis/order 
articulated in Chapter One. 
Chapter Four expanded on the work of Chapter Three by developing different 
paradigms of body knowledge. I returned again to feminist new materialism to think 
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about what bodies do, and how embodied matter might contribute to ways of knowing. I 
argued strongly here that embodiment is much more than having a sense of the body, 
but about relations with the world. In this way, I augmented critical literature, which 
discusses how distress is about relationships with the world that cannot be disentangled 
because conditions of being in the world affect bodies. I argued that physicality in 
relation to mental health is much more than just about exercising bodies in enclosed acts 
of self-management – this is not what embodiment means. Indeed, I emphasised instead, 
first of all, embodied feeling and knowing body states, thus revealing the body as an 
essential part of being, rather than just something to dictate and direct from the head-
mind. In order to access these sorts of ideas, I returned to a transdisciplinary perspective 
to bring together dance, bodywork and yoga practice as sites of interest in body 
knowledge and cultivation.  
I argued for the importance of embodied understanding, which can come 
through practice. This is practice, which is not relegated below theory but is physical, 
sensory and knowing. However, there is a point at which embodied practices become 
further instruments of internalised neoliberal ideals of individual responsibility. In this 
chapter, I underlined that bodies are not on even ground; female bodies are denied 
certain movements or space, bodies with different limitations and disabilities do not feel 
or form embodied knowledge in the same sense of muscle or bone. I suggested that an 
energetic understanding of embodiment, explored by writers including Matthew 
Sanford, helped to nurture a much less vertical relation of mind over matter, towards 
bodies as breath and energy. This chapter also turned towards trauma, and to the way in 
which medical divides between physical and mental trauma are undone by the way in 
which ‘the body keeps the score’.16 I used a range of Somatics practices to think through 
this problem, which offered ways of understanding ‘psychological’ trauma as deeply 
imprinted into physical bodies.  
                                                          
16 van der Kolk. 
218 
 
 
The final section of this chapter looked at the importance of social change: of 
working with knowing bodies to undo habits, to find new ways of moving, to work 
through internal connections to help address wider connections with the world. In this 
way, this chapter offered me a connection in itself; to show that embodied mental health 
is not only about the visceral emotional body in cognitive science, or about integrating 
mental and physical comorbidities or fitting classified ‘mental’ dis/orders into different 
types of embodied trouble. Embodied mental health is about moving and being-bodies 
in complex, entangled worlds.  
 
Mapping the Meanings: Mental Health is not all in our Heads 
I now turn towards the meaning of the work outlined in these chapters; to assess how 
this work has addressed the problems the project outlined, and how the work speaks to 
and adds to existing literature about mental health.  
In this thesis, I have conducted an analysis of the language and narratives of 
mental health in policy and public health spaces, which transmit and are reproduced in 
personal narratives – from social media to published memoirs to self-help forums. While 
this has inevitably been partial, I have argued that the powerful medical discourse and 
public health literature shapes public understanding. I have argued that the meanings of 
mental health are constantly being revised, countered and moved between different 
locations, but I have analysed that ‘mental’ dis/order is often drawn back to individual 
brains and dysfunctions, and how this has provided, for many people, a sense of physical 
grounding for distress, which often feels invisible and unreal. However, I have critically 
analysed how this internalisation might stick people to pathological labels from which 
there seems to be little escape, and lead to situations of self-blame and self-
responsibility; ultimately suggesting the intractability of the disordered self. I have found 
that psychiatric labels help provide meaning and give expert shapes for people’s distress, 
but at the same time may close off certain feelings and experiences. This is particularly 
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an issue when narrative is a main method of communication (and therapy) for ‘mental’ 
dis/order. I have confronted this idea by suggesting that narrative is not always possible 
(and in some cases even detrimental) and that it may omit and circumvent the palpable 
sensory and physical feelings that don’t always translate to coherent, rational, ordered 
narrative forms. In this respect, I have built on the anti- or post-narrative positions 
conceived in medical humanities criticism – especially that of Angela Woods. Indeed, I 
have returned throughout the thesis to the challenge of ‘languaging experience’17 
especially when bodies (conceived as physical entities below the head) are degraded, 
unthinking pieces of matter and muscle – as is popularly conceived in the popular adage 
of mind over matter. 
The title of this thesis proposes a new model of embodied mental health. There is 
a wide range of salient literature focusing on embodiment in terms of perception and 
emotion and cognition – from cognitive science to phenomenology to psychology – but I 
have found gaps in what these understandings of embodiment do for the meaning of 
‘mental’ dis/order. I have built upon a body of critical mental health and anti-psychiatry 
literature, which supports the notion that mental health is socially and culturally 
enmeshed, but found much less attention paid to embodied distress in energetic, 
rhythmic, physical and felt-sense aspects. To address this, I have critically engaged with 
Somatics, bodywork and sound and music theory to build an embodied account 
developed from much more of an energetic than anatomical bodily perspective. I have 
found the work of feminist critics like Elizabeth Grosz useful in bringing together the 
many possible layers of embodied experience, and the difficulty of extracting the 
ingredients of embodied life, which includes discourses, materiality, and the body’s 
energies and rhythms and, in this project, I have taken this approach towards the 
implications for understanding what the ‘mental’ might really mean.  
                                                          
17 Sheets-Johnstone, The Corporeal Turn. 
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 I have suggested that an embodied account must include the social and 
environmental. A lot of the literature I have drawn upon has returned to the social 
aspect of people’s lives and how embodied distress cannot be separated from these 
contexts. I have repeatedly returned to the deep problem of the language of the ‘mental’ 
in this regard – wherein mental life is considered to be an individual state – as the 
wording of two new charities set up to address stigma communicates, mental health is in 
our ‘heads’.18 Without either a new language or a new interrogation of the language, 
mental health issues will continue to be defined and confined inside the skull. I 
developed the concept of the being-body to counteract this and to drive forward the 
value of ‘being’ a body in the world, and what this means for how individuals are able (or 
not) to address, attend to, or improve their health states. I continually recognised the 
difficulty of this sort of language, but felt it necessary to stay close to bodies, to 
emphasise being and becoming, even if my terms still were awkward, ‘sweaty’19 and 
covered in ‘barnacles’.20 
In terms of the second aim of this thesis, I have looked at tools and models that 
conceptualise non-dualist ontologies to get past the impasse of language. I took on the 
challenge to use non-dualist models in cultivating alternative subjectivities – for example 
in complementary and alternative medicine or Eastern forms of spiritual practice. 
Following and building on Ruth Barcan’s cultural studies analysis of CAM practices, 
Volker Scheid’s plea to the critical medical humanities to look to frameworks other than 
Western biomedicine, and William Viney’s challenge to the medical humanities to 
intervene more explicitly in ‘ontological questions’, I have explored alternative body 
models based on energetic, vibrational and rhythmic understandings.21 I have reached 
out to practices such as sound and music therapy, bodywork (manual and moving 
                                                          
18 ‘Heads Together’ and ‘HeadCase’.  
19 Ahmed, Feminist Life, p.13. 
20 Alexander cited by Joan Schirle, in, Bone, Breath and Gesture, p.91.  
21 Viney, p.3. 
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therapies of very different kinds) that come into contact with notions of healing and 
embodied distress or traumatic experience. I have suggested that these models usefully 
foreground the notion of practice, communication which is often unspoken, and bodies 
that know and intuit, and how this might be useful not only for understanding or re-
conceptualising embodied distress, but potentially for treating it to0. 
This thesis suggests that mental life is not all in our heads. Indeed, a new 
embodied model of mental health in this thesis does two things. First, it suggests that 
‘mental’ health is profoundly physical, and therefore that these words will remain an 
obstacle unless challenged further. Second, that physical life is not only in the brain, or 
only contained to individual bodies, but is deeply embedded and connected with social, 
cultural and environmental conditions.  
 
Implications: Beyond Mental and Physical Silos 
In this section of the Conclusion, I turn towards the possible implications of this work – 
to address what this study might mean for practice and policy. While this is a PhD thesis 
(and with the limitations, I will come on to explore) I intend to gesture towards these 
areas and suggest lines of possible future activity. 
I began the thesis by discussing how the whole notion of mental health versus 
physical health has been informed by Cartesianism and anatomically-driven Western 
medical practice. While psychiatrists and members of the medical community might 
intuitively know that dualist divisions are unhelpful, they lack both the language and the 
research frameworks within which to unpick these lines, and so constantly return to the 
known segments of mental or physical health when defining and diagnosing. At present, 
the NHS lacks a clear framework or a paradigm within which to situate the growing 
evidence about (what are currently explained as) connections between mental and 
physical health. Indeed, my findings speak to the literature on integrated healthcare but 
trouble the way in which this is expressed.  
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I turn here briefly to two examples to ground this analysis and point to real-life 
settings of clinical practice. First, in some UK NHS Trusts, there are clear initiatives that 
seek to join up care and treatment. This can be seen in King’s Health Partners Academic 
Health Sciences Centre (a collaboration between Guy’s and St Thomas’, King’s College 
Hospital and South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trusts and King’s College 
London) where it is explained: 
 
From screening people for depression in acute outpatient appointments and 
providing psychological support for people with diabetes and other long-term 
conditions, to improving the physical healthcare of people with severe mental 
illness, we are working to improve the outcomes and experience of the care we 
provide.22  
 
While this is an attempt to join up mental and physical healthcare and to recognise the 
inseparability of these domains, my research suggests that this could be taken much 
further, and my particular angle has been to think about how the very language 
separating these areas troubles attempts to make pockets of good practice into a 
common understanding.  
The problem of mental and physical silos can be further seen in clinical practice 
in the TV programme ‘Behind Closed Doors’ on Channel 5. The programme follows life 
inside British GP (primary care) surgeries and in one small example of practice, shows 
the difficulty for clinicians in communicating a health issue that is perceived to cross 
physical and mental categorisation. In one episode, a GP carefully articulates the physical 
reality of a woman’s fibromyalgia watching her language so as not to infer that the 
                                                          
22 King’s Health Partners, ‘Joining up mental and physical health: an introduction to mind and body 
healthcare’, 
<http://www.kingshealthpartners.org/assets/000/000/871/Mind_and_Body_4pg_invert_original.pdf> 
[accessed 14 July 2017] 
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problem is all ‘psychological’ (with the possible negative connotations that might have in 
inferring that the problem is not real) at the same time as suggesting that CBT (with its 
focus on thoughts in the mind) might be a possible therapeutic approach.23 The 
‘syndrome’ cannot be seen on scans and x-rays – its ‘organic’ cause is not known. The 
NHS Choices website offers up ‘an emotionally stressful event’ as a possible cause, as well 
as brain chemicals, implicating ‘low levels of the hormones serotonin, noradrenaline and 
dopamine’. The symptoms equally stretch over traditional mind and body divides 
involving pain, stiffness and dizziness as well as anxiety and depression. A variety of 
health professionals are involved in its treatment from a rheumatologist to a 
psychologist, and a variety of approaches are evidenced to help with symptoms. The 
personal and subjective assessment of what works – the embodied lived experience 
rather than the expert view – remains on the fringes, as the NHS information attests: 
‘There's little scientific evidence that such [alternative] treatments help in the long term. 
However, some people find that certain treatments help them to relax and feel less 
stressed, allowing them to cope with their condition better’.24 The evidence hierarchies 
of healthcare do not trade so much in the sensate business of coping and feeling as the 
scales of symptoms on validated questionnaires. 
I began this project asking how it is possible to offer solutions to ‘mental’ 
dis/order if the meanings and understandings are tangled and torn between constantly 
moving and conflicting accounts. I questioned how embodied distress might be felt and 
taken seriously in a psychiatric diagnostic culture that splits out and categorises through 
narrative means, potentially thereby missing affective, sensate, physical experiences that 
can’t easily be translated into preferred modes of storytelling and rational explanation. 
Reaching back to Anna Davis’ paper on doctors’ sensory involvement in reading and 
                                                          
23 Channel 5, ‘Season 3: Episode 42’, GPs: Behind Closed Doors, 7 August 2016, <https://www.my5.tv/gps-
behind-closed-doors/season-3/episode-42> [accessed 20 July 2017]. 
24 NHS Choices, ‘Fibromyalgia – Treatment’, 1 March 2016 
<http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Fibromyalgia/Pages/Treatment.aspx> [accessed 20 July 2017]. 
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diagnosing bodies, the gap between clinical practice and bodywork practice is perhaps 
not as big as is imagined. However, tactile and embodied medical practices are 
overlooked and seen as somehow relegated to the history of medicine, which is now 
future-focused on technological innovation – touching from a distance – and on 
quantifying bodies and their functions, rather than engaging with subjective – 
sensory, palpable or non-verbal – experiences.25 
This thesis has tried to unpack and then break out of the containers, and to move 
beyond the notion of a vicious circle spinning between physical and mental elements. 
Clinical practice will remain stuck – awkwardly trying to offer up physical solutions to 
mental problems, or unable to clarify to patients the many health problems that do not 
fit into physical and mental boxes – without a paradigm-shift out of containers and 
towards a new language and understanding of the health of the whole being-body. 
Indeed, in a truly embodied model of mental health – as this thesis has gestured towards 
– people’s lives and contexts (from the air quality they breathe, to the histories they 
embody, to ways in which their bodies are (un)acceptable compared to societal ‘norms’, 
to the social context for their lived lives) would all be seen as part of embodied health or 
illness states. A model of embodied mental health would also see a reworking of the 
vocabulary so that irritable bowels, a racing and panicking heart, or tense, stressed 
shoulder pain would not be seen as physical manifestations of separately contained 
mental thoughts (as stress or anxiety filtering from the head down) but forms of the 
stress, anxiety, worry and distress itself. The physical expression of disorder and distress 
is not merely a representation, or a manifestation, or a reflection, or a metaphorical 
rehashing of issues based in the immaterial mind.   
While this thesis has not been focused on analysing mental health policy in 
depth, it has returned to the way in which policy and its iterations in public health 
                                                          
25 Emma Louise Pudge, ‘Self Knowledge through Numbers: The Quantified Self of Eating Disorder Recovery’, 
University of Exeter Advanced Critical Theory Conference, online video recording, YouTube, 6 May 2017 
[accessed 20 July 2017]. 
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messaging continue to (arguably unconsciously) underline dualist notions by addressing 
physical and mental health in separate (financial and organisational) silos. However, this 
does seem to be changing, as from within government and from organisations lobbying 
or campaigning on health, there is a broad move towards joining up mental and physical 
healthcare. The independent charity, The King’s Fund has set out ten top priorities for 
the integration of mental and physical health in what it calls ‘a new frontier for 
integrated care’. The first of these is the incorporation of mental health into public 
health programmes on tobacco, alcohol and obesity. As an associated report by Naylor 
and others explains, ‘Mental health prevention and promotion activities account for less 
than 0.03 per cent of NHS spending on mental health, and the majority of joint strategic 
needs assessments (JSNAs) have little or no coverage of mental health and wellbeing’. 26 
Indeed, this statistic feels stark when placed in the context that mental health issues 
‘represent 23 per cent of the burden of disease in the UK’.27  
As this thesis set out from the Introduction, the big public health issues all have 
mental life implicated in them – smoking, drinking and eating are all issues of the whole 
person and have complex emotional and sociocultural aspects. As is clear from The 
King’s Fund report, the importance of the ‘body’ and physical health for mental health is 
on the rise. However, this still has an objectifying tone and content – focused on 
exercise, quantifying steps, counting calories, measuring body weight, rather than some 
of the much more embodied directions that this thesis has suggested. The crevice 
between the two areas remains; with initiatives simply targeted at reaching across the 
divides, rather than thoroughly integrating them via the person. Health campaigns that 
silo off physical health as a sort of object-thing continue to miss the point. In an example 
of this, information from the charity, Mind, tries to explain why physical wellbeing 
                                                          
26 Naylor and others, ‘Integrating Physical and Mental Health’. 
27 Charlie Cooper, ‘Government is Breaking Pledge on Mental Health Policy, Warns Former Minister’, 
Independent, 28 March 2016 <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/government-is-breaking-pledge-on-
mental-health-policy-warns-former-minister-a6956971.html>. 
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informs mental health: ‘We all know that being physically active is good for our bodies. 
But our physical health and mental health are closely linked – so physical activity can be 
very beneficial for our mental health and wellbeing too’.28 However, the issue is much 
more pervasive; being physically active can be good for the body because the body is not 
a separate thing, but deeply related to the world and, thus, ‘mental’ health runs through 
the whole. The effects of not developing good ‘mental’ health (and not understanding 
what is needed to help foster that), have huge implications for public health generally, as 
I have repeatedly addressed. The effects of poor mental health develop throughout the 
whole person, hence poor mental health is a major risk factor implicated in the 
development of cardiovascular disease, diabetes, chronic lung diseases and a range of 
other conditions. 
If mental health is approached in a ground-up strategy, it must also take account 
of the seeds of good mental health – the foundations that support its development. A 
report by the British Heart Foundation in 2016 reflected on the growing problem of the 
societal move away from physical activity, with only nine per cent of children aged 
between two and four meeting UK guidelines that recommend at least three hours of 
activity a day. In an article on the report published in The Telegraph, it is claimed that 
the effect of the ‘inactivity crisis’ wherein ‘two-year-olds [are] spending increasing 
amounts of time hunched over gadgets, instead of moving about’, ripples through to 
teenage years and adulthood.29 The issue of physical activity in childhood is treated 
within physical health policy strategies, for example within the government’s childhood 
obesity strategy.30 However, the same sort of evidence about the importance of physical 
                                                          
28 Mind, ‘Physical Activity, Sport and Mental Health’, July 2015 <http://www.mind.org.uk/information-
support/tips-for-everyday-living/physical-activity-sport-and-exercise/#.VxXudHpi8uM> [accessed 20 July 
2017]. 
29 Laura Donnelly, ‘“iPad Generation” Means Nine in 10 toddlers Live Couch Potato Lives’, The Telegraph, 20 
January 2016 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/health/news/12108895/iPad-generation-means-nine-in-10-
toddlers-live-couch-potato-lives.html> [accessed 20 July 2017]. 
30 HM Government, Childhood Obesity: A Plan for Action (London: Department of Health, Prime Minister's 
Office, 10 Downing Street, HM Treasury and Cabinet Office, August 2016) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/childhood-obesity-a-plan-for-action> [accessed 20 July 
2017]. 
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activity emerges in mental health reports on the growing problem of ‘mental’ dis/order 
in children and young people.31 Indeed, the obesity ‘crisis’ cannot be solely considered as 
a physical problem.32 The obesity strategy, in which primary schools are called on to 
provide children with at least thirty minutes of physical activity each day, and which asks 
parents to do the same, 33 is based on doing-to the body, rather than teaching children 
about embodied self-awareness. None of the current mainstream models found in 
dominant discourse about mental health and, analysed in Chapter One, go far enough in 
tethering together physical and mental issues into one public health space.  
The implications of a siloed model of mental health are profound; the dishing out 
of separate physical and mental health measures is unlikely to resolve some of the 
biggest health issues that are deeply implicated in the whole person in the world. The 
issue of asking people to take on physical activity and separate out parts of their 
wellbeing harks back to an objectified model of the body, which must be done to and 
acted upon, as opposed to being conceived as integral to selfhood – in many different 
and changing ways. The preceding chapters of this thesis have often returned to issues of 
disembodiment or disconnection with the object body in mind over matter 
constructions. While this thesis is not about the effects of technology on mental health, 
it is a relevant and pressing question that emerges in accounts of ‘mental’ dis/order, and 
fits within a culture where the emphasis is on living in the head, or understanding the 
self as existing within the brain and its attached mind.  
   
                                                          
31 Denis Campbell and Sarah Marsh, Quarter of a million children receiving mental health care in England, 
the Guardian, 3 October 2016 <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/oct/03/quarter-of-a-million-
children-receiving-mental-health-care-in-england> [accessed 14 July 2017]. 
32 Annalijn Conklin, ‘Obesity Crisis is Not Just a Lifestyle Issue’, Gates Cambridge – Blog, 19 August 2014 
<https://www.gatescambridge.org/multimedia/blog/obesity-crisis-not-just-lifestyle-issue> [accessed 20 July 
2017]. 
33 BBC News, ‘Childhood Obesity: Plan Attacked as “Weak” and “Watered down”’, 18 August 2016 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-37108767> [accessed 20 July 2017]. 
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Implications: Embodied Research 
In this section, I turn to the implications of this thesis for research and some suggestions 
about what might be needed next. I turn to two areas here – first in terms of 
methodologies, and second in terms of how the critical medical humanities can 
contribute further to the work that I have begun to explore in this thesis.  
In Chapter Four – Knowing Bodies – I suggested that a re-evaluation of the 
importance of body knowledge, rather than the privileged intellectual ‘mind’, challenges 
the disembodied methodologies used in health research where the researcher’s body is 
only useful for its ‘ears, eyes, and maybe a hand that takes notes’.34 As Somatics 
practitioner, Carola Speads explains, ‘intellectual development, not the development of 
our body sense, is emphasized in our culture’.35 The work of Somatics practitioners, and 
others invested in bodywork practices, provides a vocabulary that can be used to support 
physical experience, as well as theorisation that emanates from that physical work, to 
create knowledge about mental health. The ideas in this chapter are not usually cited in 
academic work for a number of reasons. First, bodywork practitioners teach with their 
bodies, not always with their pens, and hence the specifics of their approaches have often 
not been well documented. Second, ideas about movement or the body are often 
associated with the New Age movement with its very broad-brush approaches to holism, 
which – as I have gestured to in this thesis – have tended to lack ‘quality’ evidence as is 
conceived by the dominant research frameworks, as well as failing to engage with critical 
perspectives. Third – and related to the second point – knowledge gained through the 
body has been regarded as subjective, fallible and emotional, the opposite of rational, 
objective clinical understanding.  
                                                          
34 Anna Lavis, ‘Myrrha: Embodied Emotion, Corporeal Resonance’, The Body and Being Network – 
Reflections, 20 August 2015 <https://bodyandbeingnetwork.org/category/reflections/> [accessed 14 July 
2017]. 
35 Speads, in Bone, Breath and Gesture, (p.44). 
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However, this thesis suggests that further research might be conducted into how 
embodied distress can be researched and how to move beyond the near-mandatory idea 
that narrative ordering or sense-making is essential to externalise or to engage 
cognitively with experience. This thesis has assessed the ways in which narrative (in 
certain contexts) might be damaging, unreliable, or limited, and that embodied 
methodologies need to be further explored. Furthermore, the prejudices and dominance 
of evidence-based medicine that prioritise systematic reviews and randomised controlled 
trials above qualitative evidence, and which positively detach researchers’ own bodies, 
struggle to accept or make room for evidence based in sensation or feeling. Experiential 
evidence is downgraded in healthcare, but this thesis suggests the need to turn to the 
body first, rather than to ideas or theory. Language does not have to be severed in 
embodied methodologies, but it can come afterwards, and it does not hold all the power. 
Indeed, biomedical research keeps the felt-sense of knowing bodies out of research, both 
limiting what kinds of experiences and sensations can be understood, as well as 
perpetuating dualist mind over matter frameworks into the very structure of research 
itself. This thesis argues for the value of embodied methodologies that break down these 
hierarchies of biomedicine and, arguably, in doing so, break down hierarchies of minds 
and bodies.  
For the critical medical humanities, I believe that thesis adds to a body of critical 
work assessing the language and discourse of health and illness. It lays the ground for 
further work analysing public health messaging and policy around the dualism implicit 
in mental health. I return here again to the point made by McNaughton and Carel that 
ethical medical humanities research needs to not only circulate ideas within the field but 
to push towards eventual shifts in policy.36 In this way, the work here suggests that the 
emphasis for treatment would not be so much on re-imprinting the problematic mind 
and body split that is already emphasised in naming and dividing up ‘mental’ health 
                                                          
36 Macnaughton and Carel, ‘Breathing and Breathlessness’. 
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issues but allowing for embodied engagement in physical, proprioceptive ways. Such 
practice might turn to the evidence about the role of yoga37 or exercise38 or to a practical 
framework for phenomenology39 as ways into thinking about embodied mental health.  
As well as engaging with the physical and felt-sense aspects of embodiment, this 
thesis calls for research that deepens questions about how physicality and social context 
might be excluded by presumptions about the boundaries of ‘mental’ health. This 
concept has been discussed in an article entitled, ‘America Is Utterly Failing People of 
Color With Eating Disorders’, which highlights the some of the universalising ways in 
which ‘mental’ dis/orders are addressed, and the problematic assumptions research, 
policy and practice can make about how bodies experience the world:  
 
It’s easy to understand how the tumult of puberty may trigger the onset of an 
eating disorder: The painful awareness of our bodies going through tremendous 
physical and emotional changes is laid out against the backdrop of our culture’s 
unreasonable standards of beauty. But for people of color, queer people, and 
transgender people, eating disorders can be traced to other structural and 
cultural factors that have been in play—quietly, insidiously, even 
unconsciously—for most of their lives.40 
 
The affect and the imprint of these ‘structural and cultural factors’ (prejudice, poverty, 
violence – for example) mean that bodily experiences vary, and the ways in which being-
bodies feel, experience and deal with distress is never simply an individualised or 
                                                          
37 The Minded Institute, ‘Yoga in Healthcare’, <http://themindedinstitute.com/yoga-in-healthcare/> 
[accessed July 2017]. 
38 V. Ravindran and others, ‘Canadian Network for Mood and Anxiety Treatments (CANMAT) 2016 Clinical 
Guidelines for the Management of Adults with Major Depressive Disorder: Section 5. Complementary and 
Alternative Medicine Treatments’, Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 61,9 (2016), 576-87. 
39 Carel, ‘Phenomenology as a resource’. 
40 Angela Garbes, ‘America is Utterly Failing People of Color with Eating Disorders’, Fusion, 5 July 2017 
<http://fusion.kinja.com/how-america-fails-people-of-color-with-eating-disorders-1793858224> [accessed 20 
July 2017]. 
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enclosed decision or ability. With the framework of embodied ‘mental’ health, and the 
concept of the being-body that this thesis offers, it gestures towards and beckons further 
research that practically engages with clinicians and health care professionals in all areas 
of care, to assess their own understandings of mind and body and mental and physical 
health relationships.  
 
Limitations 
As I approach the end of this thesis, it is important to reiterate the limitations of this 
work. First, I think about some of the limitations of the research and then – reflectively – 
about the limitations of my own capacities and location as a researcher.  
This thesis has addressed a broad and ambitious question about how the 
language of mental health supports or articulates dualism, as well as proposing 
alternative frameworks with which to counter this. There are a number of limitations to 
this. First, due to the breadth of material I have covered to engage in a transdisciplinary 
approach to address the multiple areas this question affects, I have had to restrict myself 
to cases and examples, rather than to pursue depth in one particular area. Furthermore, 
in aiming to construct alternative terms with which to think through the problems I 
outlined upfront, I have, at times, engaged with practices or theories that lack robust 
literature or critical mass behind them (for example, different bodywork techniques that 
talk about the capture or lockdown of trauma in the body). While I have suggested 
future connections between esoteric practices and work within systems medicine (for 
example in epigenetics) this is not straightforward; the science behind such fields is 
complex and cannot be dealt with thoroughly in the scope of a humanities’ thesis. 
Indeed, media reports on a systematic review that analysed how mind-body medicine 
interventions changed gene expression and how these molecular changes are related to 
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health41 were critiqued for ‘abusing’ emerging science by making such sweeping 
connections.42 Moreover, mind-body medicine often assumes forms of Cartesianism in 
the first place. To counter these sorts of problems, I have aimed to think through such 
mind-body practices critically and carefully, but recognise my ability to engage in depth 
with these issues is limited by my own sites of expertise. In this way, my own position 
working in health sciences in the NHS and university settings, has informed my 
understandings of healthcare evidence bases and methods, and challenged me to think 
about how a financially-stretched, publicly funded health system can engage with ideas 
and critical theories that seem abstract and distanced from the demands of working 
practice.  
In the Introduction, I also positioned myself as someone invested in mental 
health as a former service user and as the author of an illness narrative. In both these 
capacities, I have approached the problem of ‘mental’ dis/order with my own embodied 
histories. As a former anorexic, I have notions about what may or may not be helpful in 
therapeutic terms. In the process of my initial recovery, I narrated and re-narrated my 
experiences. Towards the end of my own illness narrative memoir, Thin, I write, ‘In her 
story lies her survival’.43 My self-help therapy was narrative in form; the anorexia was 
pushed into a corner, away from what I pieced together as my ‘self’, which I located 
entirely in my mind and within the words in my head. This thesis has been a part of a 
radical shift in this view, and I have aimed to reflect on this throughout the process; 
cautious not to prioritise my own embodied experiences, as I have focused so much on 
the contextual factors that affect individual bodies.  
                                                          
41 Ivana Buric and others, ‘What Is the Molecular Signature of Mind–Body Interventions? A Systematic 
Review of Gene Expression Changes Induced by Meditation and Related Practices’, Frontiers in Immunology, 
16 June 2017 <https://doi.org/10.3389/fimmu.2017.00670>. 
42 David Gorski, ‘Can mind-body practices “reprogram” our DNA?’, Science-Based Medicine, 26 June 2017 
<https://sciencebasedmedicine.org/can-mind-body-practices-change-the-way-our-genes-react-to-stress/> 
[accessed 14 July 2017]. 
43 Grace Bowman, Thin (London: Penguin, 2007). 
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Indeed, as I considered in the Introduction, the term ‘mental’ dis/order covers so 
much, and I have based my reading in small pockets or territories of eating disorders, 
depression, anxiety and trauma. There are huge swathes of experiences that I haven’t 
been able to mention, and there is a gap – even a discomfort – between those who speak 
out as recovered or recovering and those in the depths of severe, critical distress. I 
recognise that this is not easy to reconcile. Although this thesis has focused on the 
language and terminology of ‘mental’ dis/order, it has also come to touch on therapeutic 
suggestions and the arguably positive readings of embodiment, which make cuts in a 
vast landscape of research and understanding. Indeed, as I touched on in the 
Introduction, it is important to remain cognisant that for some people, a dualistic self-
understanding may be beneficial, particularly for those whose bodies don’t fit harsh and 
oppressive ‘normative’ societal expectations.  
 
Final Thoughts 
It has been the aim of this thesis to unpick the dualist threads in different forms of 
discourse around mental health and unpack a model of embodied mental health where 
embodiment is more than a brain or object-body. My research raises a number of 
questions about how mental health and ‘mental’ dis/order are articulated, narrated and 
explained. It demands an urgent reconsideration of what might constitute knowledge 
about mental health, which might extend beyond linear overcoming narrative structures 
to incorporate a fuller felt-sense of embodied experience.   
I have understood that the thinking subject has obscured the embodied subject 
both in terms of knowledge and experience. Furthermore, I have analysed how ‘mental’ 
dis/order has been packaged up within individual mental lives; tied to individual brains 
or misaligned thoughts, with recovery bundled up as an individualised, agentic issue – 
possible to achieve with the power of words, cognitive reflection, or improved physical 
self-management techniques. Social landscapes, embodied histories and felt or sensory 
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experiences are awkwardly fitted into brain functioning. The brain-as-king model has 
some powerful leverage, especially when it links to theories of plasticity wherein 
experiences affect the brain and the brain then responds and adapts. In this 
conceptualisation, the brain is malleable and can change; it is not simply an internalised 
organ but is related to life events and experiences.  
However, with such a brain-dominant model, as Fullager neatly articulates, the 
‘social is a ghostly presence’ with scientific knowledge, ‘that articulates a naturalistic 
ontology of mind-body relation.’44 This thesis has suggested that the dominant dualistic 
ontology is supported and underwritten in dominant medical and political discourses, 
and that – following Foucault – this is not natural, but inscribed over time, and has 
recently become a useful man-made prop for a strained national health service in a 
neoliberal climate. However, while dualism – and mental and physical healthcare 
separation – might be the dominant mode of discourse and practice, there are a number 
of insurgencies. Indeed, there are numerous pieces of research and pockets of practice 
that already embrace an idea of ‘embodied mental health’ in some shape or another. As I 
have been much more focused on language and its meanings and its implications, I have 
not reviewed these in detail, but it is important to state that these practices exist both in 
the UK and globally, and an evidence base is growing, for example, the work of 
‘integrative psychiatry’, which talks about treating the whole person; to changes in 
national guidelines (in Canada) for psychiatrists to recommend exercise as a ‘first-line 
treatment for mild to moderate depression’ and as a second-line treatment for more 
                                                          
44 Fullager, ‘Diffracting mind-body relations’. 
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severe cases;45 to research into the effects of poor nutrition and air quality on mental 
health problems.4647  
A 2015 survey by the Wellcome Trust showed that mental health is one of the top 
medical issues in which the UK public are interested.48 Mental health memoirs have 
become number one bestsellers and there is an almost daily barrage of press reports, 
personal stories, healthcare innovations and policies focused on providing mental health 
with an equal footing with physical health and determined to validate the experience of 
sufferers to end stigmatisation. However, the parameters of what mental health is, and 
what it means, continually shift. The landscape is confusing and the result arguably 
stigmatising. How is it possible to determine the experience and meaning of mental 
health if its form keeps shifting: if one moment, it is a chemical problem about serotonin 
levels, and the next minute it is couched as a disease of thoughts, if it is not physical 
health, but it is linked to physical health, or if it is mended by a myriad of solutions 
targeting bits of minds, brains, emotions and body parts one by one? Psychiatric and 
medical interactions names people’s disorders and provide powerful expert labels that 
lead and structure public understanding. Health policies and public health messages 
focus on specific health issues and increasingly focus on the power of agentic individuals 
to deal with their own health problems and take responsibility without an engagement 
with the context of individual lives. Anatomically driven healthcare departments and 
specialists divide individuals into separated parts. A history of mind over matter 
thinking, and mind over body dominance has reduced body matter to functional and 
object-like status. While medical practitioners and policy makers seem to increasingly 
                                                          
45 Ravindran and others. 
46 John Frank, ‘Finding the Right Ingredients: Improving Mental Health and Wellbeing through Food-
centred Activities’, University of Edinburgh – Edinburgh Research Explorer, 
<http://www.research.ed.ac.uk/portal/en/projects/finding-the-right-ingredients-improving-mental-health-
and-wellbeing-through-foodcentred-activities (1a5cf536-c40a-443c-809b-678eaa3022cf).html> [accessed 20 
July 2017]. 
47 Yale School of Public Health, ‘Bad Air Contributing to Poor Mental Health and Being Unhappy, Study 
Finds’, 24 April 2017, <https://publichealth.yale.edu/news/article.aspx?id=14877> [accessed 14 July 2017]. 
48 Ipsos Mori, ‘Wellcome Trust Monitor, Wave 3’, (London: Wellcome Trust, 2016) 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.3145744>.  
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ascribe to the limits of Cartesian thinking – with integrated care, and mental and 
physical connections driving new research – language is so powerful that it holds back 
these moves as the binaries persist and pulse below the surface. While the National 
Clinical Director for Mental Health feels that England can ‘dump Descartes’49 this thesis 
suggests that it is only when embodied distress is given context, is directly addressed in 
research and practice, and a language underpins this structurally, that the meaning of 
‘mental’ health will have the depth and context it requires.  
 
                                                          
49 Strathdee, ‘Integrated Care: 3 years of Progress and “Jugular” Actions Needed’. 
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